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ABSTRACT
Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for 
ethics in government and in social life reflects a need 
which has not been met. What distinguishes man as a 
rational and creative human being are his moral, abstract, 
artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas. In many 
instances, such ideas have been declared as meaningless 
by the 'reasoning' of the natural sciences.
This thesis will develop a modern paradigm that 
will synthesize subjective values coming from the 'faith' 
side of rational beings with the objective values obtained 
from their objective (abstract reasoning) side of 
themselves.
The paradigm will be illustrated by applying it to 
the Clark County's Health District Hospice Program for 
terminal cancer patients and their survivors. A typical 
case will show the paradigm's practicality for aiding 
persons to meaningfully participate in the solution and 
management of significant problems found in their every 
day lives.
Advisor Craig Walton, Ph. D.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
SECTION ONE 
PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis to present a modern 
paradigm in which reason and faith can supplement each 
other for solving metaphysical issues and for applying 
those solutions to particular issues concerning ethical 
choices. The word 'faith' is defined as one's assumption 
that all the basic assumptions of his/her 'world view' are 
true. The term 'world view', as used in this presentation, 
is defined as the sum total of all the basic assumptions a 
person has concerning both the physical world and the 
metaphysical world. The term 'reason', unless designated 
otherwise, will be defined in the classical sense. (See 
chapter two for a detailed definition.)
Today, modern man is uneasy. The current outcry for 
ethics in government and in social life reflects a need 
which has not been met by the expertise of current 
sciences and technologies. What distinguishes Man as a 
rational and creative human being certainly includes his 
moral, abstract, artistic, creative, and spiritual ideas. 
Nevertheless, such ideas and the values based upon them 
have, in many instances, been declared meaningless by 
'reasoning' as understood by those scientists who are 
positivistic when dealing with metaphysical issues; they 
see no reality in God, human freedom, or immortality.
2Therefore, this paradigm will be offered for 
consideration primarily to those modern persons whose 
current world views have led them to believe there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between their spiritual selves 
('faith') and their rational selves ('reason'). However, 
many of the concepts and premises proposed can be of 
ethical value to those persons who do not affirm belief 
in a supernatural, spiritual God.
The recent explosions of scientific technology and 
exchanges among associated scientific professions have 
given mankind much new information about the natural 
world. Recent publications are now presenting up-to-date, 
flexible, logical, and practical unifying paradigms in 
fields such as nuclear physics, evolution, and psychology.
This thesis will consolidate relevant material 
from these areas as well as material from social science 
areas and from the latest developments in theology. These 
concepts will be related to and correlated with older 
premises to derive a proposed modern unified ethical 
paradigm. It is designed for all persons who are aware 
they possess a finite autonomy and are willing to 
exercise it in situations that come up in their daily 
activities.
SECTION TWO 
REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN 'REASON' AND 'FAITH'
IN THE 2 0TH CENTURY
The conflict between reason and faith is not a 
recent development. Through the first third of this 
century, religious philosophers, such as Lev Shestov,
found no solution to the dilemma. However, from the 194 0s 
onward, developments in natural science (and new basic 
premises upon which modern science in general is based) 
have made possible tremendous advances in technology. They 
have also made possible reasoned alternative world views. 
Such an alternative is that in which reason and faith can 
be found to supplement each other in the realm of 
metaphysical issues.
Unfortunately, it has been only recently that the 
methodologies of the natural sciences have been recognized 
not to be the only methodologies applicable to the social 
sciences. The exactness needed for prediction and control 
in the physical world calls for as much objectivity as 
possible. However, relationships between objective facts 
and values (moral weights given to different solutions to 
problems concerning human beings and their relationships 
to each other) are vitally interrelated and must be 
correlated to a much higher degree than found in the field 
of natural sciences. These personal relationships need to 
be critically examined. Representative models can then be 
designed and utilized in the making of individual, as well 
as communal, policy decisions.
"Scientific positivism," as it will be used in this
thesis, is defined by Peter Angeles's Dictionary of
Philosophy as:
1. Acceptance of the "Verifiability Principle," which 
holds that a statement is meaningful if and only if it 
is empirically verified by sensory experience; 2. If 
necessary, tenet (1) can be modified to say that a 
statement is meaningful if and only if it is at least 
in principle empirically verifiable; 3. All statements 
in mathematics and logic are necessarily analytic
4(tautologies) and true by definition. Such concepts 
are not presuppositionally verified but are 
definitional conventions applied to reality;
4. Scientific method is the only source of correct 
knowledge of reality; 5. Metaphysical and ethical, 
religious, esthetic, and political statements are 
meaningless because they are not scientifically 
verifiable. Therefore, there is no way to 
appeal their truth to experience— "pure being has 
no characteristics". (1)
The reader should not assume that positivistic 
views of technical science are now obsolete in today's 
social sciences. Rosemarie Tong's book, Ethics in Policy 
Analysis, written in 1986, points out that the 
'fact versus value' problem is still with us. She found 
that, until very recently, many social scientists tried 
adamantly to make their models strictly dependent upon 
objective facts. The counterparts, value and 
subjectivity, were conspicuous by their absence. (2)
The underlying hypothesis throughout this thesis is 
that reason in its totality (of which technical reason is 
only a part) supplements faith in its search for more 
knowledge. (See chapter two for a short discussion of 
reason in its totality [called classical reason, or 
Logos].)
Readers may or may not be aware that many 
scientists in the natural sciences abandoned the 
positivistic world view around 1938. The 'Verification 
Principle' and the "sense-data" theory were dropped in 
favor of the 'Falsification Principle' and a working 
hypothesis known as the 'Statistical Method'. This 
shift emphasized counter-evidence, probability, or 
comparative judgments rather than categorical ones.
However, most of the value-oriented sciences, such as 
psychology, the social sciences, the political sciences, 
and even some branches of philosophy, have failed or have 
been slower to make this shift.
The phenomenal success of the natural sciences 
in the twentieth century enabled mankind to assume greater 
control of, and make more accurate predictions of, natural 
phenomena. Such success again renewed faith in the ancient 
concept that if Man had enough knowledge, he would 
automatically do the right (moral) things for himself and 
his fellow man.
However, the cruel and savage acts of Man against 
his fellow men in World Wars I and II (and since) have 
destroyed the illusion that human reason and knowledge 
would bring peace and harmony to those who possessed such 
knowledge.
This conviction that human reason and knowledge 
alone would bring peace and harmony was in essence the 
world view that Lev Shestov fought against with the 
weapons available to him during the early part of this 
century.
A brilliant religious philosopher, Shestov 
revolted against such a pre-determined world view that 
tried to take away from Man his inclination to a belief in 
God, and to the belief in freedom given to mankind by the 
Creator of the universe. Shestov therefore speaks for many 
in his time whose world view included a God who endowed 
man with creative power and freedom as well as reason.
My interpretation and critique of Shestov1s fight (see
chapter two) will be updated by material from both sides 
of the issue in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Theoretical answers to the problems encountered by 
modern man in his daily existence are not practical or 
meaningful to him. In almost all areas of life, the facts, 
methods, etc., which a person will accept most readily are 
those which enable his life experiences to have more 
practicality and meaning.
Out of man's daily situations arise the problems 
and the questions to which natural science, philosophy', 
the arts, the social sciences, and religion attempt to 
give satisfactory answers. These disciplines and 
institutions also give methods, tools, etc., that persons 
can select and utilize to achieve their own answers.
Theological aspects of this thesis will be 
presented in light of the everyday situations we 
encounter. The term 'existential1, as used in this 
thesis, will describe any philosophy that centers its 
analysis upon the reality of an individual who is 
subjectively conscious of his own failures, successes, 
hopes, and crises. The relationship of this individual 
self to the objective reality of the existing external 
world in which he lives is also part of the analysis.
This philosophy develops questions engendered by 
our existence on earth. Answers to such questions can be 
developed out of both atheistic and theistic world views. 
Further details about theistic answers will be developed 
in Tillich's theology (see chapter six).
We can now see how important a person's overall
7world view of reality becomes. The pure idealistic view 
(essentialism) is that the essential structure of our 
being is providentially actualized in the history of man. 
This view is opposed by those who believe the estrangement 
and conflicts found in human existence are not reconciled 
in the individual, in society, or in life in general.
Shestov and other later faith proponents have 
included in their personal world views a belief in and a 
free acceptance of a personal supernatural God. This is a 
God who has given His created human beings the gift of 
limited finite freedom and immortality of spirit. This 
move combines some of the strengths of the existentialist 
view with some of the views of essentialism.
In essentialism, the die is cast— but for each 
modern rational human being, the existential and 
ontological questions still remain. What am I? Why am 
I? What is my purpose and meaning in life? Is there a 
physical life only? Is there a continuation of my
essential and spiritual self after physical death? Why
is there something? Why not nothing? Are we partially
free and responsible to both decide and act upon
moralistic decisions vital to our meaning and purpose in 
life? The unresolved tensions between these two views are 
palpable to many.
This thesis will show that modern scientific 
technology (which has been used so successfully to control 
and predict the natural environment) cannot intentionally 
(or even unintentionally) destroy or negate Man's need for 
a self-realization of freedom. Therefore, a new paradigm
is needed to correlate and correct those other unresolved 
tensions.
The search for freedom and meaning includes the 
following process of deliberation. Individually chosen 
actions based on a given world view are considered. 
Possible actions flowing from alternative world views are 
visualized, and the results are causally predicted. A 
mental comparison of results obtained then indicates which 
view would be most effective in achieving the results 
desired. Reflective reasoning will also show that 
individual autonomy is compromised if irrational 
inclinations (Kl), or unreasonable premises issued by 
external 'authoritative edicts', are allowed to be the 
final authority upon which the individual bases his 
subsequent actions. To be authentic, these authorities 
must at least be consciously seconded by the moral agent. 
Such a deliberative process is equally valid when used 
to formulate actions to be taken to accomplish goals 
originating from spiritual world views (K3) as well as 
from the natural scientific world views (K2). (Kl), (K2),
and (K3) are symbols designating three different modes of 
knowledge. More explicit explanations will be given in the 
next section of this chapter (section three).
Numerous examples will be given to illustrate that 
rational moral actions can be corroborated by reasonable 
and testable means other than the objective demonstrable 
and corroborative techniques used mainly by technical 
sciences.
These other ways of corroboration justify the
inclusion of universally valid moral premises in an 
individual's total rational input towards obtaining and 
updating flexible solutions of daily problems. Such 
solutions have the greatest probability of easing those 
tensions created by rapidly changing conditions in the 
world and in one's personal life.
Analysis of modern world view points show that 
technological advances have not eliminated the striving 
for meanings, purposes, and goals sought by intelligent 
human beings. Many human beings are still willing to 
consider, deliberate upon, and then risk acting on 
moral and ethical (but still logically reasonable) 
hypotheses about themselves and the universe.
To logically show the soundness of the above 
arguments, we can now proceed to the means and methods 
for establishing our final paradigm. This paradigm is 
based upon the world view that an Absolute Spiritual 
Intelligence created the world and designed it to evolve 
towards an ultimate goal. This goal is one in which each 
singular entity will be in unity and harmony with all 
other entities in that universe.
SECTION THREE 
METHODS AND PREMISES UTILIZED IN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINAL PARADIGM
The primary basic premises, the methods, and the
means by which this thesis will establish its synthesized
paradigm are as follows:
A. The scientific method, as a primary means of
obtaining conceptual knowledge about reality, will
be a common factor in the following three modes
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of knowledge indicated in premise (2) below;
(2) All knowledge available to mankind can be 
subsumed under one of the following three modes of 
knowledge described by St. Bonaventure in the 
thirteenth century:
a. "Sensibilia" (knowledge obtained by sense 
observation, or the "eye" of the flesh). This 
mode will be identified by the symbol (Kl).
It is a subjective self-knowledge obtained by 
the self's sensing, imagining, and perceptions 
of sensory experience.
b. The "eye" of reason, or the "eye" of 
"intelligibilia." (This knowledge is otherwise 
known as conceptual knowledge, a knowledge 
based on empirical information as well as a 
priori concepts.) This nomenal mode will be 
subsequently represented by the symbol (K2) .
c. The "eye" of spiritual contemplation, or 
"transcendelia". This mode of knowledge will 
be the means used to reconcile (or at least 
establish the possibility of) a working 
relationship between 'faith' (Kl) and 'reason' 
(K2). (3) This mode will be identified by 
the symbol (K3).
B. The scientific community seeks to classify, 
differentiate, contrast, abstract, and categorize 
specific objects. All objects falling into a given 
category are to be understood by means of concepts 
and the interrelations between combinations of
these generalizations. On such a basis, decisions 
are made in the realm of the natural world to 
predict, control, and even change natural objects 
and their relationships to each other. Consistent 
or predominant substantiation of these sensory 
objective experiments results in the establishment 
of laws for natural science procedures. Errors and 
counter-evidence lead to revision or replacement of 
these generalities or concepts. Later parts of this 
thesis will show the need to maintain such an 
orderly method in all three modes of knowledge,
(Kl), (K2), and (K3).
C. To facilitate (in the manner of mathematical 
symbols x, y, z, etc., and their relationships to 
each other) the application of the scientific 
method in short symbolic form, I have chosen to 
describe the scientific method to the reader as a 
digging process. I will assign the sentence, "D(l)
= Dig," to represent part of the process. Then I 
will use the sentence "D(2) = Deliberate," to 
represent the conceptual way of processing 
universals involved in the problem to be solved.
The final decision as to which alternative 
(putative) generalization to use to solve a given 
problem (in terms of practicality, efficiency, 
value, etc.,) will be represented in the rest of 
this thesis by the sentence, "D(3) = Decide." The 
execution of the selected method of solution will 
then be represented by the sentence, " D(4) = Do,"
(carry out actions necessary to achieve a viable 
solution to the problem). The method of testing and 
finding potential or actual errors via feedback 
will be represented by the sentence, "D(5) = 
Debug." Therefore, any utilization of the 
scientific method to justify premises (and/or 
substantiations of them) in support of the thesis's 
final paradigm will be accomplished by the symbolic 
use of the five D's. They will stand for the 
methodology of: (1) Digging; (2) Deliberating; (3)
Deciding; (4) Doing; and (5) Debugging.
D. Utilization of the five D's provides us with a 
common ground and means by which each of the three 
modes of knowledge (a, b, and c of (2) on page 10) 
can be corroborated. This practical substantiation 
is as rationally sound for modes of knowledge 
concerning autonomous human beings as demonstrable 
empirical corroboration is sound in the world of 
'natural science.' It will be shown that the only 
difference in the application of the scientific 
method to all three modes of knowledge is in step 
five ("D5" = "Debug"). This D5 includes the 
further steps of substantiating one's final results 
by checking them against standards set by the given 
communal group. This group consists of those 
persons trained in using group-established standard 
procedures to bring about the goals desired.
E. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's famous theory 
of the "Identity of the Opposites" can be shown to
be a rationally sound assumption that explains many 
of the past contradictory problems of physics. 
Excerpts from recent books (1990,1992) detailing 
the latest advances in astronomy and in the areas 
of nuclear and quantum physics will be presented to 
corroborate Hegel's dialectical method in general. 
Such corroboration, in my opinion, lends additional 
justification for using Hegel's 'Notion' or 
'Identity of Opposites' to reconcile 'faith' and 
'reason' on a common, universal ground. Hegel's 
'Notion' is explained in chapter four. The 
explanation given has been taken from W. T. Stace's 
book The Philosophy of Hegel. (4) (Excerpts from 
recent publications on Hegel will be included in 
chapter four to indicate that the basic concept 
explicated by Hegel's 'Notion' is not significantly 
different from that in Stace's explanation.)
F. This thesis will also incorporate certain 
aspects of Paul Tillich's "Method of Correlation" 
that illustrate the necessity to relate the 
contents of the theological message to the daily 
situations of life. This will be accomplished 
through the use of analogies between concrete 
experiences and universals.
These universals relate to what Tillich calls 
subjects of 'ultimate concern'. This latter term 
will be defined and elaborated in chapter six. (5) 
To supplement the above methods and premises, every 
effort will be made to have as few preconceptions
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and presuppositions in the analyses as possible. My
purpose is also to recognize any presuppositions
that are unavoidable, and to state their possible
effect on the interpretations given. A final
comment introducing an additional factor in any
analysis concerning vital moral concern is
expressed by Ian E. Thompson. In his 1981 book,
Being and Meaning, Thompson gives us an additional
insight as to the problems involved when attempting
to interpret styles of creative personalities (such
as Paul Tillich's.) Thompson's book is a study of
Tillich's theory of meaning, truth, and logic.
Thompson tells us:
It is an art as much as a science to "read 
styles", and it requires religious intuition, 
on the basis of ultimate concern, to look into 
the depth of a style, to penetrate to the level 
where an ultimate concern exercises its driving 
power. (6)
SECTION FOUR 
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD UTILIZED 
IN ALL THREE MODES OF 
RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The evaluations used in this thesis will be
individually 'zero beat' against the ideas and concepts
of various authors (and my own critically considered
assumptions and beliefs). The term 'Zero Beat' is
described as follows: It is a term which comes from a
calibration procedure during which radio transmitters and
radio receivers can be tuned to almost exactly the same
frequency. When a transmitter, calibrated by a crystal
(accurate to the highest degree possible) sends a given
15
signal, such as 14.2 thousand cycles per second, the 
receivers are also tuned to receive the same frequency. 
When the receiving station's meter reading of the 
frequency is off the sending station's signal by even a 
few hundred cycles per second, an audible intermediate 
frequency will be heard by the receiving station 
personnel. The further off the signal is off frequency, 
the higher the pitch will be until the signal frequency 
passes beyond the 16,000 to 18,000 cycles per second that 
the human ear can detect.
The pitch of the audible sound is used to bring 
both transmitter and the receivers into exact attunement. 
This is accomplished by adjustment of the receiving 
station's tuning dial to read 14.2 thousand cycles 
per second at the point where the intermediate frequency 
(or difference between the dial reading and the 
transmitted signal) has decreased in pitch and frequency 
until no audible sound is now heard. When this is done, 
both stations are on exactly (for all practical purposes) 
the same frequency, or at 'zero beat'.
It is my conviction that (as a visual and audio 
analogy) the term 'zero beat' may give a better insight 
as to Hegel's 'Notion' which plays a key part in this 
thesis. (The reader is asked again to refer to chapter 
four on Hegel for detailed explanations concerning terms 
such as the 'second moment' and the 'third moment. ')
In addition, evaluations used will be individually 'zero 
beat' against the ideas and concepts of various authors, 
by my own critically considered assumptions and beliefs,
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and against the communal standards of the given mode of 
knowledge being used. Communal standards are defined as 
those standards, agreed upon by the consensus of trained 
peers in that particular mode of knowledge, to be used as 
a means of corroborating conclusions and final solutions.
We can make use of this analogy from radio 
communication techniques to visualize part of Hegel's 
'Notion' by stating that individual actions (called 
particulars) may be taken to lead to results that may be 
compared to the experience of others going through the 
same actions. All transmitting and receiving stations 
(except the station designated as the base station) are 
the 'particulars' which, by 'zero beating,' reconcile 
their respective differences (as 'others'). They are now 
integral parts of a basic undifferentiated frequency 
transmitting and receiving system.
Thus, in the Hegelian 'Notion', all particulars 
that are apparently opposite (different) from their basic 
unity ('second moment' of his 'Notion') eventually come 
together in a common ground with the basic source. This 
transition from opposition to unity or identity is 
accomplished in Hegel's 'third moment,' called 
'reflective reasoning'. Through this process, particular 
thoughts (like individual receiving and transmitting 
stations) continue to be individual thoughts while yet 
being joined in their commonality (as with the 14.2 
thousand cycles per second) to a common source. This 
source is the original source of the frequency received 
through 'reflective reasoning' for 'zero beating' to the
17
original source of being. When this is done, there is 
now identity or unity with the original source.
Now, all (the original transmitting station and all 
of the individual receiving stations) can be said to be on 
the same frequency or, in Hegelian terminology, the 
'Identity of the opposites' can be recognized as 
particulars in unity with the universal.
Science does the above process well when finite, 
non-free natural world objects follow pre-established laws 
or patterns essentially based on the principle of cause 
and effect or correlation. When such laws are followed, 
demonstrable results can be and are corroborated 
independently by all users, who thereby constitute a 
community to support each other by achieving approximately 
the same results from each of their individual efforts.
The 'zero beat' analogy presented here is, I hope, 
a helpful means by which a reader not totally familiar 
with Hegel's technical explanations of his 'Notion' can 
visualize a practical application of the principle of a 
communal consensus concerning the common experience of a 
group of individuals. These individuals have followed a 
commonly accepted and trained line of actions (using the 
five D's in the specific area of concern to achieve a 
common goal). Blind acceptance of 'authority' (or training 
methods by others) should be avoided by each individual 
seeking to become a member of this peer group ('unity').
To make the training methods and techniques of the 
group become a part of one's own personal belief, it is 
necessary to achieve the illumination of the 'eye of
reason' as proposed by St. Bonaventure. One does this by 
reflection upon the first two steps of the five D's 
(Dig, and Deliberate) while judging the lines of action to 
follow by which the goal desired may be achieved. Then, an 
individual's critical reasoning used during these steps 
should be literally grasped by intuitive insight that 
these actions are the right ones for him/her also.
(Refer back again to Ian Thompson's remarks about the 
part religious intuition plays to arrive at what Hegel 
calls 'reflective reasoning,' and to arrive at what St. 
Bonaventure attributes to the 'eye' of trans-rational 
reason, or [K3].)
Individual results of actions decided upon and 
acted upon in the above manner should then be and can be 
consistently verified by comparing ('zero beating') the 
individual results with standards previously determined 
by group consensus. If not too far off the standard, then 
one can reasonably assume that the individual experiences 
achieved have been properly verified as conforming to the 
accepted and valid standard for that mode of knowledge. 
Should an individual corroboration be too far off from 
the communal standard, then rechecking and finding the 
errors causing unacceptable deviations can be corrected.
It may be, in special cases, that an individual's 
experience (in modes of supra-rational knowledge) will 
such that the new input will be tried by other communal 
members. The communal standards could then be modified 
according to the changed dynamics encountered. It is 
assumed that the original standard adhered to by the peer
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group was not predetermined, but selected in a mutual 
interchange among all participants (all as free receiving 
and free sending agents). After mutual agreement, that 
standard could be said to be the locally selected station 
to act as the net control station (until changed by the 
mutual consent of the participating stations).
SECTION FIVE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We can summarize the results of section three on 
the scientific methods found within the 5 D's by saying 
that any mode of knowledge must be corroborated by the 
experiences of others in order to be considered as the 
most probabilistic correct knowledge at that given time 
and in those circumstances.
The explanations and analogies in sections three 
and four have been presented at length because their 
significance to the syntheses and conclusions drawn from 
them is so great. One such significant factor is that they 
serve as necessary means to focus our critical reasoning 
powers on one of the chief problems of the past. This 
problem concerns the development of procedures and their 
use to substantiate the consolidation of reason under 
one of the three generally accepted modes of knowledge.
The success of working with finite and generally 
non-free objects and their interactions has led to 
empirical science's past assumption that sensory 
experience (stripped as much as possible from subjective 
bias and pre-conceptions) is the only acceptable form for 
rational corroboration concerning any mode of knowledge.
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It is therefore necessary to show the primary reason why 
other modes of knowledge, (Kl) and (K3), have so long been 
considered by empirical sciences as not being rationally 
justified knowledge. That sort of thinking in the past led 
to the dictum, "All knowledge is conceptual knowledge".
Today, what is the primary reason that some natural 
scientists use to deny substantiation of any mode of 
knowledge which includes subjective value factors? It 
certainly is not that the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge 
are being achieved by unscientific methodologies to arrive 
at their 'value1 types of knowledge. Science's past 
rejection (and much of its current rejection) has largely 
been based on its insistence on observing specific and 
non-deviant rules for obtaining the corroborative evidence 
necessary to justify highly probabilistic solutions. All 
(K2) modes of knowledge need virtual certainty or 
knowledge that is 'exact enough' to meet all practical 
requirements of it. Other modes of knowledge have been 
denied meaningfulness and usefulness in their 
respective areas on the basis of their introducing 
corroborative (subjective 'values'). These values are 
not nearly as applicable to the empirical sciences (K2) 
as they have been found to be when operating within the 
(Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge.
This author believes that the evidence given so 
far is sufficient enough to show that the past empirical 
science's curtailment of other means of corroboration 
utilized by the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge (in 
conjunction with the corroborative techniques of empirical
science) was unjustifiable.
The same scientific method used to achieve the 
uniform results of the empirical sciences will be shown 
to be necessary to insure and corroborate commensurate 
results in the (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge as 
presented in this thesis. The scientific method (five 
D's) will be used in all aspects, including the practical 
everyday utilization of our final paradigm. However, the 
means of practical and experiential substantiation will 
not be restricted to (nor be the same as) the objective 
sensory corroboration which has had such great success in 
substantiating the results of natural science laws and 
methodologies.
Insight by our rational minds is needed in each 
of the modes of knowledge. This insight will first be 
sought by utilizing the conceptual knowledge called 
'understanding.' This form of knowledge is based on the 
Law of Identity 'A=A' and 'A cannot be equal to Not-A'. 
Insight will also be sought by application of Hegel's 
'Notion' or the 'Identity of the Opposites'.(See chapter 
four of this thesis for review of Hegel's 'Notion').
The last commonality found in all three modes of 
knowledge is the communal agreement in each mode as to 
what standard (to 'zero beat' against) will be used for a 
comparative substantiation of each individual experience.
Past history corroborates the justification of 
using communal standards for setting acceptable ranges of 
deviation. Within this deviation, rational and revelatory 
('faith') modes of knowledge will be found to provide
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practical and emotionally acceptable structures for a 
rational, emotional, and judging being to utilize.These 
structures should allow more freedom for individual 
adjustments and holistic involvement in those decisions 
and actions that are vitally important in finding purpose 
and meaning in those areas of the greatest concern to the 
individual and to his/her community.
Therefore, this thesis will compare, abstract, 
evaluate, and synthesize entities examined under the 
appropriate (Kl), (K2), and (K3) modes of knowledge. In
all cases, the same rational techniques described 
previously will be utilized. This procedure to be used is 
felt to be both necessary and sufficient enough to justify 
the unified paradigm reached. This paradigm was made by 
dialectically synthesizing 'faith' and 'reason' on the 
common ground of a singular unified origin of their 
respective particularities.
The premises offered by the specific authors 
interpreted and my evaluations of them are analogous to 
the accidents, or 'others', in Hegel's 'Notion'.
The overall tradition of discussing implied basic 
premises and their evolution into explicit premises is 
analogous to the Hegelian dialectic which originates in 
an 'Absolute' (undifferentiated basic unity). This basic 
unity is the first step towards the evolution of Hegel's 
'Notion' into a concrete philosophical stance which I 
will show contains implicitly that undefinable part 
of our knowledge called 'connatural knowledge'.
'Connatural knowledge' (very briefly defined) is a
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form of knowledge that, according to Thomas Aquinas, is an 
innate knowledge available to rational spiritual human 
beings. However, it is of such nature that it cannot be 
conceptualized, nor be put into words. (7) Connatural 
knowledge (the highest level within supra-rational 
knowledge or K3) will be heuristically correlated with 
man's reason by utilizing the concepts contained within 
Hegel's 'third moment' of his 'Identity of Opposites' or 
the 'Notion.' (see chapter four and chapter five for 
details on and the justification for this implicit 
correlation.)
It is anticipated and predicted that this third 
mode of knowledge will continue to evolve so that man's 
reason (K3) can see both with and through the eye' of the 
spirit. In this way, unforeseen vistas which lie ahead may 
be more comprehensively revealed to mankind. Therefore, 
the historical development of the spiritual side of the 
creature called the rational animal may yet qualify to 
justify Hegel's conviction that religion is, "a continuing 
elevation of the finite spirit into the infinite (or the 
Divine Spirit)". (8)
SECTION SIX 
PARADIGM'S PRACTICAL ASPECT 
IN ETHICS
The structure elaborated upon in the body of this 
thesis and my main personal application of the concepts 
found therein will be focused primarily in the area of 
providing aid to bereaved survivors of terminally ill 
cancer patients. These concepts will also be a basis for 
my development of a future guidance model to aid these
survivors. Such survivors are often unable to make ethical 
decisions and assume or resume responsibility for a 
meaningful and purposeful life in the absence of the 
deceased.
An example of how the intended ethical guidance 
model will be utilized is given in section six of chapter 
seven in this thesis. I am convinced of the need for some 
kind of flexible, yet standardized model to be available 
for those Hospice volunteers who wish to aid the survivors 
in having procedures to help them make the readjustments 
necessary to carry out their remaining life in a 
meaningful, useful, and self-satisfying manner.
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CHAPTER 2
SHESTOV
SECTION ONE 
ATHENS
Lev Shestov, author of Athens and Jerusalem, was a 
Russian philosopher who lived from 1894 until 1938. He 
was recognized by the French and English speaking world as 
a promoter of existential thought. Shestov was also 
famed for his challenges to the pretensions of scientific 
positivism and its basic assumptions— Shestov's passionate 
spiritual convictions led to his denial of the scientific 
basic premises of a necessitated regularity (in the 
sequence of natural phenomena). He also denied the causal 
necessity assumed to govern the natural world. (1)
Shestov spent his lifetime in rebellion against 
dogmatism, the half lie, and any form of tyranny. He 
sought to stir the urge in his readers to learn honesty 
again. He felt such honesty could only come about when 
mankind would recognize the falsity of the concept that 
metaphysical truths arise solely from obedience and 
passive submission to the structures of being which are 
given in experience. Shestov sees these structures as 
contributing factors in formulating a concept known at 
that time as 'Necessity'. (Shestov, 38)
The terms 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' will be used by 
Shestov as representing the terms 'reason' and 'faith' 
respectively. In some cases, the sense or particular
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meanings of 'reason' and 'faith' (as used within a given 
context) will be seen to be ambiguous (and which 
interpretation we make in our modern time may or may 
not be the one Shestov intended us to have). Whenever this 
occurs, I will elaborate upon the reasons chosen for my 
particular interpretation in that specific context.
The author moves on by asking us several questions 
which are 'irritants' to positivist sciences. What are 
these 'ready made' mental categories and where do they 
come from? He also asks, why and how do we assure 
ourselves of their 'truthfulness' and 'reasonableness'? 
Shestov then puts the finishing touch to this line of 
questioning by asking the reader, "Are not 'facts' 
simply a pretext or a screen behind which quite other 
demands of the spirit are concealed?" (Shestov, 49) 
Shestov saw that the critical philosophers 
ceded truth to be that which 'experience' portrays. 
However, he does acknowledge that certain philosophers 
have seen clearly that 'facts' are only basic 
materials which do not of themselves constitute 'truth'.
He declares that these philosophers find it necessary to 
mold and even transform 'facts'. For example, to help 
substantiate his own declaration about molding, Paul 
Tillich, a modern philosophical theologian, states that in 
the classic sense, "Reason is that structure of the mind 
that enables it to grasp and shape reality." (2)
Shestov now identifies those selected philosophers 
who deny that 'facts' are in and of themselves the final 
and supreme court of judgment— He names Plato, Aristotle,
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Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant as adhering to the
conviction that facts do not solely furnish knowledge or
truth. For example, Shestov quotes Kant as confessing:
Experience, which is content to tell us about 
what it is that it is, but does not tell us 
that what is "is" necessarily, does not give 
us knowledge; not only does it not satisfy, it 
irritates our reason, which avidly aspires to 
universal and necessary judgments. (Shestov, 52)
For Shestov, the importance of Kant's confession 
cannot be overemphasized. It shows that fact and 
experience irritate our reason because they do not give us 
the knowledge we so strongly desire. At this stage of the 
treatise, my conviction is that the 'irritant' factor can 
be attributed to the failure of fact and experience to 
surrender information that would enhance the ability of 
'knowledge' and 'reason' to do a more effective job of 
aiding man to control his world.
Shestov asserts:
Only the knowledge which we never succeed in 
finding either in the 'facts' or in 'experience' 
is that which reason, our better part, seeks 
with all its powers. (Shestov, 49)
Shestov thinks the readers should be asking
themselves the following questions:
(1) "How is critical philosophy distinguished from
the dogmatic?" His partial answer is to recall for
us a significant conflict that he claims the historians
neglect. This conflict was between Descartes and Leibniz.
Descartes took a firm stand on his conviction that:
Eternal truths do not exist from all Eternity 
and by their own will, as their eternity would 
require, but that they were created by God in the 
same way that He created all that possesses any 
real or ideal being. (Shestov, 49)
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Leibniz was indignant and considered Descartes' 
declaration to be absurd. The reader is now asked to 
consider the question that would follow if Descartes is 
'right' about Eternal truths not being autonomous, but 
dependent upon the will of the Creator.
(2) This crucial question is, "How would philosophy 
be possible?" or " How (in general) would 'truth' be 
possible?" Shestov recalls for us the two principles 
which Leibniz used in his search for 'truth'— the 
principle of contradiction, and the principle of 
sufficient reason. Descartes questioned the reliability 
of the principles for 'reasonable' proof upon which 
Leibniz later relied. Without these two principles as 
reliable presuppositions, the resultant proof is an 
illusory one according to Shestov. He saw this as leaving 
Leibniz with no stand but an indignant one. ('Indignant' 
can be interpreted as similar in use to Kant's use of the 
word 'irritant' when faced with the conflict between 
'knowledge' and 'belief').
Our Russian philosopher continues to badger 
our 'reasoning' by asking us, "Are we obligated to flatter 
all of reason's desires and forbidden to 'irritate' them? 
Should not 'reason' be forced to satisfy us and avoid in 
any way stimulating our 'irritations'?" (Shestov, 51)
Maybe we still use 'reason' by means of 'rationalization' 
to satisfy us (and thus quell our 'irritations').
To flatter reason (and to ask it to avoid 
irritating us) is a solution that does not fulfill the 
honesty that Shestov asserts is necessary to break the
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bonds of 'Necessity' which 'reason' has imposed upon us.
He finds no evidence that any of the critical philosophers 
(or pre-critical philosophers whom he mentions) asked such 
questions of reason.
Shestov thinks that all of the philosophers he
mentions are passionate seekers of universal and necessary
truths. He finds these men as being convinced that
universal and necessary truths are the only things worthy
of being called 'knowledge'. He found them to be convinced
not only of the worthiness and need for such 'knowledge',
but that it is the only source of truth. Shestov then
quotes Leibniz as proclaiming:
Eternal truths are not content to constrain, 
but do more: they persuade.
Shestov concludes that the others were also 
persuaded by 'reason' alone to accept such 'knowledge' 
with out question. They did so because they believed they 
could not (and therefore should not try to) escape from 
such immutable and eternal truths.
We can understand Shestov's difficulty in 
accepting 'knowledge' as being an 'eternal truth' when 
such acceptance is based upon meeting the condition that 
a knowledge statement can be demonstrably proven by 
scientifically accepted methods of corroboration. Only 
the mode of knowledge we have identified in the 
introduction as (K2) meets such criteria for demonstrable 
corroboration.
Up until now, we can view the material Shestov has 
covered as belonging under the term 'Athens'. To show us 
the incompatibility of such reason to the views held by
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a man of faith, he presents the 'Jerusalem' side of 
modern man in the following section.
SECTION TWO 
JERUSALEM
Shestov now presents basic concepts he understands 
to be pertinent to the man of 'faith'. He sees each of us 
as seekers of evidence needed to justify our own personal 
beliefs and our understanding of ourselves and our 
external world.
Shestov leads off into the 'Jerusalem' (or 
'faith') concepts by reminding the reader of Kant's 
attitude towards three metaphysical problems— God, free 
will, and immortality of the human soul. Shestov finds the 
conclusion of the Kantian evaluation (that the three 
metaphysical problems are not demonstrable) very easy for 
a spiritual soul to accept. Then he quotes Kant's response 
to Kant's own findings, "I had to renounce knowledge 
(Wissen) in order to make room for faith (Glauben)."
Shestov now presents us with Kant's own view about
his renouncement:
It is a scandal for philosophy and human reason 
that mankind must accept the existence of things 
outside ourselves merely on faith. (Shestov, 53)
Shestov takes very seriously Kant's remarks about 
our incapability of giving ourselves proof for the 
existence of things outside of ourselves— proof sufficient 
enough to remove all doubt.
Staying only with the information Shestov has 
presented to this point, I interpret his next few 
assertions as being crucial to achieve the purpose of his
book, namely, to give the reader hope, and to enable one 
to not be misled by misuse of the power of non-spiritual 
and impersonal truths. He is convinced that knowledge, as 
it has heretofore been used by mankind, has transformed 
real truths into non-representative nonspiritual and 
impersonal truths. He feels we should not view the 
impossibility of proving God's reality, our free will, 
or the immortality of our souls, as being repugnant for 
human reason. Shestov holds that we can be content to 
accept these three metaphysical truths on faith alone.
However, this thesis will demonstrate in later 
chapters that human 'reason' does not have to be cut out 
of the world view held by those possessing a religious 
'faith'. It will be shown that we do have other 
reasonable means of affirming an individual's freely 
accepted 'faith'. Such a faith cannot, by its individual 
nature, be corroborated by the same techniques natural 
science utilizes to insure its tremendous success to 
control objects in the finite nature world. These other 
'substantiating' methods as support for 'faith' actions 
have been suggested in chapter one— they allow for 
individual deviations based on subjective inclinations 
and sensual experiences. In spite of such deviations, they 
are means of obtaining rationally reasonable affirmations 
of intellectual inquiries and their structural solutions 
when put into action to accomplish goals based on a 
rational 'faith' content. We can individually utilize 
these other reasonable 'corroboration' techniques to 
affirm (with virtual certainty) our individual actions and
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thoughts in trying to reach spiritual and moral goals in 
our own every day life experiences.
Getting back to Shestov (who did not have the
knowledge we now possess), we find him asking us to go
along with Kant's conclusion that we must accept the
reality of things outside of ourselves merely on 'faith1.
(Modern spiritual views of what is meant by 'faith' will
be elaborated upon in later chapters of this thesis.)
However, to give us a better insight of Shestov's
early grasp of what is currently proposed in some
theological circles, we can quote one modern spiritual
view of what is meant by 'faith'. Schubert Ogden's book On
Theology (which was published in 1986) gives us this
definition of faith:
Faith is fundamentally to accept one's life and 
its setting, and to adjust oneself to them in a 
self conscious way. (3)
For the present, I believe that a reader can see 
that this modern definition incorporates both truths— the 
inner subjective and non-demonstrable relationships to 
both inner concepts and entities outside of oneself, and 
adjustment to the external existence of objects and events 
in the physical world.
After deliberating upon the evidence for both 
'faith' and 'reason', Shestov concludes both need 
postulates— postulates which by their nature are of faith. 
He tells us that the scandal of philosophers (at not 
knowing that things exist outside of themselves) is 
misplaced— that scandal should be felt in attempting the 
impossibility of proving the existence of God!
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Shestov therefore blames 'reason' as the culprit 
who desires necessity and universality. The quest for 
necessity and universality irritated reason which could 
not assimilate these questions honestly, but had to call 
them absurd to avoid thinking about them.
Shestov could have used 'reason' in place of the
word 'thinking' in the preceding sentence. Many people use
the terms reason and thinking interchangeably, but a real
difference can be (and I believe should be) made between
them. I would like to point out this drastic difference
by first quoting Martin Heidegger. He states:
Thinking only begins at the point where reason, 
glorified for centuries, is recognized as thinking's 
greatest adversary. (4)
In addition, Paul Tillich's distinction between 
'reason' and what Heidegger calls 'thinking' should 
clarify the issue for Shestov's readers. As a distinction, 
we can view 'reason' (as it appears to be used by both 
science and Shestov) as that which Paul Tillich calls 
technical reason. Tillich makes a distinction between this 
type of technical reason (which he sees as serving as a 
means to an end) as opposed to the concept of classical 
reason.
Tillich tells us that classical reason is, " a 
structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and shape 
reality". (Tillich I, 72) Such reason, according to 
Tillich, is effective in cognitive, esthetic, practical, 
and technical functions of the human mind. Tillich sees 
this as being an ontological concept of reason.
However, Tillich finds that the classical concept
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of reason is often replaced by a technical concept of 
reason which tends to reduce reason to a technical 
capacity (or methodology) for 'reasoning1. He explains 
that reason (in its classical sense) determines primarily 
the ends, while secondarily performing the function of 
obtaining means to the ends.
Tillich realizes (and I believe that this is also 
Shestov1s conviction) that scientific reasoning should not 
be used to determine the end as well as the means. 
Technical reason (K2) should, according to Tillich, be 
willing to accept its ends from elsewhere. He finds no 
danger in this situation so long as technical 'reason' is 
willing to fulfill the demands of ontological 'reason'
([K1J, [K2], [K3], and combinations of them).
(Tillich I, 73)
The above distinction is a crucial one and will 
allow the major premise of this thesis to be a plausible 
alternative to Shestov's conclusion that Athens and 
Jerusalem cannot be reconciled. (The following chapters 
are placed in their respective order to progressively 
construct the logical structure of the thesis's final 
paradigm— one that amalgamates the latest human knowledge 
in the areas currently considered under the terms 'reason' 
and 'faith'.)
Shestov realizes that the 'Necessity which not 
only constrains, but persuades' cannot have a God that 
lies out of reason's ability to comprehend— the existence 
of such a God would prevent reason's capability to 
obtain full knowledge.
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Such thoughts on the gap between 'reason' and 
'faith' (already expressed by him) led Shestov to believe 
that they contributed to what he sees as failure on the 
part of Kant's Critiques to shake the foundations upon 
which European philosophers based their investigative 
thoughts.
Shestov starts out the last part of his Foreword 
by informing the reader that Spinoza's fundamental ideas 
were accepted and assimilated by critical philosophy. 
Shestov believed such ideas led to the formulation of a 
Law of Necessity. This necessity (which determines the 
order and structure of being) does not constrain, but 
persuades reason to accept that man is determined.
I interpret Shestov as being convinced that if 
anyone accepts and sees life under the Spinozan concept of 
'Necessity', then the greatest good for man is man's 
ability to understand this law. It logically follows (if 
these premises are accepted as being true) that one can 
search for the determinate causes, understand them, and in 
contemplation of these eternal necessities, find man's 
highest joy. (I encourage the reader at this point, to 
ponder over one's own existential response to this 
declaration of the 'highest joy' of man.)
Shestov's own response to such a declaration is 
immediate. He asks the reader to grasp what Shestov claims 
the critical philosophers holding the above view 
overlooked. He explains that this oversight was due to the 
fact that man needs a special and strong foundation if man 
is to occupy a special place in the physical world.
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Shestov claims this foundation can only lie in the belief 
in a Supreme Being— the very same Supreme Being which he 
feels these critical philosophers have denied as ever 
existing. He sees them as striving to convince themselves 
that the destiny and meaning of Man's existence can only 
be achieved through pure intellegere. (Shestov, 57)
As one might anticipate, Shestov lays most of the 
blame for this upon Spinoza. He finds Spinoza rejecting 
any concept of the biblical deity. Shestov believes 
Spinoza's reasoning leads to a rejection of one's 
possessing an immortal soul. He states that the proof of 
critical philosophy for such a conclusion is that an 
eternal truth tells man, "Everything that has a beginning 
has also an end". (Shestov, 58) Shestov tells us that 
the man of 'reason alone' will accept this, but the man of 
faith is not persuaded by this supposed 'truth'.
Whether or not Spinoza is well characterized by 
him, Shestov's presentation clearly shows the conflicting 
view of life that prevailed between certain rationalist 
philosophers and the biblical man of faith. He concludes 
that the enlightened thinkers arrive at their conclusion 
that eternal truths not only constrain, but persuade, and 
inspire those who succeed in acquiring them. Shestov 
quickly points out that to accept this view point, one 
must give up those aspects of man associated with weeping, 
laughter, cursing, and other human emotions. He flatly 
states that these human emotions and feelings (as a part 
of human thought) are left completely out of consideration 
by the speculative thought of those led by 'reason alone'.
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Again, the reader should realize the difficulty 
some of Shestov's terminology is (or will be) causing. It 
should now be clear that 'reason' (as Shestov uses the 
term) is only a part of what he believes the term human 
thought to stand for. This distinction (and its 
ramifications for us) is very important, and will 
developed throughout the remaining chapters.
He continues by showing us how easy it is to 
rationalize one's conclusion (based upon the acceptance of 
the assumption that the world is governed by 'Necessity') 
that mankind needs to strive for autonomous ethics— ethics 
which are fitting for the autonomous laws of being.
(Shestov, 59) He adds to this concept with his comments 
about the 'Ancients'. He understands that the Ancients 
recognized man as being only one of the links of 
the phenomena found in the physical world. He sees this 
concept as one which constrains and persuades man that 
the 'Necessity' of the physical world (and its natural 
laws) is all there is.
The author of Athens and Jerusalem now asks his 
readers to consider a question he felt was not asked by 
those philosophers who believed that 'eternal truths' not 
only constrain, but also persuade. He asks us, "Do we know 
what is essential in our relationship to 'eternrl 
truths'?" He then puts the question in another way— if 
the 'truth' which constrains us does not succeed in 
persuading us, does it thereby lose its status as 'truth'?
To provide a background on this question, Shestov 
points out that early philosophers were considered to be
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constrained by 'truth' itself. However, Aristotle after 
making such a statement added that, "Necessity does not 
allow itself to be persuaded". Shestov interprets 
Aristotle's comments as implicitly allowing the 
constraining 'truth' to persuade also. (Shestov, 60)
I believe that at this point of Shestov's 
presentation, one must interpret for oneself what Shestov 
meant by bringing in Aristotle's reluctance to accept what 
appears to be so true— that "Necessity does not allow 
itself to be persuaded." My interpretation is that 
Shestov used this to justify the need to make a definite 
distinction as to the usage of the term 'persuade' as it 
is used with the term 'Necessity' and with the term 
'Eternal truths'.
Shestov firmly believes that the use of the term 
persuasion and Spinoza's "vera contemplatione gaudere" are 
hidden substitutes for the natural emotions and feelings 
of the biblical man. He feels that these critical 
philosophers of his time are still trying to convince all 
men that their type of philosophical truths are ones that 
have the gift of persuading all men. They see this kind of 
truth as being the only type of truth that 'reason' will 
recognize as being true 'knowledge'.
Shestov perceives that the reason no limits were 
placed upon the pretensions of these critical philosophers 
was that they failed to see that 'truths' are only true 
for those whom they persuade.
He now summarizes his above thoughts on persuasion 
by giving what he calls a concrete example of the
fundamental difference between Hellenist thought and 
Biblical thought. Shestov claims that when the Psalmist 
(or any spiritually seeking individual) cries out to God 
in heart felt prayer, the supplicant's thoughts and truths 
he receives are not only connected to the facts given in 
the experience, but are certainties of truths based on 
something to which the given in experience finds itself 
subordinate. By this example, Shestov attempts to show us 
that 'facts' about the material world of necessity can 
have a beginning and therefore an end. However, Man (by 
having a dual relationship with that which underlies 
himself and the 'facts' of the physical world) is 
therefore spiritually excluded from having an absolute 
ending.
When critical philosophy denies the possibility of 
Shestov's above example, I believe Shestov has given the 
open minded bystander to this scenario an insight into the 
man of 'reason alone'. We, as objective bystanders, can 
see how the man of reason alone must let 'Necessity' 
guarantee any facts (created by 'Necessity') to be 
'eternal truths'. While this appears to let the man of 
reason alone acquire only that 'knowledge' which is true 
'knowledge', we bystanders should be able to see that this 
sort of 'knowledge' is limited to the forever immutable.
We can see (and hopefully empathize) that the view point 
of the man of reason alone is to understand that 
comprehension of 'true knowledge' is the ultimate 
happiness. (Shestov, 62)
This above view does not consider the content
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of such knowledge, but finds that contemplation of such 
eternal necessity is the greatest good for mankind. (For 
those familiar with the atheistic existentialists, one 
finds they are in almost complete accordance with this way 
of accepting and adjusting oneself to the reality of 
life.)
Shestov finishes his above lines of thought 
by reminding us that the more men were preoccupied with 
denying the authority of the Bible, the less they tried to 
account for its contents.
Shestov now seeks to justify his contention that
critical philosophy's great error was failure to examine
the unstated assumptions they had which provided the
certainty of their concept of what constituted 'true
knowledge'. To do this, he calls upon some of the thinkers
in Medieval philosophy. In regard as to how some of these
Medieval philosophers subjected the words of Scripture to
their reasoning powers, Shestov quotes Duns Scotus,
I believe Lord what your great prophets said, but 
if it be possible, make me understand it.
He uses the above example to illustrate his own belief
about most (if not all) of the critical philosophers. He
thinks they failed to seek, in Biblical lore, an
evaluation of the knowledge which pure reason brings to
man. For example, Shestov tells us that when Scotus hears
the words, "Rise, take up your bed and go ", he replies, "
give me my crutches that I may have something upon which
to lean".
I understand Shestov as comprehending the 
assistance needed by Scotus was knowledge that is obtained
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by pure reason alone. Shestov now wants his readers to ask 
themselves if they also believe that knowledge by pure 
reason is above faith, and that such a conviction is 
believed as an 'eternal truth'. Shestov then quotes 
Leibniz's answering words about the priority of reason 
over faith, "It not only constrains, but also persuades".
(Shestov, 64)
Such a concept of knowledge is seen by our author 
to have not only seduced the first man, but since that 
time, the fruits of the tree of knowledge became the 
source of philosophy for all time. He pursues this issue 
by elucidating that the constraining truths of knowledge 
subdue and persuade men while the free truth of revelation 
(which does not seek 'sufficient' reason) 'irritates' men 
just as 'experience' irritates them. (Shestov, 65)
Now, can we see it as possible that the critical 
philosophy's 'Eternal truth' about pure reason is itself a 
presupposed truth that not only constrains, but also 
falsely persuades those who have been seduced by it? Our 
Russian philosopher, in my opinion, is right when he sees 
the 'Eternal truth' (in which reason sees that knowledge 
[K2] is above faith) is itself a form of truth that not 
only constrains reason, but also persuades reason that it 
has obtained 'true knowledge'. (The reader is asked at 
this point to temporarily refrain from taking sides on the 
issue.) I strongly feel that Shestov would not have been 
so adamant in his challenge to the place of reason had he 
not been posing the problem as an either or one. No 
consideration of Hegel's 'Notion' and its impact on the
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concepts of what constitutes human freedom was indicated 
in Shestov's book. (See chapter four on Hegel's 'Identity 
of Opposites' for the view that there is no such a thing
[as an either/or] when considering elements that are
polarities— for example, finite versus infinite and one 
versus many.)
SECTION THREE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I found Shestov's last few convictions as being 
the crux of his whole book. He believes it is possible 
that such knowledge (as that obtained by pure reason 
alone) will inevitably lead to the injunction 'one will 
die'— die, if one accepts as 'Eternal truths' those
premises obtained by 'reason alone'.
At this juncture, the inquisitive reader will 
discern the difficulty Shestov had when we consider our 
own individual interpretations of what is meant by the 
terms 'faith' and 'knowledge'. I perceive Shestov as being 
convinced that the 'knowledge' which is above 'faith'
(and thus a truth that constrains as it also persuades) is 
not an 'eternal truth'. Nevertheless, he comprehends it as 
a concept which does constrain and subdue necessarily—  
therefore he feels it limits or eliminates the truths of 
revelation.
This chapter has attempted to show that this early 
nineteenth century division between one's 'faith' and ones 
'reason' is one that we will still find existing with 
modern human beings today. Modern technology and 
'technical reason' (K2) have been projected as giving man
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self-made answers to all problems including spiritual and 
moral ones. It is the purpose of this thesis to illustrate 
(in the following chapters) conceptual tools that each 
person can utilize to achieve more effectiveness in 
becoming the autonomous, spiritual, and rational beings 
they desire to be.
Shestov believes that a person must be in the 
world, as well as beyond it, in order to obtain the 
primordial freedom he maintains was lost in the mythical 
Fall. He perceives 'reason' (in the form of a necessity) 
has eliminated the side of man that laughs, weeps, 
laments, etc.,— a side that is so readily found in the 
life of the biblical man of faith.
We can easily interpret Shestov as seeking to 
drive all of us to critically examine the basic 
unexpressed assumptions— assumptions that are utilized to 
substantiate the certainty of premises 'reason' asserts 
are 'eternal truths and are self evident. Kant, in chapter 
three, will critically examine how these two opposing 
views (subjective faith as freedom and objective reason as 
finite necessity) can be combined in a single relationship 
within us. Hegel, in chapter four, will progress beyond 
Kant's advancements. Through Hegel's concept of the 
'Identity of the Opposites', the human being (as a finite 
and spiritual particular) is connected with the universal 
source of all being— a source which Hegel will present to 
us as a 'Divine Inclusive Subjectivity'. Paul Tillich, in 
chapter six, will go beyond the Hegelian concept of pure 
reason in its speculative and idealistic form. Tillich
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will present to us that (in both the subjective and 
objective aspects of human reason) distortions occur that 
cause reason to search for what the world calls 
'revelation1. He will show us that through 'revelation' 
(K3), a progressive unity can be obtained between 
subjective reason and objective reason— his amalgamation 
of the two is called 'theonomy'. In each of these 
succeeding chapters, a progressive development of both 
the structure and the content found within 'faith' and 
'reason' concepts should be able to be either implicitly 
or explicitly identified by the reader.
I believe that a thoughtful reader can, by 
temporarily accepting the insights given by Shestov so 
far, understand why he fought those seeking to establish 
true knowledge through reason alone. Why should the 
critical examination of all else under the critical eye of 
'Necessity' philosophy exclude the same critical 
examination— examination of the basic assumptions of 
'reason' alone about the certainty of its unnamed source 
of self evident truths that 'reason' alone found to be 
'eternal truths'?
In contrast to the Hellenist world viewpoint, 
Shestov tells us that to find God, man must tear away from 
the seduction of reason. When man does so, Shestov 
passionately believes that the believer (by 'faith') will 
be able to receive 'faith' truths (or what are called 
biblical revelatory truths). He is convinced such 
revelatory truths (K3) are necessary to transfigure 
reality into a return to original freedom. (Shestov, 70)
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Therefore, I understand Shestov's overall intent 
as being one to convince his readers to be open to all of 
the evidences within and without oneself. I comprehend him 
as feeling that anyone who does this will find himself to 
be a fallen creature needing help. If a person openly and 
truthfully seeks the wisdom, love, and help of a Universal 
Divine Being, then all that is needed for his/her finite 
spiritual growth towards infinite spirit will be 
available to him/her. (Biblical sources for reasonable 
corroborations of this interpretation are numerous. See 
End Note 5 for two specific examples.)
The 5 D's within the appropriate mode of 
knowledge (Kl, K2, and K3), were only implicitly utilized 
in this chapter. The remainder of the thesis establishes 
criteria for our use in arriving at the best solutions and 
their application of both 'faith' and 'reason' concepts 
towards solving the real problems that arise in our 
everyday lives.
All readers are encouraged to experiment with the 
'tools' presented in the Introduction. Through application 
of this logical approach, the reader may 'test' the 
method's practicality by a progressive recycling back to 
previous chapters found in this thesis when an 'opposite' 
cannot be reconciled in the reader's own judgment. Based 
on evolving or new concepts spontaneously appearing in 
one's thinking, such a recycling should dialectically 
narrow any remaining gap one may perceive between the 
originally conflicting world views held by 'faith' and by 
'reason'— such a gap has heretofore prevented many
rational individuals from obtaining an integrated 
self-will that is essential to achieve greater harmony (in 
spite of existential distortions) within him/her-self.
Once such unity is being progressively achieved within, 
then such integration can be extended to other persons—  
also to the natural world, and to the 'Creative Originator 
of all Being1 (or that which is the ground of all Being 
and called by many by the name of 'GOD').
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NOTES
1. Lev Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem, (Athens 
Ohio: University Press, 1966), 19. Subsequent references 
to this work will be cited in the text parenthetically as, 
e.g., (Shestov, 19)
2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol I, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 72. 
Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the 
text parenthetically as e.g., (Tillich I, 72)
3. Schubert M. Ogden, On Theology,
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982) 71.
4. William Barrett, Irrational Man, (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1962) 206.
5. Two Biblical examples corroborating the fruits 
of intentional unity with the ground of Being-Itself (GOD) 
are; (1) N.T. Matt 6: 33 where we are told, "Seek ye 
first the Kingdom of God and all that you need will be 
given to you"; and (2) N.T. II Timothy 1: 7 where it is 
stated, "God does not give us a Spirit of Fear, but He 
gives us a Spirit of Love, a Spirit of Power, and a Spirit 
of a sound mind".
CHAPTER 3
KANT
The opinion of many philosophers in the past and 
during modern times is that Immanuel Kant's ethical 
treatise, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
is one of the most important ethical treatises ever 
written. Published in 1785, this book is an argument for 
axioms which could be used in erecting a general structure 
of moral freedom. This general structure is one that the 
world needed and still needs as a basis for greater 
unification among individuals (and between the civil 
communities of human agents). (1)
This chapter will therefore attempt to summarize 
Kant's main premises in a continuous synthesis of 
interpretation, explanation, and substantiation of his 
premises by consideration of his own and other 
philosophers' views.
Three main premises are presented in his treatise. 
Section one of this chapter will develop his first premise 
(the concept of duty concerning morality). Section two 
will summarize Kant's second premise (the autonomy of the 
human will.) Section three will give Kant's third premise 
(the concept of human freedom), a concept by which Kant's 
"Categorical Imperative" becomes possible--possible for a 
mortal and imperfect human will to recognize the oughtness 
of his sensible self to obey, and the capacity of his 
reason freely to give such an obeyable law to itself.
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The purpose of such an approach is to give the 
reader unfamiliar with Kant's treatise a basic grasp of 
his concepts— concepts that may be utilized to reevaluate 
the reader's world view in which 'faith' and 'reason' are 
not in cooperative unity with each other.
Kant gives an invaluable contribution to each 
rational being seeking to be real, alive, and whole as a 
person— a whole person being defined as one who has 
relatively unified the emotional, rational, and judgmental 
aspects of his human and spiritual nature.
Kant's Foundations focuses on his famous statement 
that, "There is nothing in or out of the world that is
absolutely good except a good will". (Kant FMM, 9) This
chapter will interpret and comment on Kant's teachings as 
he reasons how such an absolute premise is possible. He 
will show us that if we dwell upon his 'Categorical
Imperative', we can see it is possible and we can
intuitively comprehend what it means. Kant is convinced 
that an autonomous person will freely acknowledge the 
'Categorical Imperative' as an unconditional universal, 
and that one's own moral 'maxim' should be in accord with 
it.
According to Kant, there is only one moral 
'Categorical Imperative' which is, "Act only according to 
that 'maxim' by which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law." (Kant FMM, 18)
The term 'maxim' was defined in Kant's treatise, 
but it is a very short and generalized definition given 
in section one. There, Kant stated that " A maxim is the
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subjective principle of volition". (Kant FMM, 17) He 
follows this definition by explaining that the objective 
principle of volition is the practical law— a law which 
would be a practical principle to all rational beings 
subjectively as well (if full power over desires and 
inclinations could be accomplished by reason).
It therefore appears that a personal 'maxim' could 
be viewed as a principle or moral rule of self-conduct 
decided upon by one's will to guide actions taken to 
achieve the intent (final choice) of the will to be 
morally good.
Natural philosophy (dealing with the natural world 
and definite objects in it) was concerned with basic 
principles and laws the natural world was subject to. Kant 
saw however, that for the finite rational human being, 
these basic laws and principles are obtained from either 
laws of nature, or laws of freedom.
He saw natural philosophy concerned with the laws 
concerning physics of natural man. He saw moral philosophy 
as being concerned with moral laws from which a free will 
could obtain the influence necessary to decide upon what 
personal 'maxim' one ought to have (if it was to be in 
accordance with a universal moral maxim).
Such moral laws, according to Kant, need a person's 
power of judgment (aided by experience) to make decisions 
as to which cases the laws are applicable. In addition, 
the laws need one's judgment in order to get access to the 
decision process. (Kant FMM, 5)
The reader is led to see that a metaphysics of
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morals is absolutely necessary for practical reason to 
speculate on the unseen source of the principles achieved 
through a priori reason. We can also see that without 
guides and norms that are absolutely universal and 
binding, our human morals are open to error and 
corruption.
His metaphysical foundations were built upon the 
premise that a personal 'maxim' which conforms to the 
moral law is not necessarily 'morally good', unless it 
conforms for the sake of the law. Such conformity, 
according to Kant, is done out of duty (or obligation) to 
the universal moral law out of respect for it.
Kant surely realized that persons possessing a 
common knowledge would feel more comfortable with a 
conception of a universal moral law that can rest on 
testimony of its truth through one's own experience of 
living. In addition, he was fighting a philosophical 
climate that was deterministic in nature concerning 
natural man in the natural world. We will therefore find 
him starting to establish his foundation principles of 
morality by literally proving, by common experience, that 
man does find himself doing actions that he feels he must 
do, but does not really want to nor understand why 
he does them.
Inclinations and desire do not enter into such 
necessitated but undesired action and therefore are 
incapable of explaining why he responds to a demand he 
does not want to do. However, Kant believes there is a 
rational explanation for this demand. He therefore
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analytically proceeds from this commonly experienced 
phenomenon to eventually arrive at a rational 
determination of an absolute and universally binding 
moral law (via section two) that supplies the explanation 
for doing one's duty in regard to the moral law. Kant then 
(via section three) synthetically derives step by step the 
return from sources of the universal moral law and its 
principles to its practical application in everyday moral 
life experiences.
SECTION ONE 
PRACTICAL REASON, AND DUTY OF 
OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW
The first section of Kant's treatise starts with 
his famous statement, "There is nothing in or out of the 
world that is absolutely good except a good will." (Kant 
FMM, 9) We can interpret Kant as recognizing man is 
subject to the negation of a good will through distortion 
of fundamental principles needed for the will to intend to 
be morally good. Kant sees reason as a faculty of the mind 
whose proper function is to influence the will. He sees 
reason's function as being first, the means by which a 
will becomes aware of the 'Categorical Imperative'. 
Secondly, Kant finds reason creatively influencing the 
will to freely establish its 'maxim' so that it is in 
accordance with the 'Categorical Imperative'. Kant does 
not see that use of reason which justifies the natural 
means to happiness (inclinations) as being a morally 
worthy use of reason. These latter uses are 'Hypothetical 
Imperatives.'
Many people today still believe that man has yet to
rationally communicate to others (and to himself) the 
essence of an intelligible justification for one's inner 
sense of duty. Kant tells us this duty or oughtness comes 
from man's 'common sense of morality'. He does not go into 
detail, but it is supposedly a knowledge able to be held 
by all rational creatures. An illustration from the 
Biblical literature can indirectly aid us in our 
comprehension of it. King David looks upon a beautiful 
woman called Bathsheba who is the wife of one of King 
David's soldiers named Uriah. David desires her and 
takes it upon himself to call her to court during Uriah's 
absence and gets her pregnant. Unwilling to face Uriah 
with this breach of morality, David tries but fails to 
pass the cause of pregnancy to Uriah. He solves the 
problem by putting Uriah in the front rank in battle and 
getting him killed. Inclinations and desire crowded out 
any moral law obligations in David's mind.
How to tell David of his immorality was a problem 
for Nathan (the priest). So he told David a story of a 
very wealthy rich man with many sheep and lambs. Upon the 
arrival of a guest, the rich man does not want to use one 
of his own lambs for a feast, so he steals the only lamb 
of a poor neighbor and uses it to give a feast to his 
guest. David was indignant, he said that such a person 
should be punished severely. He asked Nathan,"Let me know 
who he was". David was then told, "King David, thou art 
the man." David could not rationally avoid what he 
previously disregarded, and therefore repented of his act. 
However, Nathan told him that his violation of God's moral
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law would result in the death of one of David's sons. (2)
We can see from this story how much easier it is to 
objectively condemn the other person for failure to 
perform his/her duty to a law one does not really desire 
to obey as a duty to it. David condemned the first 
injustice, so could not excuse the second, his own! When 
posed as a universal law for all others, one (disregarding 
impulses from non-moral inclinations and desires) can 
innately know, without knowing the reason why, that such a 
call to obey is an obligatory one for every rational 
being.
Yet, many people today are still so impressed by 
the empirical authority of modern science that they do not 
see how often in their own daily lives that they do things 
they do not wish to do, and that these necessitated 
actions cannot be explained by the cause and effect 
methods of the empirical sciences. In such cases, relying 
upon empirical science and not inquiring deeper into such 
unexplainable actions that most persons have actually 
experienced themselves, there is some justification for 
this general belief— that man has yet to rationally 
communicate to others (and to himself) the essence of an 
intelligible justification for one's inner sense of duty.
Kant sets forth the argument that if the universal 
impulse to happiness did not determine a person's will, 
there would still be a necessary law that the person ought 
to seek his happiness from duty only. In this way, his 
conduct would then possess true moral worth. (Kant FMM,
15) However, even though duty be opposed by natural
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impulses, Kant believes the love commanded by Scripture 
can be equated with beneficence from duty (which can be 
considered as the practical love residing in the good 
will). (Kant FMM, 16)
He also believes that such practical love can be 
commanded and rooted in three principles of action: (1)
Action must be done from duty for it to have moral worth; 
(2) The moral worth of (1) is in the maxim by which it is 
determined, and not in the purpose which is to be achieved 
through such duty-bound action. From his analysis of the 
first two principles of action, he concludes that the 
purposes we have for our actions and their effects as ends 
(as individual purposes) are incapable of giving any 
unconditional moral worth. Therefore he arrives at 
the third principle; (3) Duty is the necessity of an 
action carried out from respect for the law.
(Kant FMM, 16)
Our moral philosopher sees the law as something to 
respect. Only a universal and necessary moral law that is 
unconditionally binding upon all moral persons is worthy 
of such respect. It must also be recognized and treated as 
a command also. (Kant FMM, 18)
At this point of section one, we can review and 
correlate the material presented so far by applying the 
concepts given to one's own experiences in the moral 
realm. We can mentally create a moral situation and then 
apply the five D's to these concepts. During the 
reflective and contemplative mental review, one 'D' at a 
time is applied. In this manner, one can see if self
57insight is aware of its sense of the rightness or 
wrongness of each stage of action taken up to and 
including the final one. The anticipated results can then 
be mentally compared with one's peer group's range of 
acceptability of what constitutes a moral person, or a 
moral act. (It is assumed that the peer group uses the 
concepts of the 'Categorical Imperative' as they have 
been disclosed at this stage of Kant's development of it).
In his analysis of the moral law to the concept of 
the autonomy of the human will, Kant's logic makes its 
appeal to common human reason through consideration of how 
we find ourselves actually responding when we find 
ourselves in this situation. First, our internal feelings 
tend to strongly resist those commands of duty based on 
respect without regard to desire or inclinations. Reason 
does not seem to seek consensus by a compromise with the 
needs of the inclinations. Are the duties too strict for 
man? Is a compromise with inclinations a corruption and 
destruction of what duty is really about?
Our common knowledge has a need to go into 
practical philosophy to find the source and determination 
of the laws of duty. Why? Because duty demands are opposed 
by man's natural inclinations that seduce common reason 
with the promise of happiness. This opposition can cause a 
temptation to compromise the strict demand of duty itself.
Practical common sense recognizes the danger of 
compromise which would destroy the ultimate worth of laws 
of duty, and thus destroy our respect for them— such 
recognition causes it to seek a practical philosophy to
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help practical reason obtain the source of and 
determination of the duty principle. By means of practical 
philosophy, practical reason obtains the universally 
applicable and unconditional premises it needs to 
establish for our will. It also sees the necessity of 
choosing the laws of duty and to exclude those maxims 
considered in order to fulfill the needs of one's 
inclinations. (Kant FMM, 22)
In summation, the human being experiences, at 
times, taking certain spontaneous moral actions which, 
despite not feeling like doing them, are a response that 
is elicited by a unknown sense of obligation to do so. 
Kant, through practical philosophy, gives his readers a 
rational source of strength which will aid the will to 
resist or overcome the natural impulses within man to 
dilute the laws of duty.
SECTION TWO 
CONCEPT OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE HUMAN WILL
Kant now primarily deals with the discovery and
construction of basic principles of morality in what
modern man lacks, a practical philosophy. Kant states man
has never been able to describe how pure ethics accounts
for the way men actually behave. He claims it is
impossible to pick out a single instance where an action
showed that the maxim of that action depended solely on
moral grounds. (Kant FMM, 23)
Biblically we could corroborate the above
conclusion by Christ's statement in the Gospel of John
where he told his disciples and others that without him,
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they could do nothing. I interpret Christ to mean the 
maxim of a person1s intent would be contaminated to the 
degree that Paul expressed in Romans 7:14-16 where he 
declared:
We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, 
sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions.
For I do not do what I want [intend by will], but 
I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do 
not want, I agree the law [comparable to the 
"Categorical Imperative" of Kant] is good.
Kant cannot find temporal man as achieving holiness 
of will by carrying out completely (in action) the 
"Categorical Imperative". Therefore, he finds man is 
concerned as to how reason (by itself) can command what 
ought to be done on grounds that are not empirically based 
nor empirically corroborated. Kant sees the answer coming 
from an a priori knowledge. He tells us that if such a 
supreme principle of morality does exist (holiness of an 
absolutely good will), then such a principle must be 
rationally established as a doctrine of morals outside 
the realm of 'common rational knowledge' .
The above principle is a different concept than 
that of the reason of technical understanding (K2), which 
likes all of its knowledge to fall within the limits of 
common rational knowledge. Philosophers in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century called the 'necessity 
philosophers' were irritated by the limitations imposed 
on technical reason (K2). We can see their refusal 
to let Kant's attempt to justify any knowledge lying 
outside practical reason (such as speculative 
knowledge derived from pure reason) was based on the 
grounds that no demonstrable and independent corroboration
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could be found for such postulates. Kant's approach was to 
isolate pure reason from all taint of anthropology, 
psychology, or physics.
We find him convinced that there is a human 
temporal limitation to acting in an absolutely moral 
manner. Kant uses human limitations to arrive at his 
conclusion that all works (actions) are distorted by 
inputs to the will other than the will's consideration of 
and attempted application of the 'Categorical Imperative.1 
He therefore realizes that no one should derive morality 
from activities and experiences of seeing morality in 
action. Because Kant cannot find it possible to prove in a 
rational way that freedom is real in human nature, he 
attempts (by analogy) to find a way out of this dilemma by 
resorting to our world sense experiences— He uses them to 
convince us that we can only know what the appearances of 
external objects reveal to us, and can never know their 
true inward identity. This analogy hits home for we all 
know, as rational beings, that we too often judge others 
by their outward actions.
His study takes the reader by logical progression 
to advance from popular philosophy (bound by experiential 
examples) to a metaphysics to extend rational knowledge to 
its maximum. He sees it necessary to do this by presenting 
reason's practical faculty from its universal rules of 
determination. The rather revolutionary way Kant sought to 
establish the rules of universality, necessity, and pure 
thought (as a priori constructions of the mind) is found 
in his transcendental method. Kant examines rational
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knowledge from this higher level of reason so he can show 
us the source of our 'Pure Practical Reason' and freedom 
for moral duty. Because his transcendental method was a 
new method of philosophical thought, a brief definition of 
it will give the reader an insight into Kant's utilization 
of its logic in his presentation of the principle of 
morality— a principle found in all rational moral maxims. 
(3)
The Catholic Encyclopedia gives us extracts from
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to help us get a brief
explanation of his new method. The encyclopedia informs us
that Kant himself described the transcendental method as:
I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge 
which is not so much occupied with objects as with 
the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far 
as this mode of cognition is possible a priori.
(Kant CPR, A 11)
Another excerpt found in the encyclopedia tells us 
a priori knowledge of objects is not possible on the 
basis of the traditional assumption that all man's 
knowledge should conform to objects— one must start from 
the supposition that objects should conform to man's 
knowledge. (Kant CPR, B xvi) Kant looks for the conditions 
that make a priori knowledge possible— a knowledge 
distinguished by its necessity and universality. He 
states such conditions cannot be found in the objects, 
but only in the forms that already inhere in the subject 
before it receives the external impressions. He goes on to 
tell us it is only through these forms that phenomena and 
objects are constituted or produced. Therefore, man is 
only able to know a priori as much of things as he himself
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projects into them. (Kant CPR, B xviii) Kant assigns to 
these inherent forms the pure perceptions of the sensitive 
faculties (space & time), the twelve concepts or 
categories of the intellect, and the three ideas of reason 
(existence of God, immortality, and free will).
The key element of the transcendental method is the 
transcendental deduction of purely rational concepts, 
which shows that the "conditions of the possibility of 
experience" are also the conditions "of all objects of 
experience". (Kant CPR, B 161) For Kant, the last 
sentence uses the term 'objects' to mean objects-for-us, 
but not objects of the things-in-themselves. Therefore,
"no a priori cognition is possible for us, except of 
objects of possible experience" (i.e., of human 
experience). (Kant CPR, B 166)
Proceeding from the premise that everything in 
nature is determined by laws, Kant finds that only 
rational beings have the capability of acting according to 
their conception of universal laws or principles. He shows 
us that the reason of a rational person's will is required 
for the will to derive actions required by the moral law. 
He states that will is a faculty of choosing that which 
reason recognizes both subjectively and objectively as 
practically necessary or good.
In man, subjective volition can go the other way 
and seek to satisfy inclinational desires. So practical 
objective reason is, according to Kant, a restraint on the 
subjective needs of an individual. This restraint, as a 
command, is what Kant calls an imperative (Kant FMM, 30).
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By examining the grounds for a possible categorical 
imperative (i.e., of a practical law), Kant, by use of the 
transcendental method, leads the reader to a necessary 
conclusion— that for there to be a supreme practical 
principle for the human will, it must an objective 
principle which is an unconditional end for all rational 
beings because it is an end in itself. As an objective 
principle, it is universal and therefore holds for all 
other rational beings as a means by which all laws of the 
will can be derived. As a practical imperative (or duty), 
the maxim is to treat all rational beings also as ends, 
and never as means only.
By means of the presented principles, Kant shows 
that there can be a organized union of rational beings 
through common objective principles. He gives the name of 
a 'realm of ends' to such a union. A rational being (being 
a person who recognizes himself as one giving universal 
principles through the maxims of one's own will) therefore 
belongs to the 'realm of ends' as a member— as such, he is 
subject to the universal laws that he gives to himself as 
well as giving to those other wills that are also members 
of the 'realm of ends'. All this is done, according 
to Kant, from the idea of the dignity of a rational being 
who freely obeys no law unless he himself also gives it. 
(Kant FMM, 53)
We can conclude with Kant, on the basis of his 
logic to this point, that the principle of each human will 
(as a will which can act in accordance with universal law 
via all of its maxims) is capable of being equivalent to a
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'categorical imperative1. (Kant FMM, 50) Kant now points 
out to us that the rational human being is bound to moral 
laws by duty to them, but only when that being has 
subjected himself to his own, but also universal 
legislation, and is therefore (freely) bound to it also.
He calls this principle of morality the principle of the 
'autonomy of the will'.
To conclude this section, three of Kant's main 
premises concerning the role of the autonomy of the will 
in the formulation of his "Categorical Imperative" are:
(1) The absolutely good will is one whose principle must 
be an unconditional 'Categorical Imperative'.
(Kant FMM 23); (2) The absolutely good will contains only 
the form of volition. Autonomy is the form of volition in 
the rational being. (Kant FMM, 24); and (3) Practical 
reasoning, using a universally conceived concept of 
morals, has shown that the autonomy of the will is founded 
in the postulate of freedom. (Kant FMM, 71)
SECTION THREE
POSTULATE OF FREEDOM TO MAKE "CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE" POSSIBLE
Section two was an analysis of the development of a 
universal concept of morals that showed that its 
foundation was to be found in the autonomy of the will. 
However, as Kant indicated, to prove morality is not an 
illusion of the mind, and the autonomy of the will is 
real, it must be possible that a synthetical principle 
that is both necessary and universal can be found in pure 
practical reason. He needs to and does show that if the 
freedom of the will is presupposed (as the only
universal and necessary premise that can account for the 
autonomy of the will), then morality and its principle can 
be shown by an analysis of the concept of the will's 
freedom. This seems to be a contradiction in that the 
principle arrived at by an analysis is a synthetical 
premise— that is, an absolutely good will is one whose 
maxim can always include itself as a universal law. It is 
synthetical because an analysis of the proposition of an 
absolutely good will shows that its maxim (as being 
included as universal law) cannot be found. Kant shows us 
that the concept of freedom is the only necessary and 
universal cognition which is a common ground for a union 
of the autonomy of the will and the categorical 
imperative.
Kant's concept of freedom, as being the necessary 
premise to the explanation of the autonomy of the will, 
has to include sufficient evidence to show freedom as a 
transcendental condition of the will of all rational 
beings. The certainty of such evidence cannot be obtained 
from experiences of human nature, so it must be proved a 
priori. During such proof, freedom must be proved as being 
possessed by rational beings having a will.
For us, Kant has already defined natural necessity 
as a property of causality whereby non-rational beings 
(entities not capable of making free choices) are 
determined in their actions by external causes. He now 
uses an analogy between natural necessity and freedom. 
Freedom is understood as being the property of the will 
by which the will can be effective as a cause. This cause
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is independent of any foreign cause which could have an 
undue influence on the will. From what we have learned to 
this point, we can see that the will, as self determined, 
has the possibility to give this freedom up in response to 
outside influences other than the 'Categorical 
Imperative.1 Kant recognizes this danger and says that if 
such influences are allowed by the will to influence it, 
it is no longer an autonomous will but a heteronomous one.
(Kant Fmm, 26) It is not difficult to find ourselves in 
agreement with Kant's rationale to this point.
He now uses his knowledge of the then current 
scientific reasons and conclusions which were formulated 
in mathematical equations (laws) that were considered as 
being equivalent to the actual 'laws of nature' itself. 
From this knowledge, he draws the premise that a free will 
is also subject to laws in that it cannot be lawless. His 
conclusion, if his premises are assumed to be correct, is 
a logical one. The freedom of the will is autonomy— the 
will's property is to be a law to itself in all of its 
actions.
Like ourselves, Kant is not content with being 
unable to comprehend the metaphysical grounds underlying 
the freedom of the will's reason. He explains to his 
readers that the compulsion felt by practical reason to 
think itself into the intelligible world is not an act 
which transcends the limits of reason. He posits the 
intelligible world as a positive thought only upon the 
condition that the concept of freedom can be seen
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to be connected to a positive faculty called reason.
(Kant FMM, 71)
He continues in this train of thought by 
considering pure practical thought as the cause of a 
person's will to act in a manner that will result in 
external actions moving in accord with the maxims that 
are in accordance with universal laws.
At first reading, it would appear at this point in 
Kant's ethical treatise that he is presenting us with a 
contradiction. He has told us that reason is not able to 
grasp the presuppositions supporting the premise of an 
intelligible world. From this, he drew the conclusion that 
if man is to think of his reason as being practical to his 
well being, then man must assume and accept the concept of 
an intelligible world.
Let us compare the above premise and conclusion to 
the premises and conclusions found in previous paragraphs 
concerning the sensory world and man-made laws in regard 
to the cause/effect relationships found in this world.
Upon making such a comparison, there seems to be an 
inconsistency because Kant continues by implying limits to 
pure practical reason when and if pure thought oversteps 
its boundary. He sees such an overstepping if pure reason 
attempts to give an explanation of how pure reason can be 
practical.
Kant now seems to leap over this difficulty by 
postulating that a declaration of finding freedom in 
the intelligible world as impossible for reason's 
comprehension can be reversed! Explanation of such a
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reversal has Kant requiring us to go through another step. 
We can assume that beneath outward appearances, things in 
themselves are hidden from us. But, instead of assuming 
the laws governing the activity of the hidden are the same 
as those which govern the world of appearance, we can just 
as logically expect them to be different. (Kant FMM, 79) 
Law, order, unity, harmony, freedom, love, truth, 
beauty, and justice are terms that we cam assume to be 
universal and necessary concepts that rational man 
accepts as being appropriate ones. Kant states that for 
our subjective thought, there is no possibility of 
explaining the will's freedom, just as there is no 
possibility of discovering and explaining the interest of 
man in moral laws. But, Kant tells us, man does take an 
interest in them. Kant tells us this moral feeling is not 
a standard for moral judgments, but has an effect on man. 
He sees the law (given by objective reason alone) as the 
cause practical reason needs to accept this subjective 
effect on the will. (Kant FMM, 80)
We find that Kant's above assumption that the laws 
of intelligibility are different (opposite and free) from 
the law of necessity (non-free determinations of objects) 
in the natural world is a logically possible assumption.
If so, then how can the two laws be reconciled? This is 
similar to the original problem of this thesis. Is 
'reason alone' (as the deterministic factor of the 
finite natural world) in conflict with or compatible with 
'faith' (the concept of man's freedom to have an input 
into his own destiny)?
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We can perceive that if the natural world concepts 
are grounded in the intelligible world, and the fact that 
Kant tells us pure practical reason cannot comprehend 
suppositions of freedom, then we have a case of two 
different synthetic a priori propositions that need a 
synthesis— a connection that we hope will be one that 
establishes the unity necessary between them to work 
for the universal and necessity premises previously 
posited. Kant tells us that such a connection must be 
a cognition in which the two different synthetic a priori 
propositions are grounded. (Kant FMM, 65)
However, Kant goes no further than this. In fact, 
it was earlier in his treatise (concerning the postulate 
of autonomy of the will, and his drawing the principle of 
morality from it), that we were first told that two 
different synthetic a priori propositions must be 
connected by a third cognition in which these two 
are grounded. (Hegel's 'Notion' does this task for us.
The term 'Notion' is not a simple one to explain nor to 
understand. It is defined and interpreted in the next 
chapter of this thesis called the Hegelian chapter).
At this stage of his ethical metaphysical 
foundations, Kant stopped short of showing how a reversal 
of the natural law did not create conflict with reason in 
the intelligible world, but was unified with it. We need 
to go beyond this original treatise of Kant to find that 
Hegel gives us a solution identifying the ground of both 
in the original Oneness of the Absolute Mind (also the 
Absolute Idea, and Absolute Spirit) as explicitly stated
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in the Hegelian chapter. Hegel shows this 'Oneness' by way 
of a deductive, and logically necessitated set of 
universal categories emanating from that original Being 
called God. Chapter four gives Hegel's reasoning to 
substantiate such unification.
Theodore M. Greene and John R.Silber wrote an 
English translation of Kant's book Religion within the 
Limits of Reason Alone (first published in 1793). (4)
According to the opinion of these authors in their 
introductory remarks, Kant had not laid a foundation in 
his analysis of human will to rationally justify the 
interrelationships between freedom, rationality and 
sensibility that he proposed. Without a common ground 
as a basis for the unity needed, Kant had merely defined 
will as abstract reason by the word ('Wille') and as a 
faculty of desire by the word ('Willkur'). He did not show 
how these two aspects of the will could be united in a 
single faculty of volition.
Rationality and sensibility need unity to account 
for the experience of obligation. The Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morality was written in 1885 and did not 
(according to Greene) give sufficient grounds within the 
concept of the human will to establish a basis for the 
unity needed for the required interrelationships proposed 
in Kant's theory of ethics. Therefore the next section 
is considered as highly essential for the reader to see 
the essential contributions Kant made in later years to 
his analysis of his concept of the human will— an 
elaboration which was amplified even further by Hegel's
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premise of the 'Oneness of the Absolute Mind' being the 
common ground of all (which would include the basic 
connection or ground between duty and autonomy as found in 
the human will).
SECTION FOUR 
BATTLE WITHIN THE WILL
In Kant's second critique, The Critique of 
Practical Reason (written in 1788), he posed the will as 
being either heteronomous or autonomous. Man, however, 
finds by his experience of guilt (caused by failure to 
carry out his maxim which is in accordance with the 
Categorical Imperative) that his will is heteronomous 
in action while being autonomous in its conscious 
intentionality. (Kant R/LR, Ixxvii)
Greene continues in his Introduction to the 
Religion to argue that prior to this book, Kant's concept 
of the human will was not sufficient enough in its depth 
to account for man's moral experience in regard to his 
will. Greene found that the Religion is Kant's earliest 
and only sustained analysis of the human will that shows a 
faculty of volition sufficiently capable of willing both 
happiness (through the sensual input of 'Willkur') and 
virtue (through the rational input of will called 
'Wille' by Kant).
Faced with these two alternatives (and both good in 
their basically different ways), the 'Willkur' seeks an 
immediate solution. However, the 'Willkur' realizes from 
input from the 'Wille' that it needs to be free from such 
temptation in order to freely declare a self-maxim that is
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in accordance with a self-accepted universal 'Categorical 
Imperative.' This course of choice is needed in order to 
act in one's external conduct in accordance with the 
universal demands of a moral maxim that can be created 
only by an absolutely good will.
We see Kant finding the will (as 'Willkur') as a 
unitary faculty where sense and rationality have a common 
meeting place— here, obligation is a constraint of the law 
on the temptation of will to reject it. (Kant R/LR, xcvi) 
Kant makes an issue of what constitutes an evil nature of 
man versus a good nature. He finds this in the order of 
subordination— does man subordinate the demands of the 
moral law ('Wille') to the immediate solution for the 
specific moral problem at hand as demanded by natural 
sensual inclinations? If so, the decision maker is 
considered morally evil. On the other hand, a good man 
is one who consciously subordinates his sensible nature 
to that of his moral nature. Kant sees this latter 
alternative as expressing one's freedom and power as a 
truly free being.
The above tendency to subordinate the desires of 
the 'Willkur' to that of the 'Wille' or visa versa is what 
Kant now finds expression in his concept of 'Gesinnung'
(or in English, 'disposition'). In the Religion, Kant 
develops his concept of 'disposition' as being the 
ultimate subjective ground within a person— the ground 
where one chooses to subordinate his sensory impulses to 
the rational law (or to do the opposite) each time an 
ethical decision is to be reached.
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Greene now explains why he thinks Kant's concept 
called the 'disposition' is the most important single 
contribution of this work to Kant's ethics. He feels 
that this concept allows Kant to keep continuity and 
responsibility (in the free workings of the 'Willkur'), 
and to have an ambivalent volition to be included in 
complexities found within the faculty called the human 
will. (Kant R/LR, cxv)
Greene goes on to quote Kant as saying:
The disposition, i.e., the ultimate subjective ground 
of the adoption of maxims, can only be one and applies 
universally to the whole use of freedom.
(Kant /LR, cxv)
As such, the disposition (as the incentive 
behind the willing or rejecting of the spirit of moral 
law) establishes the morality of the acts of the 
'Willkur'. Included within the 'Willkur' is another of 
the 'Willkur's' functions— it must freely accept the 
disposition's choice of its maxim (if man is morally 
responsible). The disposition therefore determines the 
intelligible or noumenal character of the 'willkur' while 
specific actions (those performed in the external world 
stemming from one's internal maxims) create its phenomenal 
character.
My short summary of a translator's explanation of 
Kant's concept of the 'disposition' found in the human 
will may be acceptable only to those familiar with Kant's 
total presentation of it. Readers desiring further details 
substantiating the high points I have selected to give a 
general basis for Kant's 'disposition' can find them on or
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near the pages quoted in my end notes concerning these 
high points.
As free, the 'Willkur' is spontaneous in each 
separate specific maxim, and not predetermined by what it 
was prior to such a new determination. It is also not 
undetermined nor indeterminate. The disposition, in its 
freedom, is its own law. Acts are determined by whom the 
subject-self is. Kant sees us as finding out who we are 
not only by observation of our external actions, but by 
inferring from them the quality of our moral character. He 
sees our 'disposition' as being an indication of our full 
true nature which is freely (but not always consciously) 
willed in every present moment. It is a continuity 
unsupported by outside predeterminable forces and as 
such, is essential to moral self-identity. (Kant R/LR, 38)
According to Greene, Kant thus leads us to see our 
'Willkur' (acting in its fully integrated capacity which 
includes 'disposition') is the ground of our moral 
responsibility. We can therefore conclude with Kant, that 
the 'Willkur' (as defined) must select and reflect one 
incentive above all others— this incentive is made a 
self-maxim which will be the determinate foundation for a 
person's subsequent moral conduct in the external world.
Another conclusion of Kant's analysis of the will 
was that, dispositionally, there is no compromise between 
the good and the evil will. The will is either one or the 
other. He shows the reader the range of what constitutes 
his concept of the good and the range of what constitutes 
his concept of evil. With no compromise between the two
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concepts, there can be no intermediate transition at the 
midpoint between the two alternatives. (Kant R/LR, cxxvi)
A brief injection of information from natural 
science may be helpful at this point. Kant has made a 
spontaneous jump between evil and good. Such action is 
known in science as a second order discontinuity or a 
spontaneous jump from one line of continuation to an 
entirely new line of continuation without any continuity 
found to exist between them. This phenomena is found in 
the field of physics where a linear function does not 
continue in a linear fashion as previously, but with an 
additional cause/effect increment, it spontaneously 
discontinues its former path as predicted and establishes 
a new and different string of cause and effect 
relationships.
The above analogy (taken from the realm of physical 
science as experienced in the natural world) seems 
significant to show that Kant has logical justification 
for posing an alternative view to the one which finds 
polar opposites as ratio mixtures where there is no such 
thing as either opposite being entirely cleansed and 
completely independent of the other.
The overall effect of the 'Willkur' as described in 
this section does give us a rational basis for an 
understanding of the constraint of the law (through 
persuasion of its testimony) upon the temptations of the 
'Willkur's' desires to reject such a proposed moral law. 
Greene states that by such a conception of the 'Willkur', 
Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' is confirmed by his
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analysis of evil volition— an analysis which shows the 
decline of virtue and power of the good to a point it 
spontaneously ceases to be good and leaps into the realm 
of the evil volition.
SECTION FIVE 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC VIEWS AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON THE CONCEPT OF LIMITED FREEDOM FOR 
RATIONAL AND SPIRITUAL MAN
In light of modern scientific laws (based on 
empirical observation and subseguent demonstrable sensory 
examples, some readers may be interested in Appendix I 
which gives a detailed example to show logical, 
experimental, and experiential corroboration of the 
premise that modern man has a realistic certainty of a 
limited freedom of choice in influencing his own personal 
destiny. (See Appendix I, 223)
My own convictions (based on many examples of the 
scale of observation creating the phenomenon man observes) 
are similar to those of many other scientists in dealing 
with laws made to express relationships of objects in our 
natural world (and the similar reactions of all rational 
beings have to external objects).
A conclusion to the above is that there is a common 
rational ground of being which maintains the connection 
(or a commonality) between the particular entities of the 
entire universe. Unfortunately, this premise is a 'first 
premise1 and therefore cannot be substantiated in the same 
manner we corroborate subsequent dependent facts by 
demonstrable repetitions of specifically given determinate 
causes and their subsequent binding effects— relationships
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that allow man reasonable control of his finite and 
relatively non-free material world.
Therefore, we can only hope (on faith in the 
natural unity and harmony generally prevailing in the 
world) that there is a high degree of correspondence to 
the universal laws applicable to the entire range of 
phenomena and to those universal laws applicable to 
nomena.
SECTION SIX 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In concluding this chapter, pertinent paragraphs 
giving correlations and explanatory parallels to 
appropriate aspects of Kant's Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals are in order.
Like all pure practical reason, empirical proof 
of any practical premises cannot be obtained by reason 
itself, but these premises can be reasonably interpreted 
as guides to action. However, no action can change the 
pure objective status of the Categorical Imperative 
against which the moral agent can only zero beat her/his 
moral choices. For Kant, no human actions can ever fulfill 
or justify the (K2) Categorial Imperative.
We find St Paul in Chapter 7 of the Book of 
Romans in the New Testament implicitly corroborating 
the "Categorical Imperative" by his famous "woe is me" 
confession:
I can will what is right ['Categorical Imperative'] 
but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want 
[my actions do not carry out the intent of the will 
or the maxim of the 'Categorical Imperative'] but
the evil I do not want is what I do! ..... So then,
I of myself serve the law of God [moral law similar
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to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'], but with my 
flesh I serve the law of sin.
We can easily correlate this scripture to Kant's 
eventual conviction that we cannot determine the moral 
worth of an action because it will always be contaminated 
by outside influences other than the categorical 
imperative. However, Kant agrees with St. Paul (who said 
it first) that the law of his inner self is in accordance 
with the law of God. Kant proclaims the law of the will 
as being free. It does desire to act freely in accordance 
with the "Categorical Imperative." Significant insights 
(showing how the Biblical imperatives can be correlated 
with the intent of an autonomous will's maxim) can be 
achieved if the reader subjects each imperative to the 
criteria and methodology of this thesis's final paradigm.
The above premises are used by Kant to logically 
connect the fact of the will being a law to itself. He 
connects it by its also being an expression of the 
principle of acting to no other maxim than that which can 
also have itself as a universal law or its object. As this 
principle is also the formula for his "Categorical 
Imperative", the logical conclusion is that a free will 
and a will under moral laws are identical.
Perhaps, at this point, an non-verbalizable sense 
of danger is felt by applying as a true analogy, the 
necessitated knowledge of the cause and effect of the 
natural finite world as being similar to the unknown free 
world of uncontaminated reason— an analogy which 
necessitates freedom as being subject to the same law of 
cause and effect as it is found in the finite necessity of
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the natural world.
Postulating a presupposed freedom of the will, Kant 
can state the principle of morality. He finds it to be a 
synthetic proposition that "an absolutely good will is one 
whose maxim can always include itself as a universal law." 
(Kant FMM, 56)
We recall it is necessary for the cognition of 
different synthetic propositions to be connected through 
their common ground in a third cognition. At this stage, 
Kant states that pure practical reason in itself is not 
capable of providing a basis (a posteriori experience of 
the connection) for the deduction of the concept of 
freedom.
To deduce the concept of freedom, Kant first states 
a premise that freedom must be presupposed as the property 
of the will of all rational beings. Freedom must also be 
demonstrated. The will must also be shown to be that of a 
rational person. If a rational being regards reason as the 
source of reason's principles, then that being must regard 
itself as free. Kant states that if we act as if we were 
free, the results of subsequent actions taken on decisions 
made in believed freedom will demonstrate to that 
individual rational being that he did have indeed a free 
will. Use of such premises can lead to practical results 
never to be obtained unless tried.
I am sure that most rational beings seek 
substantiation of conclusions reached that are primarily 
based upon their own personal experiences. Most find that 
they believe they possess at least a limited free will in
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a moral sense. Reality of the results achieved in acting 
in a moral manner forces us to cognitively accept the 
limitation of the will's power. It does this by the fact 
that our intended results never measured up to what our 
will really wanted to accomplish.
Therefore, we can see Kant as giving us in his 
reasoning, a definition of 'faith' in the following 
sense— that when one tests out a untried hypothesis (based 
on 'faith' in a presupposed and non deductive premise), 
the subsequent experience itself gives us an understanding 
that we could not have had otherwise. The results obtained 
by this type of a self-experience are substantiated by St. 
Anselm's experiences when he risked acting on belief, then 
experienced, and after experiencing, understood.
Now, reflective reasoning helps us understand the 
freedom of our will in a rational way as well as the 
experiential way that Jesus Christ promised when He asked 
rational beings to actively seek the truth. If one did, 
then the truth of the morality laws would make us 
free— free to freely accept a unity offered to us in 
spite of our rebellion to being a unified part of the 
universal whole.
It is difficult for many modern rational beings to 
understand the concept Kant had when he stated that reason 
would overstep its bounds if it tried to explain (in 
conceptual terms) how pure reason can be practical. Kant 
considered this situation as being the same problem as 
giving a conceptual idea of how freedom is possible. The 
law of cause and effect, which has been so effectively
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used in the control of finite necessity entities, has no 
room for free choice to interfere with its concepts which 
work so well in the finite natural world. We find Kant as 
stating freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of 
which can in no way be shown according to natural laws, or 
in any possible experience. (Kant FMM. 66)
Freedom of the will, according to Kant, must be 
presupposed as the property of all rational beings. He 
sees morality as a law for rational beings. However, one 
cannot be held responsible to do an ought, unless man is 
capable of and free to do so. In Kant's presentation of 
the 'Categorical Imperative', he admits that in this 
temporal world, man cannot achieve that which the 
imperative demands, a holiness of will. A contradiction 
exists when a demand for moral achievement is made, a 
demand which cannot be met and yet holds man accountable 
for. Such a choice constitutes not only the necessity of 
the autonomy of the rational will, but also requires a 
postulate of immortality in order to be able to give man 
hope to achieve the moral perfection of a holy will. We 
therefore find in Kant's treatise two of his three main 
metaphysical postulates— those of freedom, and 
immortality.
Before leaving Kant, it needs to be again mentioned 
that he felt that our sincere intentions to carry out 
moralistic actions in accordance with the "Categorical 
Imperative" justify our 'moral worthiness' in spite of the 
fact our actions fall far short of carrying out the 
universal maxim as a perfect 'holiness of will'.
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Nevertheless, of the readers who have a fairly educated 
Christian religious background, many will know of others 
who have a feeling that a spiritual person can earn 
moral worthiness by his/her actions. Such a premise is a 
legalistic and logically reasonable solution for obtaining 
immortality.
However, Biblical teachings (especially St.
Paul's) view such legalistic and logical solutions as 
unacceptable. Therefore Kant's answer to man's potential 
propensity to radical evil as being justifiably off set by 
God's Divine Grace can be elaborated upon by different 
Biblical teachings pertaining to 'Grace' and its 
relationship to evil.
Kant has indicated to us that moral perfection must 
be 'posited' in the holiness of a man's disposition. 
However, he is wary enough to not equate the holy 
disposition as identical with the concept of a supreme 
righteousness of moral perfection in the deed itself.
This position allows Kant to recognize that any such 
righteousness attained by a good disposition is "A 
righteousness that is not our own." We can also see with 
him that such a righteousness is one that logically can be 
given to us by such a concept as that of God's divine 
grace.
Who really knows? We must have lost sight that 
both worlds that Kant took into consideration have their 
initial premises based on faith (an innate feeling of 
conviction that we are in the grasp of what Tillich calls 
the power of Being (K3), and others call 'GOD') rather
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than upon rational proof (K2). We test our actions 
taken on our initial beliefs when guided by models we now 
call paradigms. These paradigms are practical according to
the measure they can help us attain our moral (and
hopefully practically realistic) intentions in our worldly 
lives.
This chapter has briefly presented Kant's proposed 
Foundations and excerpts from the Religion in support of 
metaphysical moral premises. Such premises serve as a 
general foundation for subsequent generations to create 
appropriate moral paradigms— models that reflect our 
increasing knowledge in this area. It has also presented 
additional substantiations to support the thesis that 
Kant's 'Categorical Imperative ' is a highly rational 
proposal that is applicable to all rational beings. It 
can be conceived as a universally valid concept for people 
of various cultures and stages of technological, 
sociological, and spiritual development in our human 
history.
We can perceive and perhaps experience it if we can 
combine our innate desire for peace and unity with Kant's
rational persuasion— that (although not provable by a
virtual certainty obtained by repeatable and demonstrable 
sensory evidence), the idea of a pure intelligible and 
moral world can still be a useful and permissible idea. 
Such an idea is one that corroborates the concept of a 
rational faith.
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(Kant R/LR, cxiv)
5. Lecomte de Nouy, Human Destiny, (New York: 
Longmans, Green and CO, INC. 1947) 15-24.
CHAPTER 4
HEGEL
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) has 
been credited by many as having developed the most 
complete comprehensive and systematic philosophy of modern 
times. A German Idealist, Hegel followed a path set by 
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which was a synthesis of 
sensory experience (Empiricism) with truths obtained by 
reason alone (Rationalism). However, to solve the problem 
of the non-freedom of the human will in the phenomenal 
world (Kl) and the freedom of the will in the noumenal 
world (K2), Kant had to split reality into a world of 
appearances (phenomena) and the (noumenal) world of things 
in themselves as they really are. (In chapter one, page 
ten, (Kl) was identified as a subjective self-knowledge 
characterized by the self's sensing, imagining, and 
perceptions of sensory experience; (K2) as "unbiased 
rational (noumenal) conceptional knowledge based on 
external data as well as objective-self a priori 
concepts"; and (K3) was defined as "that mode of 
knowledge which is a result of self-mediation— a 
means by which a commonality is established to reconcile 
or establish a working relationships between polarities 
such as 'faith' and 'reason'". These supposedly 
irreconcilable opposites (determination of phenomenon in 
the nature world [including natural man] versus the 
freedom of moral acts in the noumenal world of man) were
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asserted by Kant to be independent of each other and not 
interacting with each other. (3)
Yet Kant could not speak of moral problems without 
presupposing their complete interaction. The human 
experience of moral action can be taken as an illustration 
of such interaction between the opposites of determinism 
(non-freedom) and freedom. If the same human will was not 
both moral and natural at the same time in both realms, 
moral experience would be impossible. Such an experience 
presupposes a temptation in (Kl) subjective inclination 
(in the 'willkur') to be present in the noumenal realm 
(K2) of man's will (wille). At the same time, moral 
experience presupposes the ability of the moral self 
(wille) to change the perceived world of appearances to an 
order of what ought-to-be according to the obligation to 
the moral law within the will. A conclusion drawn by Kant 
from the above reasoning was that a rational moral person 
in the phenomenal world is obligated to seek a change in 
it in order that the highest good (a union of the two 
opposites) might be more effectively achieved in the 
phenomenal world.
Kant's approach to the problem of man's nomenal 
sense of ought-to-be versus what he finds 'is' in the 
phenomenal world was rationally limited by his inability 
to establish a rational unity between two different 
synthetic a priori propositions; (1) Rational beings can 
perceive that natural world concepts are grounded in the 
intelligible world (K2); and (2) Pure practical reason 
cannot comprehend the presuppositions of freedom.
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Any unity to be established between them must be by a 
cognition in which the two are grounded. (5)
Kant saw the rational necessity of establishing a 
common ground between the opposites of non-freedom and 
freedom in the will of a rational being, but (within the 
subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge he 
was operating with) could not rationally justify such a 
ground.
To the inquiring mind which seeks knowledge for 
knowledge's sake, Hegel's 'Notion' performs the task of 
establishing a common ground for the unification of the 
subjective self (Kl) and its 'other' (the objective self 
as [K2]). Therefore, this chapter examines the Hegelian 
solution that identifies the ground that unites both (Kl) 
and (K2) as being in the original Oneness of the 'Absolute 
Mind' (also known as the Absolute Idea' and 'Absolute 
Spirit').
Why is Hegel so important to this thesis? He is 
important because his system is an advancement on 
Kant's in the realm of ethics and morality. However, the 
primary reason is that his 'Notion' is a rational and 
self-developed methodology that resolves the (Kl) and (K2) 
conflicts found in the initial phases of his spheres 
of Logic, Nature, and Spirit (and in the derivations of 
the subsystems within each sphere). Therefore, the 
categories of Hegel's 'Notion' have been utilized as 
foundation stones of my thesis paradigm. This paradigm has 
been formulated to serve as a basic standard (exemplar) to 
guide any solutions of (Kl) and (K2) types of conflict
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that arise in the minds of modern rational (spiritual) 
beings.
We, as finite human beings are also partially 
infinite (as participators in and as an effect of the 
infinite itself). Hegel's 'Notion' identifies the evolving 
relationship between all polarities (opposites such as 
hope versus despair). Such opposites are to be found in 
both the natural (phenomenal) world and the rational 
(nomenal) world. Hegel identifies a relationship
between all such polarities in the term "Identity of the
Opposites" while still allowing the polarities to maintain
their individual identities such as finite versus
infinite, the one and the many, and the subjective-self 
versus the objective-self. I see the 'Notion' as vitally 
relevant to rational spiritual beings. It gives hope and 
rational justification to a mode of knowledge (K3) which 
had not been acknowledged by those limiting all objective 
and unbiased knowledge to be the (K2) mode of knowledge. 
With the inception of the (K3) mode of knowledge, rational 
man now has hope of playing an important part of his own 
destiny rather than being a mere creature of nature and 
subject only to determinate causes and effects beyond his 
volitional will's ability to effect a change from what 
'is' to what ought-to-be.
This chapter will therefore give Hegel's own 
definition of his doctrine 'Identity of the Opposites' 
before attempting a summary of its application to the 
Philosophy of Right, and the Philosophy of Religion as
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they progressively appear in the development of the 
'Notion1
SECTION ONE 
HEGEL'S 'NOTION'
Hegel's definition of his term 'Notion' is:
a being which in passing outwards into its 
opposite passes only into itself, and this 
opposite does not become anything different, 
but remains, even in the opposition, 
completely identical with itself. (2)
Hegel's 'Notion' became the primary "moment" 
of his ontology because of his predecessors' impasse 
between 'being' as immediacy and 'essence' as categorical 
mediation. The contradiction that resulted by such 
mediation could be resolved by what Hegel called 
self-mediation as the vital third phase of actualization. 
He accomplished this by presenting the 'Notion' as a 
concept of a being which in its 'opposite' remains 
identical with itself (or self-mediation). By going beyond 
the contradiction, the 'Notion' becomes a synthesis of 
being (Kl) and essence as (K2) in a fully actualized 
essence 'identical' with itself.
Turning to Logic, Hegel sought a system of Logic 
with a method— a system that reaches judgments with a 
measure of certainty for its accumulative knowledge. He 
felt that only the dialectical method could obtain such 
desired results.
Paul Johnson, in his book The Critique of 
Thought, states that Hegel does not use the dialectic 
terms, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the way these 
terms are often attributed to Hegel. The three stages are
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not two different propositions synthesized into a third 
proposition in order to obtain a unity of the identity and 
a unity of the differences between self and what seems to 
be another self. (3)
For Johnson, Hegel's first term is a determination 
of thought, not a thesis or proposition. Hegel's second 
term of his notion, when seen in dialectic, is not an 
opposing proposition (Antithesis) but some judgment formed 
by the understanding (my K2) based on simple apprehension 
(my Kl). His third term then, as found in logical thought 
(my K3), (and as a term of unification of the first two 
determinations of thought) is expressed as the syllogism.
(3)
Reflection upon Johnson's comments concerning 
the thoughts of the knower, (the structure of such thought 
by the knower about the being of that which is sought to 
be known by the knower) led to a dialogue with my 
advisors. My subsequent insight (on re-reading of Hegel's 
logic on the dialectical method) is that the third step of 
thought by the knower in his/her logical thought (to grasp 
the essence of the being the knower's thoughts are 
directed upon) must reflect the ontological concept of 
Hegel's 'Notion'— the concept that the third term is a 
self-mediation (my K3) of a being whose first two 
determinations (immediacy as being, and essence as 
mediation) are only moments that become unified in the 
self-mediation of a initial abstract being (reason)— a 
being whose flow of thought upon itself and about itself 
create not only its own content, but does so with a
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rational structure of abstract thought in its first 
two movements to reach a culmination of relatively 
concrete actualization through thought's successive 
moments of thought— thought concerning a specific and 
determinate 'Other' (from its potentiality to its actual 
becoming in the existent world).
At this point, we can see Hegel's conclusion.
Reason, as object, is reason from the side of being.
Reason as subject, is reason as seen from the side of the
knower. The 'concept' unites being and knowing in absolute 
reason. They are identical in their differences.
Therefore, in the complete structure of thought (in a 
being of completed thought about itself), the form is the
content, and the content is the form. The ontological
steps of the dialectical flow are immediacy, mediation, 
and self-mediation. Their parallel identities in the 
structure of thought are simple apprehension, judgment, 
and syllogism.
By repeated cyclic use of the moments of the 
'Notion', the "synthesis" of the subjective self-identity 
with its contradictory 'other' (or 'others') creates the 
resultant subjective identity— an open identity which 
continually grows goes through the same process of the 
moments within the 'Notion' to resolve contradictions 
and reach higher levels of dialectical "synthesis". By 
this means, Hegel seeks to deduce all subsequent 
categories, geneses, species, and individuals that exist 
in the sensory world and/or the mental world.
Our main emphasis in this chapter will be what
Hegel said about his newly introduced term of 
self-mediation as it is found within the unity of his 
'Notion'. By such self-mediation, the 'absolute identity' 
absorbs the differences within itself and also becomes an 
'identity of opposites'. This principle of reason allows 
'opposites' to emerge as absolute identities while yet 
being absolutely distinct. Critical examination of the 
actual relationships between apparently completely 
opposite and irreconcilable polarities (plus and minus, 
good and evil, etc;.) is carried out by self-reflective 
reasoning (vernunft) of the subjective self— this is a 
type of reasoning which I see as (K3).
(K3) at this point, may be viewed as a progressive 
mode of being (knowledge as that which is identical to 
being in the noumenal world of pure reason) which will 
include more and more concrete universals as temporal time 
passes for human thought. (We could consider this basic 
category of being (and mode of knowledge) as a gift of 
self-mediative perception from the 'Subjective' 
ground-of-being itself to all autonomous rational and 
spiritual temporal beings as they exist in the natural 
world.
(* please note that the utilization of the level of 
thinking considered under the (K3) designation can only 
rationally find an identity between the polarities of the 
opposites when operating under the self-explained premise 
of pure reason as the self-determined, self-posited, and 
self-developing antecedent to all consequences found in 
the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. See last paragraph
on this page for any further elaboration)
By means of a deductive movement of the three 
concepts of: (1) universality; (2) particularity; and
(3) singularity, Hegel's 'Notion' is a self description of 
the dialectical method Hegel found as being a rational 
self-explanatory way of combining what each of the first 
two moments of the 'Notion' had kept separate. They kept: 
(1) understanding (K2) (which insisted upon distinction, 
difference, and negation between entities of different 
classes or categories from; (2) identities of all 
particulars within each distinctive category.
We can sum up the above by stating that (K2)'s 
principles find that different entities (such as A and B) 
are either distinctive or identical. 'Verstand' (K2), or 
(reflective) mediation, seems to express only the 
differences of the 'opposites', but Hegel shows us that in 
actual reflective self-mediation (K3), A and B are seen to 
be both identical and different. Therefore, the principle 
of reason (as 'vernunft') brings both natures of objects 
into unity by the formula Hegel calls the 'Identity of 
Opposites'. Pure reason has therefore found for itself, 
a reasonable explanation (as a self-explained and 
self-determined one) to logically show that what is 
different (A from B) is also identical (as expressed 
by the formula A is not [not-A]).
Such a resolution of all polarities is only 
rationally possible when the original cause of every thing 
is postulated as pure reason— a reason which in itself is 
self-determined, self-posited, and self-developing. By his
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dialectic, everything in the noumemal and phenomenal world 
originates by the drive and self development of pure 
reason itself.
It is only by the culmination of successive 
recycling of the triadic steps of development in thought 
itself about itself, that the 'Absolute Idea1 continues 
creating particular (concrete) universals that are either 
'appearances' of or completed essences (actualities) of 
the phenomenal objects we perceive in our natural and 
temporal world.
The speculative characteristic forms of pure 
reason need to be associated with practical reason 
(through actual experience) for rational man to accept 
such speculative (pure reason alone) postulates. The next 
section will therefore deal with the ethical concepts of 
thought that become actualized in the form of ethical 
institutions in the external world man in which man 
exists.
SECTION TWO 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
In Hegelian philosophy, the third sphere of his 
system is called the category of the spirit. As the 
synthesis of the triad, Spirit is the unity of the Logical 
Idea and nature. The pure mind (pure reason) in the Logic 
went over into its opposite in nature (the irrational). 
Hegel's dialectic leads us through a thought process of 
reason that at first finds spirit separated from its 
structural form in the sphere of Logic. Seeking a solution 
to this conflict of opposites, thought (through a process
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of self-mediation) realizes that through the spirits of 
particulars known as human beings, Spirit can become 
Absolute Spirit (or Absolute Idea). In its fullest 
development (through the realm of spirit in spiritual and 
rational human beings), Spirit can return to itself as an 
enriched rationality. In this way, Spirit becomes 
increasingly subjective and less a substance.
Hegel's dialectic applied to the philosophy of 
spirit falls into three main spheres; (1) the human spirit 
viewed subjectively (our thesis's (Kl) wherein Spirit is 
only implicit); (2) Spirit progresses (by moments of 
reason) out of itself into an external objectivity (K2). 
This external world is not a world of irrational nature, 
but an objective world of spiritual institutions; and (3) 
through the process of self-mediation, Absolute Spirit is 
(K3) or the unification of the Logical Idea and nature.
As (K3), it transcends the finitude of both the subjective 
spirit and the objective spirit. Absolute Spirit or 
Absolute Idea, as self-determined, self-posited, and 
self-developing is infinite in its potentialities. By 
reabsorbing the concrete particularities from the 
subjective spirit and the objective spirit stages of 
thought, the Absolute Idea (Absolute Spirit) needs to be 
both finite and infinite at the same time. (Hegel calls 
such a unity the 'true infinite'.
It has been previously mentioned that speculative 
forms of pure reason need to be associated with practical 
reason that is associated with actual experience for 
rational man to accept speculative (pure reason)
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postulates. Therefore, we will look at the external 
objective spirit as it is expressed through the Philosophy 
of Right or Law. It is the first institution of the 
spiritual and objective institutions of law, morality and 
the state.
My thoughts and comments upon the Philosophy of 
Right, and the role of the human will in regard to the 
concept of right are based upon my study and subsequent 
acceptance of T. M. Knox's presentation of this concept in 
his introduction to his book Philosophy of Right. (5)
Knox's translative definitions of the terms used in 
(as he saw Hegel using them) are as follows: (1) 'Right'
is a term meaning civil law, morality, ethical life, and 
world history; (2) Thought is defined as a product of 
thinking; (3) Philosophy is the thinking of the 
universal. Objective thoughts are universals, or abstract 
and different from concrete particulars. The universal is 
therefore the form (structure) , and the content of this 
form is the particular; and (4) The 'concept' or 'Notion' 
is essentially the 'Identity of the opposites'.
Understanding (verstand) distinguishes between form 
and content, universal and particular, but does not find a 
common ground to unify these opposing concepts. The 
understanding faculty of mind (K2) does not comprehend 
that a 'thought' is not an empty or abstract entity, but 
is a determinant of itself. The essence of thought is its 
concreteness and such a concrete thought is what Hegel 
calls the 'concept' (Knox, viii) My presentation of the 
definitions of the concepts, as Hegel used them in the
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development of the 1objective-Notion' of the final sphere 
of the triad (Spirit), was to let the reader see Hegel's 
consistency in his triadic development of the logic 
itself, natural man and nature, and in the development 
of spirit in the noumenal nature of the rational being 
called man.
Knox finds Hegel as viewing the 'concept1 as the 
thought that determines itself and gives itself a content. 
It is therefore a 'universal' that particularizes 
itself— the thought that creates itself, forms itself, 
gives itself an content, and determines itself to be the 
form. Concrete is defined as a thought that is not empty, 
but is self-determining and self-particularizing. Knox 
finds Hegel viewing the 'concept' as being the inward 
principle of all reality.
Hegel used the term 'Idea' as being the concept 
viewed concretely, or in synthesis with the content it 
gives itself. As such, the 'Idea' is the 'concept' insofar 
as the 'concept' gives reality and existence to itself.
As self-determined, the 'Idea' (or reason, or truth) is 
the unity (Identity) of subject and object, of form and 
content.
Knox finds Hegel telling us that in the objective 
spirit, human freedom is expressed through the will.
The will is defined as that property of the subject which 
is active in molding and altering both the internal and 
external world to what the subject thinks these worlds 
ought to be. Will objectifies itself in the external world 
and this objective spirit is considered by Hegel as the
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sphere of the 'right' or 'law'. 'Right' or 'law' is 
therefore the objective universality of the will in 
general (Knox, 3 6)
Hegel also tells us that a rationally conscious 
individual who is aware of itself as subject (but also 
aware of the external world of the 'other') is a person.
As a person, self-determined and self-enclosed, this 
entity is an infinite universal and therefore cannot be 
treated as a means to an end. As a person, one has both 
rights and duties. Hegel therefore informs us that the 
general law of the 'right' is, "Be a person and respect 
other persons". (Hegel, 382)
The subject matter of the science of 'right' in 
the Philosophy of Right is the Idea of right (or the 
concept of right) in conjunction with the actualization of 
that concept. I felt that Knox's effort to help the 
reader apprehend the 'rights' of persons as something 
inherently rational was accomplished. Knox's Introduction 
to his book leads the reader through the origination and 
development of the rational will of persons. Hegel 
develops the idea of the absolutely free will by the first 
moment of the will being immediate and abstract. The 
embodiment of the 'concept' is seen to be an immediate 
externality— the sphere of abstract or formal 'right'. The 
next stage is the will's reflection from its objective and 
external embodiment back into its subjective-self. It 
becomes, at this point a subjective individuality in 
opposition to the universal (or the right of the 
subjective will compared to the right of the world). By
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unifying the partial truths of both of these abstract 
moments, the Idea of the good is grasped by thought in the 
subjective will and in the objective world. This unity, in 
spite of the opposites still maintained, is accomplished 
through the freedom of the will (as the common ground of 
the unity of the subjective and objective aspects of the 
rational being). Therefore freedom is real in the sense 
that it is found in both the internal and external ethical 
life of a person. (Knox, 3 6)
Therefore, the reader's practical reason can grasp 
that an unity of seemingly opposing opposites can be 
reached through the dialectic of self-mediation. The 
'Notion', or Absolute Idea is therefore the idea of a 
being which in its opposite is identical with itself and 
therefore mediates itself. (Hegel, 223)
We have followed the stages of thought Hegel 
discovered to arrive at his concept called by various 
names such as 'Identity of Opposites', 'The Absolute 
Idea', 'Divine Subjectivity (inclusive of objectivity)', 
the 'Absolute Mind', and the 'Ground of all Being'. The 
latter term will be used in the chapter on Paul Tillich. 
Bernard J. F. Lonergan in his book INSIGHT - A Study of 
Human Understanding described Metaphysics as "that 
department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, 
transforms, and unifies all other departments of human 
understanding". We can see that Lonergan's definition of 
Metaphysics is remarkably similar (in what it implies 
about Metaphysics) to Hegel's 'Notion'.
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SECTION THREE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The next few paragraphs are my distillation of the 
abstract comprehensions of Hegel and Lonergan in their 
solutions to unify all other (Kl) and (K2) departments of 
knowledge by a (K3) form of knowledge— a form which does 
indeed underlie, penetrate, transform, and unify the polar 
opposites of subjective-self and objective-self as they 
are found in rational beings.
Briefly, the first moment of pure reason is 
described as an indeterminate being. As indeterminate 
initially), (Kl) is a continual evolving totality or sum 
of its own rational drive of being, becoming, and the 
infinite substance field of identical no-things.
Reason, as a determinate form of thought about 
itself, becomes a progression of inward thoughts about 
itself. These determinate form of thoughts (K2) are 
moments during which (K2) forms of thought separate 
themselves from the absolute and infinite negativity of 
thought also included in the (Kl) mode of knowledge. Each 
successive (K2) determinate thought is considered by the 
subjective whole (Kl) (as an initial indeterminacy of 
thought and the previous accumulative concrete-universal 
forms of thought (K3) accepted by it and added to it— a 
cyclic process which progressively enriches (Kl)'s basic 
subjectivity. It, (Kl) in its pure form, is now a 
progressively greater Divine Subjectivity (really a 
previously completed unity of an infinite substance yet to
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be realized and its current unity of concrete-particulars 
within itself.) The cycle thus becomes (Kl) the 
undifferentiated beginning which returns to itself as an 
open end— in essence the infinite and developing beginning 
K1/K3 is at the completion of any given cycle of the 
dialectic (of pure thought about itself) pure philosophy 
itself. Such an end is an open one, especially in the 
minds of finite rational and spiritual beings.
These cumulative concrete/universals can be 
some of those previously and individually derived by the 
human subjective-selves who have progressed to at least a 
partial understanding of this abstract stage of pure 
reasoning. Human thought (also springing out of the 
infinite self-determined, self-deposited, and 
self-developing reason of Divine Subjectivity) has to be 
realistically recognized as having the distortions of 
being also a determinate part of the natural world. 
Therefore Hegel's idealistic form of pure reason does give 
us an idea of what our reason could achieve if it was in 
perfect unity with its source, the Divine Subjectivity (in 
Its process of evolving to the point that all thought as 
structure is also its own content in actuality).
Thus, the dialectical cycle goes on in the process 
of pure thought. Hegel saw the pure thought structure as 
being available for the development of thought in thinking 
finite individuals. I perceive such insight on his part as 
being significant in his concept of human religion as 
being a process of elevation of the finite mind towards 
the infinite 'Absolute Idea'.
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In the Tillich chapter, we will discuss the 
distortions of the pure thought in those persons who 
pursue the attainment of Kant's goal for mankind— the 
goal of achieving an absolutely good will for oneself.
It is suggested that it would be practical for 
most readers to go back and review the practical 
application of the structural form of thought in 
the concepts formulated to carry out the Philosophy of 
Right— as expressed in the external forms created by the 
objective-self in its pursuance of the moral good.
The 'Notion's applicability to the objective 
spirit (as self-mediative and developing through the 
phases of; (1) abstract right; (2) morality; and (3) 
social ethics) can be directly related to an individual's 
own concept and experience of abstract 'right'. I 
therefore believe that going through the Hegelian 
'Identity of Opposites' in such a practical manner will 
make it easier for the reader to grasp the Absolute Idea 
as it reaches its completion in the concept of the 
Absolute Spirit, the third triad (or sphere of spirit) in 
the doctrine of the 'Notion'.
The dialectical structure of the thought processes 
in the Absolute Spirit's Divine Subjectivity culminates in 
the unity of the subjective and the objectivity spirit in 
all the particular entities possessing independent and 
potentially autonomous wills. Under such unification, they 
become 'ones' of the 'One of the many ones'. Dale Schlitt, 
in his book Divine Subjectivity, carries us through the 
abstract thinking needed to comprehend pure abstract
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reasoning. Therefore, Appendix II of this thesis will 
show the steps of the dialectic in the concept of 
religion. Religion is one of the three triads; (1) Art;
(2) Religion; and (3) Philosophy— triads that are the 
elements of the Absolute Idea (which is the ultimate 
Idea). The Absolute Idea is an accumulation of and an ever 
evolving end result of the moments of Hegel's triadic 
phases of thought (as the Idea). The Absolute Idea 
progressively builds its concrete universals as the one's 
of itself. It then adds them to itself. This Idea is 
identical to the Divine Subjectivity and is utilized by 
such Subjectivity in its unfolding progression of 
movements of its pure thought— pure thought that 
actualizes its potential concrete-universals from the 
nothingness of its original indeterminacy. (2)
One of the most questionable parts of the Hegelian 
'Notion' was the deduction of Nature and the dialectical 
transition from the Logic to Nature. I have not gone into 
detail on this aspect, but it is my suspicion that it was 
due to the premises underlying the sciences of nature that 
were prevalent during his productive periods of 
formulating his 'Notion'. Having a strong background in 
modern mathematics and physics, I found no difficulty with 
the idea of the 'Notion' providing the thought structures 
from which the actuality of thought's content is made 
manifest in the non-free objects or entities we find as 
existing in our natural world. Therefore I have written 
the following chapter as an intermediate one (chapter 
five) before the Tillich chapter (chapter six). It is
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for those interested in more detail of 'Hegel reviewed in 
the light of modern scientific knowledge of the space-time 
natural world1. This intermediate chapter will also 
include my modification of the Hegelian 'Concept' to adapt 
it from its pure reason aspect of being an exemplar 
against which to 'zero beat' other systems claiming to be 
as open and modifiable as Hegel presents his to be. My 
adaptation will be to justify our human understanding of 
Hegel's pure reason' concepts and our need to have such 
a standard in order to pick out our best rational 
alternatives to achieve our individual and communal moral 
goals in life.
Chapter six (my Tillich chapter) will take what 
I believe to be the essentials of Hegel's 'Identity of the 
Opposites' and pursue the essentials further. Tillich 
does this by pointing out the distortions involved in the 
autonomy of the will, in the heteronomous aspects of the 
will, and in the unification of these two separate aspects 
which he dialectically examines. Tillich's result is 
'Theonomy'.
My concept of a 'failed part' (T.E.R. or 
Transcendental Entropic Residue as that part of autonomous 
reason which fails to stay in line with the universal law 
of freedom) is to me, a needed modification of the 
Hegelian dialectic for my paradigm. When this term 
('failed part') is included, the dialectic becomes not 
only a speculative pure reason mode of knowledge, but a 
practical paradigm— one that can be applicable under the 
existential conditions of modern life. Tillich's
contributions bring us a realistic picture of man as a 
personal, rational, and autonomous being. Such a being 
seeks to play (at least) a partial role in his/her destiny 
(in spite of the distortions found in this temporal 
world).
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CHAPTER 5
HEGEL REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPACE-TIME NATURAL WORLD.
AND NEED FOR MODIFICATION OF NOTION FOR 
PRACTICAL USE IN THE NATURAL WORLD
Recent immersion in Hegelian philosophy, coupled 
with my extensive scientific background, led me to an 
intuitive application of Hegel's 'Notion' to electricity. 
Reflection upon this connection illuminated and lent 
corroboration to my understanding's grasp of the Hegelian 
'Notion' as a practical (as well as a speculative) 
insight.
In the field of electricity, the words 
'electromotive force,' 'resistance,' and 'current' have 
been given these terms; the term 'voltage' (E) for 
electromotive force; 'ohms' (R) as an expression 
designating a given or derived amount of resistance to 
current flow; and 'ampere' (I) as an expression 
of the strength of the current flow. These electrical 
terms and the algebraic equations expressing their various 
relationships (E = IR, I = E/R, etc.) were memorized by 
many (including myself) without any understanding of why 
these relationships occurred so they could be symbolized 
and formulated into scientific laws.
If an appropriate path (called a conductor) is 
provided, current is supposed to flow from positively 
charged particles to combine with negatively charged 
particles until all the oppositely charged particles (+ 
for positive, and - for negative) have combined and become
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neutralized particles that constitute what is called a 
common ground. Such a current is supposed to flow from the 
positive charges to their opposing charges called 
negatives— the high (positive) potential force is thereby 
drained to a common ground which is conventionally 
called negative. However, in reality, we are told that the 
negative particles, called electrons, flow as current (I) 
to eventually neutralize the excess positive particles 
contained within an insulated compartment such as we find 
within a car battery. The other insulated side of such a 
battery is full of negative electrons which are called the 
ground of the battery. This negative side of the battery 
can be directly connected to the universal common ground 
which we call Earth without any interchange (current flow) 
taking place.
Hegel's 'Notion' first considers determinate 
entities as opposites to the ground from which they 
emerge, a ground which, as an indeterminate negation, can 
be analogous to our mother Earth.
It is my conviction that the element we call a 
positive charged one, and in our concrete example 
designated as (Al), can be intuitively seen as a part of 
its common ground (Cl), which is now missing its positive 
part (Al). The singular unified entity we are calling (Cl) 
is an unity that is composed of two entities which we 
abstractly call a positive charge (Al) and a negative 
charge (Bl).
In our abstract thinking, the element we call (Al) 
separates itself from the only ground of its source, the
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unified singular entity we are calling (Cl). With such a 
separation (in thought), we now need to bring in a term 
(CC), which we shall use to symbolize the total ground and 
sum of all the unified particular entities we shall call 
Cl, C2, C3, ... Cn. This common ground (CC) now has one of
its infinite and absolutely identical entities (Cl..Cn) 
separate itself as (Cl in thought) into the positive part 
of itself (Al) and the negative part (Bl).
The old (Cl) is now different from the remaining common 
ground (CC) as well, and we shall call it (Cl) minus (Al) 
or (Bl). We can now comprehend, in this non-durational 
(instantaneous) point of abstraction (called a moment of 
the successive moments carried out within the 'Notion'), 
the following:
(1). The old (Cl), although now in conceptual 
thought seen as (Bl) for (A's) ground, is still the 
free self-determined subject which, except in 
thought, has not left its place as an indeterminate 
member of the immediate indeterminate ground called 
Being. It is, in the essence of thought, now only 
completely identical with the remainder of the 
original content of (Cl) or (Bl) (the negation part 
of the original no-thing [Cl]);
(2). At the same moment, (Al) as a thought, has 
manifested itself as a determinate (Al) which sees 
itself as separate (difference) from its source. 
Therefore, it is a contradiction to its source (Cl) 
which we now think of as (Bl). Through the reflective 
process of thought Hegel calls by the German name
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'Aufhebung1, the apparent contradiction (Al) is 
recognized in thought's self-mediation as being an 
'appearance' only. Thought can therefore abolish this 
conception of being 'appearance', but still preserve 
(Al) by taking it back into its ground (now Bl).
In doing so, it becomes again the identity we 
originally called (Cl). However, Hegel tells us 
there is a difference now. Because of the process of 
pure thought or reason, the self-mediation within 
(Cl) has now changed it into a concrete universal;
(3). Such a process of thought within itself, when 
completed, changes the former initial ground of total 
immediacy (Cl) , and it is now at a higher level we 
have designated as (Cla). It is higher in that it has 
accumulated an determinant negation (Ala) element.
This thought determinant element (accident) can now 
be kept track of by identifying its reabsorption into 
the old (Cl) by renaming (Cl) and now calling it 
(Cla) ;
(4). This (Cla), although still identical with the 
other indeterminates (Cs), is also now different from 
them in that the opposites within itself are also 
identical in their differences within this unity. We 
see this in that the internal interactions between 
(Al) and (Bl) come only from within (Cl).
Therefore, the entity (Cl) is now both (Al) =
(Bl) and (Al) = not (Al), or (Bl) as its opposite. The 
conclusion reached from the above is that the original 
ground of ground of indeterminacy now has a concrete
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universal within itself. This process takes place by 
the instantaneous determinant and successive movements 
described by Hegel's 'Notion'.
The above process, or moments of thought 
determinations of Hegel's 'Notion' have been given symbols 
to identify them. We can visualize electrical patterns and 
relationships between voltage (E), resistance (R), and 
current (I). They constitute events we can measure as 
literally existent in our natural world). Thought concepts 
extracted from such visual imagery can then be accepted as 
representative of concrete contents— contents that have 
been realistically cognized by a structure of thought 
patterns. These patterns have shown that when the 
structural form of thought has been fully manifested and 
become real or actual, the form has become the content 
(the two are identical).
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to 
explain why my insight into the appropriateness of the 
analogies I can make concerning Hegel's 'Notion' is not 
finding difficulty in surmounting an age old problem— the 
problem of creating 'something' which is 'coming-to-be' 
out of 'nothing'. To state that an existent entity 
(determinate object) springs out of 'nothing' is a 
proposition which violates the law of contradiction. This 
law, in conjunction with the law of Identity (A=A, B=B), 
constitutes the mainstay of that form of knowledge called 
conceptual knowledge or understanding— or that knowledge 
which this thesis identifies as (K2).
Because the law of contradiction is so self-evident,
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we have not in general questioned the abstract term 
'nothing' (and the generally accepted use of it) to stand 
for the opposite of the term 'something'. By the same 
token, we have allowed ourselves to let the terms 'being' 
and 'non-being' be thought of in the same sense of 
opposition as 'something' and 'nothing' exhibit towards 
each other. It will be my contention, that in abstract 
thinking, the term 'nothing' can take on a different 
connotation. It must be looked at as that which cannot be 
distinguished from an infinite number of substances which 
are identical in nature to that 'particular' we designate 
as a no-thing. To be distinguished as a particular 
something, any particular thing must be different from all 
that which surrounds it.
The reader is now asked to temporarily accept this
idea or concept that the term 'nothing' can also have a
different meaning in a more abstract context. I am also
asking the reader to accept a modified heuristic approach
when evaluating my assumption concerning the reality of
what the term 'nothing' stands for. A heuristic principle
is defined as;
one which is neither asserted nor evaluated as 
true, but is assumed for the specific purpose 
on hand because of its previous usefulness as an 
investigative tool. (1)
My expansion of the above dictionary definition is 
that, as an inductive principle, a first trial that this 
concept tried had to be found successful in its 
application before it was rational to try it again. After 
many successive utilizations of it, it became to be known 
as a 'heuristic principle'.
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Let us now return to the paragraph where the 
example of a particular no-thing (Cl) is (among its 
infinite number of identical particular
'C's— C1=C2=C3.... to = Cn. (Cl), in abstract thought (a 
timeless moment of the interactions of the moments of 
determination within the 'Notion'), is the ground of the 
determinate abstraction (Al). As such, it is now minus 
its positive (Al). Therefore (Cl), in abstraction, is 
no longer the no-thing (Cl) it was prior to the removal 
(in thought) of its integral part called (Al). It is now, 
in pure thought, minus its positive so that it is no 
longer a true (Cl). Therefore it is no longer a neutral 
particular of a non-determinate whole (a whole consisting 
of an infinite number of balanced [and therefore 
non-distinguishable or non-determinate] entities within 
the All itself).
I am convinced we are not violating Hegel's Science 
of Logic when we consider this infinite intelligent 
(rational) All, as initially being composed of all there 
is as 'Being-Itself. However, this 'All' is in the initial 
form of an infinite number (quantity) of similar units 
that are non-distinguishable from each other. As such, 
initially in thought, the infinite quantity of no-things 
are the source of pure reason's infinite potential for 
creating structural forms and therefore determinant 
contents.
Prior to the beginning or initial pure thought, 
there is no initial determinate thing to be distinguished 
from the indeterminate field of immediacy or the first
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moment of the pure thought of Being itself.
Before this initial moment, we cannot find any
structure as yet, no specific (determinant) content as
yet. Nevertheless, mankind, in its early stages of human
history, had my paraphrased statement as one given to man
by revelation:
In the beginning was the Word [Reason or Logos], 
and the Word was with God [the Intelligent Being] 
and the Word [as Logos] was God [the rational 
structure or form of 'pure reason']. The Word became 
flesh [content] and dwelt among us. (6)
We, as readers of Hegel, are informed of and 
capable of abstractly applying Hegel's 'Notion' to the 
above discussion of the Word becoming flesh and dwelling 
among us. We now have a tool (the 'Notion') that we can 
use to logically visualize that the content of the 
personality known as 'Jesus' the man, was the full 
manifestation of the personalized essence of the 
universal Spirit known as God— this manifestation was 
concretely symbolized by the name Christ (a term 
recognized as synonymous with that of the term God).
We can also recall Aristotle's thought that there 
is no such thing as 'formless matter' nor 'matterless 
form.' If we do, we can say that relatively speaking, if 
the content of reason is the form of reason (at the 
initial point of the logic), the mix of the two opposites 
(form and matter) is maximized in favor of formless 
matter (the no-things of the immediacy of Hegel's Being).
An infinitely small spark of reason as structure (or form 
or essence) of a thought in Being breaks away from its 
opposite (non-being or no-thing) and becomes a determinate
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moment in the dialectical movements of the 'Notion'. 
Subsequent potential concrete universals (diverse 
particulars in unity with each other and with the 
universal 'All') have not at this point become the 
majority portion of the proportional mix of content and 
form within the 'All' as 'Subject'. Therefore, the 
manifestation of the potential possibilities of various 
creative essences are only potential, and the will of the 
'All' has not subsequently started to manifest itself into 
those actualities that humans see as 'appearances' in the 
existent world.
The resultant growth of the human reason comes from 
a striving to ascend from the finitude of thought (the 
concepts of appearances in natural world) to infinite 
thought (complete unity, in spite of a human's 
particularity, with the original Being— a Being called the 
'All' by many and 'God' by others).
The above striving and its progression is called 
'Religion' by Hegel. (2) The role of 'Religion' 
in Hegel's categorical sphere (Spirit) is highly important 
as it occupies the position between Art (1st movement) and 
Philosophy (3d movement). There, it serves as the 
'Identity of Differences' between Art and Philosophy. In 
this role, it preserves and reformulates the original 
unity which is now advancing in its production of 
'concrete universals'. In full identity with such 
universals, the remaining and infinite number of 
indeterminate no-things found in this basic ground of all 
being can be viewed as the continuing source from which
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'particulars' (called 'accidents' by Hegel) may be 
created. Such 'particulars', after reflective 
reasoning (found in the 'essence' of 'Religion' as a 
spontaneous movement within thought itself), are 
incorporated (preserved) as 'concrete universals' in 
the developing original ground of all being—  Being as 
Absolute Divine Subjectivity.
My hypothesis and discussion on the indeterminate 
nothings of formless matter can be summarized by stating 
that the relative nothingness of space itself could 
actually be an infinite quantity of quantum matter— matter 
which consists of equally infinitely small and identical 
particles. Therefore any one particular particle cannot 
be distinguished from another. Any subsequent distinction 
only occurs when the energy of thought (in its various 
structural forms) distills the basic matter into 
different entities that appear to us as actualities we 
encounter in our physical world. Substantiation of such a 
concept being rationally possible came to light and was 
published in May 1994 in a magazine called World Report.
The article was called Alternative Realities and stated 
that a recent laboratory test has corroborated that the 
top quark actually does exist rather than being a 
speculative assumption of physic scientists. A proposed 
ten dimensional universe is now being offered as a major 
assumption to support a new universal theory called the 
'superstring theory'. This theory holds that all matter 
and energy are the result of the vibration of 
infinitesimally small loops that are one hundred billion
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billion times smaller than a proton! (3)
Modern science (via calculus computations) assumes 
minute differences in materials used can be disregarded in 
various technologies, and the practical results work 
within the realm of virtual certainty (thus justifying 
their use of reductive formulations). It is my conviction 
that we can reasonably assume that such infinitesimally 
small loops of matter in the 'superstring theory' do not 
have any significant amount of differences between them, 
or there would be at least a small build up of subsets 
within this great group of indeterminate 'loops'. These 
subsets would adhere together as an 'Identity of 
Opposites' and therefore rearrange the initial and 
indeterminate field of 'no-things' into being a 
combination of no-things and some-things.
Hegel's 'Notion' can now be more easily envisioned 
as being a method of thought which creates the content of 
thought. Within its inner movements, thought finds those 
concepts we find within the category called 'Religion', as 
being essential and necessary concepts. They are needed 
to mend an apparent disunity between the categories of 
Art and Philosophy of the Spirit (as they are found 
in Hegel's last categorical sphere of progressive 
development which he calls the 'Absolute Idea'.
One result of our thinking to this point is that 
we can now logically see, as part of our moral growth, 
the practicality of the speculative pure reasoning Hegel 
gives us concerning the teleological aim of Being-Itself.
As unified parts of this infinite source of all being, we
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can conceive our individual goals as being the full 
actualization of our complete individual essences. In 
this sense, as eventual (perfected) entities, we will 
be a unified part of the Omega (end) for which Alpha, as 
the beginning, is striving to reach.
The concept of the 'Notion' comes sequentially in 
order after being (non-distinguishable immediacy) and 
essence (difference, limitation, and opposition). 
Nevertheless, it is really that structure of thought 
which, ontologically creative and teleologically oriented, 
selects the rational structural essence of a teleological 
oriented intention of pure reason. This is accomplished 
before the process of randomly (chaos) selecting rational 
alternatives (instantaneously) and processing them by what 
we can deem the scientific method (the five D's).
Reflective thinking now uses the five D method (in 
the respective mode of knowledge one is in) to arrive at 
the most reasonable means to achieve the process of 
the manifestation of that essence to reach its full 
manifestation. Full manifestation is that point where the 
content (matter of the determinate) is equal to the 
structure of thought that created the content. Such pure 
thought is not only the beginning, but the process and the 
completion. It may be noticed that such a procedure is 
flexible and can be repetitively followed by human 
thinking if and when future unaccountable contingencies 
(unpredicted) occur.
On a side thought, we can also recognize that, in 
Schlitt's terminology, the Absolute Reason of the Divine
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Subjectivity we commonly call God, is capable of 
overcoming the short circuits induced by man's abuse of 
his finite freedom. Man does this by freely separating 
himself from God by breaking the bonds of unity of 
similarity and the bonds found in differences between 
God and his created creatures. God does not need to 
temporally overpower the contingent distortions to His 
original and ultimate volitions (distortions that Kant 
told us emanated from human desires and inclinations of 
the natural man).
God's answer to the problem of distortion is solved 
in that duration of what we call eternity. Therefore He 
does not need to lose patience. He needs only to weave any 
temporary delays into His intentional and ultimate will 
for His teleological aims to be achieved. Any such 
temporal delays are insufficient to destroy the 
ultimateness of God's 'Holy Will' to be accomplished.
Hegel also said (in light of his conviction that 
first philosophy should lose nothing reasonable) that 
"every thing that is, is reasonable". (4)
We can now conceive that his proposition (the 
identity of a finished teleological product is a a full 
manifestation of the essence of that particular entity) is 
a logically self-evident premise. That manifested essence 
is the product of the mind's dialectic starting from the 
original ground of its being, and proceeding within its 
self-identity by movements of determination within 
itself. Such a structure is explicated for us when we, by
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thought, apply Hegel's 'Notion' when and where it is 
logically appropriate.
Appropriate, in the last part of the previous 
paragraph, must include the fact the appropriateness is 
also in accordance with the 5 D's and the three modes of 
knowledge (Kl), (K2), and (K3). The 'Notion', as such, is
not a propositional premise, but a dialectical tool to use 
in our continual strivings to gain control of our external 
environment. This tool also helps insure that our freedom 
can be more fully utilized in the creation and control of 
those individual maxims which determine our moral conduct 
in life.
If we reflect upon the assumption that the 
infinite number of no-things (as a plural sum of them) 
is not the 'Absolute All' in its entirety, then the 
mystery of the Original Reason, Spirit, Idea, is not only 
unknown, but unknowable to the (K2) mode of knowledge.
If so (and the possibility of this premise is just as 
logically possible as its opposite), then the original 
'All' cannot be subsumed under the guise of being the 
original pure Reason, Absolute Spirit, and Absolute Idea, 
all of which are supposedly potentially knowable.
The Absolute Idea, or the 'Notion' has to include 
more than that which the finite mind of man comprehends as 
pure reason. If such an element is a component of reality, 
then that which is posited as first cause (and therefore 
self-determined, self-sufficient, and self-developed) must 
have a mystery element (for finite man's reason). This 
element is an addition to the part the human reason calls
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no-thingness. Conceptual knowledge (K2), if under this 
alternate premise, is only capable of achieving conceptual 
truths found in the indeterminate part of Being's original 
self— a self that in addition to its initial no-thingness 
also contains the potential for self-creating an infinite 
number of determinates in a manner we humans can only 
encompass with the term 'chaos'. We lack a better 
understanding because of our total lack of comprehension 
of the whole 'Absolute Idea' which cannot be subsumed 
under that part of knowledge known as (K2). How could man 
do so with his particular form of pure reason alone? Each 
of us is only one particular of an infinite number of 
particulars.
However, as finite beings, we have for our 
individual control only a discrete part of the real 
'Whole' of all there is. As such, I am convinced that 
man's power over finite necessitated objects in the finite 
world gives us a sense of power that corrupts us.
Supposedly absolute power (as some world leaders felt they 
had) absolutely corrupts and man's hubris (our innate 
desire to control and be the all ourselves) has led to 
(and will continue to lead to) our literal bodily deaths 
— deaths as temporal beings who have freely abdicated our 
innate freedom to retain our union with our common ground 
of all the particular entities we define as human 
individuals.
The road ahead divides as to how we view the future 
of life in a dimension beyond the four dimensions of this 
physical world. Our reason and faith in the future is
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contingent, according to the actions we follow in 
consonance with our paradigms of how life should be 
conducted.
In my paradigm of man's spiritual now (and for the 
future beyond our temporal stage of reality), the split in 
the direction we take is either: (a) to continue in
reality (in timelessness not endless time); or (b) to lose 
the freedom of self-identity and return to the void of 
non-entities or no-things as part of the term I will now 
define as being 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' (T.E.R).
By this phrase— which I have synthetically a priori 
conceived and coined to rationally justify a connection in 
my mind— I mean a connection between Hegel's pure reason 
(speculative reason) formulation of his 'notion' and that 
form of heteronomous understanding (conceptual) that we 
use to apply universal natural laws of cause and effect 
to control the natural world.
I am introducing this term in order to justify the 
adaptation of the Hegelian 'Notion' to practical usage by 
finite mankind and make his 'Universals' concrete ones 
rather than sensuous and abstract ones. I call it 
'Transcendental Entropic Residue'. Just as when the time 
was right, calculus was discovered by Leibniz and Newton 
at approximately the same time, it may be that there is in 
current literature of which I am unaware, another, or 
others, who are expressing (or have expressed) in 
different terminology, a concept similar to that which I 
am introducing as 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' in 
my terminology. Nevertheless, I have created this term to
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stand for 'a failed part1 of that 'essence' of an entity 
which has manifested a part of its 'essence' by this 
part's 'appearance'. It appears in the actuality we call 
the 'existence' of an entity in the natural space-time 
world.
Before proceeding with further details of this part 
of the 'essence' of an entity, it is fruitful to sketch 
very briefly what Hegel meant by 'essence'. He defined 
this term as being a 'definition of the Absolute'. (Hegel, 
179) He called the Absolute the 'essence' of the world.
He saw it as being the unseen source of the appearances we 
find (and call actuality) in the space-time natural world. 
This source was what Hegel found to be the underlying 
unity which becomes manifest in the diversity and 
multiplicity of the natural world as we conceive it on 
our scale of observation.
Essence, as the inner part of the external objects 
we perceive in the space-time natural world, is an 
abstraction from the totality of the entity we perceive as 
'appearance' in our space-time concepts of objects 
external to us. (Hegel, 198)
By use of our reason, Hegel shows us we can 
abstractly separate 'essence' into three spheres or 
categories; (1) ground of existence; (2) appearance; and
(3) actuality. Further abstractions can be deduced 
(according to Hegel) as moments within each of these 
three basic categories.
Before expounding further on this potential and 
realistic 'failed part' of the essence of a spiritual
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human being, it needs only to be said that we are 
considering here a problem that has existed throughout the 
history of mankind. It has been carried forward in Western 
culture in the form of a myth— A myth of the 'fall of man' 
as explicated in the 'Garden of Eden and the eating of the 
forbidden fruit'.
It is my conviction that most human beings today 
are not exempt from the ramifications of this problem, but 
can find themselves in full accord with Saint Paul and his 
dilemma which was so distinctly enunciated in the famous 
New Testament chapter in Romans 7:15-24. There, we are 
told:
For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am 
carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do, I allow 
not, for what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, 
that do I. If then, I do that which I would not, I 
consent unto the law that it is good. Now then, it is 
no longer I that do it, but the sin [separation from 
unity with source of being] that dwells in me. (5)
Few persons, in honest appraisal of themselves as 
moral creatures, feel that, in this existent and temporal 
world, they are truly autonomous persons. Instead, they 
see themselves as heteronomous ones like St. Paul 
confessed himself to be.
Under the assumption that the reader will accept 
St. Paul's assessment of the common human condition 
concerning moral intentions and moral actions, I have 
taken the liberty to abstract from and call that part of 
man's heteronomus will which is not in a full harmonious 
relationship with the total entity called a self, a 
'failed part'. This means that this particular 
part is neither in harmony with other morally like-minded
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humans, nor in unity with the source of all creation. As 
a contradiction unacceptable for unity, we can consider it 
as being a piece of 'Transcendent Entropic Residue'.
The above 'failed part' will not continue as a 
preserved return to its original source and become a part 
of an 'inverse funnel' effect. The 'inverse funnel' is my 
visual image that as the circle of a given dialectic is 
completed on the horizontal level of human reflection and 
understanding, it really represents an increase in the 
vertical direction as well. It can be visualized as a 
gradual winding upward like a spring coil, while gradually 
increasing in a horizontal direction. The vertical 
direction would correspond to Hegel's concept that 
religion is the movement of the finite mind towards the 
infinite. As one of those 'failed parts', it is 
logically and realistically (by metaphysical law) destined 
to start its entropic return to the literal no-thingness 
(chaos of the infinite non-determinate no-things). Thus it 
becomes again an indistinguishable part of the 
non-determinate immediacy found within the original ground 
of all being, a ground from which it was originally born.
In summation, this residual material (diverted from 
its intended participation in the eventual fully 
actualized 'essence' created by the 'absolute All') 
is now subject to the law of entropy. It qualifies for 
subjection to this law because it was the failure of the 
human rational will of a given person to totally possess 
the 'holiness of will' necessary to be realizing one 
hundred percent of its potentiality at that particular
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location, and within the given contingencies of the 
situation at that time.
The word 'transcendental' is therefore used to
signify the human spiritual reason that is within the
world, but also transcendent to it. Thus my term
'Transcendental Entropic Residue' represents:
the whole process described above wherein the freedom 
of man allows man to distort a significant part of 
his rational spiritual self-being decisions. These 
distortions are very significant in that they (now 
separated from their unified identity with the 
ground of all being) have reached their fullest 
manifestation possible. The return to no-thingness 
of the Divine Subjectivity (God) will complete the 
process called 'Transcendental Entropic Residue'.
Such manifestations have cut themselves off from 
the only source of self-determined freedom and 
self-directed growth (the Divine Subjectivity known 
commonly as the one God). In conjunction with this 
premise, this author is truly convinced, spiritually, 
rationally, and holistically, that true free growth is 
that growth which will eventually achieve a destined 
teleological purpose (goal)— one which the respective 
entities were designed to meet as free particular 
individuals who are parts of the universal 'All'.
Out of connection with, and in disunity with the 
ultimate All's intention for our spiritual development, 
this undesired residue of our creativity is now ready to 
start the journey of dissolution— a journey in accordance 
with the laws of entropy. We can rationally justify such 
an assertion because the natural laws of physics still 
affirm that energy (as thought forms in Hegelian 
terminology) cannot be destroyed, but only change their
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mode of appearance (manifestation as a visible reality, or 
as atomic elements, in electrical, material, magnetic, 
etc., modes ).
Within the dialectical movements of man's finite 
reasoning, man may recycle (go through again one or more 
times) the series of instantaneous movements indicated by 
Hegel's 'Notion' that occur within pure thought. The 
number of successive so called instantaneous times such a 
cycle is performed (upon choosing the best method [for an 
intentional action to be performed] from various 
alternatives) is incidental to the final result of 
ignoring or resisting the development of thought and 
spirit within oneself. The final result is the same, 
distortion or failure of the self-constructed form to be 
in unity with the ground of all Being (God), will result 
in a temporary content (appearance in the natural world) 
only. It will start its spirit disintegration into the 
formless no-things from which it sprang. Its permanence 
and generation to be sustained and manifest in timeless 
reality is possible only if it is the partially fulfilled 
'essential' form and manifestation of the original 
self-determined, self-posited, and self-developed source 
of being man has called Logos— or that ultimate spirit and 
the absolute idea of the original creative ground of Being 
-Itself. Hegel describes such a Being as a 'Divine 
Subjectivity inclusive of objectivity'. I regard this 
term as Hegel's attempt to describe a personalized God and 
not being a term to represent an abstract, non-personal 
objective entity. Instead it is a term to describe a
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Being who is beyond the separation of self (I) and the 
'other' as a non-personal 'It'.
Last, but not least, I am convinced that the 
content of this 'residue' concept rationally and logically 
helps Hegel's original and continuous intent to save all 
experience for reason— nothing examined should be lost but 
to be acknowledged, posited, perhaps negated, but yet be 
preserved (Aufheben-Aufhebung). (Hegel, 106)
Returning to our main subject, that of a self which 
is self-determined, self-posited, and self-developed,
Hegel elaborates on the no-things which are logically 
potential to become some-things. He tells us it is 
immaterial as to which pole of a given polarity (for 
example positive versus negative) is selected and be 
be called the base (ground or subject we can label as 
[Cla]) when the other opposite is removed from the 
original element (Cl). In thought, the polarity we call 
positive (Bl) has separated itself from the only ground of 
its source— its base (Cl), where (Cl) is only (Cl) when it 
is the unity of [(Al) and (Bl) only]. With such a 
separation (in thought), (CC), as the total ground of all 
unified particular entities called (C1-C2-C3-.... Cn), 
now has one of the infinite (Cs) differentiate itself (and 
declare itself as an independent positive or determinant). 
At this non-durational point of abstraction, called a 
moment by Hegel, the original ground of this element (Cl) 
becomes (Cl minus Bl) or (Al) as it is now minus its 
positive (Bl). This (Bl), while separated in abstract
129
thought, is still a part of the ground (Cl) from which it 
has arbitrarily separated itself.
Thus a finite part [(Bl) of (Cl)] which is one of 
the infinite ground of like particles or elements called 
C1-C2-C3 ...to Cn, has in thought, separated itself from 
its unity with (Al) in the original (Cl). In this sense, 
and in analytic terminology, this separation from the 
basic element we call (Cl) as subject, (Bl) becomes a 
predicate extracted by thought in its creative excursions 
and search for its boundaries beyond those of its current 
status. Why cannot the attempt to think in terms of pure 
reason be conceptualized in this manner? Man in his 
limited reason (which is contaminated in its existential 
environment) attempts the same thing!
As we continue to look deeper into what Hegel 
explores in his 'Notion' as the 'other', let us 
reflectively conceive the (Bl) in our example as a 
particular— It is a particular by creating, in the 
original ground, a negative (what is left of a negative 
and positive in balanced unity). This new negative 
is now not a unity as its positive has been temporarily 
abolished from it by abstract thought (Hegel). We see this 
in actuality in a car battery. The 'other' (in thought and 
in the positive side of the battery) is potentially 
available to be returned and preserved by its return in 
that it now changes the neutral non-entity (Cl) into the 
negative (Al), a change created by the negative created by 
the temporary absence of (Bl). The negation of this 
latter negative preserves the original unity in potential,
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but (Cl) has now returned (in thought) after reflective 
thinking on the situation. It is now back in a potential 
form to its original unity ('Identity of Opposites').
However, this original ground which was previously 
undifferentiated from the countless other nothings (C1-C2 
etc) now is no longer totally indeterminate, but has a 
preserved concrete (real creative thought) of a positive 
determinate nature which stood out of its passive role to 
become an active determinate in thought. It therefore 
brings back, in its return to home ground (old Cl), an 
infinitely small differentiation (distortion) accrued in 
its temporal escape (by instantaneous moments within the 
internal unity of thought itself) from its original and 
basic ground of thought itself.
Thought's understanding first sees this escaped 
determinate (escape in abstract thought only) as being a 
differentiation, and then as being an contradiction to its 
original unity with its basic ground of being. (Does not 
man's conceptual thought [K2] do this and then stop in its 
belief that the law of identity, A= A and the associated 
law of contradiction are sufficient proof of the 
determinate non-free nature of the natural world including 
man?)
Before continuing our practical application of 
Hegel's 'Notion' in our modern natural world, we can see 
the need of Hegel to go beyond Kant's apparent tendency to 
keep his critical reason within the limits set by the 
knowledge we designate as (Kl) and (K2). We can apply this 
sort of reasoning to any entity's essence that has been
131
partially manifest as an actuality in the external world. 
For an example, a positive voltage retainer on the 
positive side of a car battery, has (as its opposite 
polarity) a negative container (holding an excess of 
negative electrons) in isolation from the positive 
charges. The negative charges are available as current 
(I) in the process of reunification with their positive 
counterparts.
So, if a common ground as a means of connecting 
these negatives is established, the particular voltage (E) 
will be negated (unless replaced by other means) and yet 
preserved by its return to a neutral entity we find in a 
common ground of all electrical phenomena.
To illustrate further, let us consider only the 
current 'now' appearance of an entity we see before us as 
an external existing object. Let us also assume that this 
entity we have before us is a rational being, or one which 
is free to separate its future actions from any 
cooperation (be in unity with) with its original ground of 
being. We now have, in opposition to free and whole 
hearted unity with its source, a determinate being who has 
been given the freedom to not cooperate in unity with its 
source. (We remember that the given commandments to not 
steal, cheat, lie, etc. would not need to be given, should 
those rational beings given the commandments, not have had 
the power [freedom] to reject their compliance to them). 
Such a rational being has the potentiality to totally will 
to be in tune with, or to be partially in tune with and 
partially out of tune with its self-determinate, self­
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sufficient, and self-developing ground from which it came.
Let us further assume that what we now see is only 
a part of an entity which is potentially either autonomous 
or heteronomous— an entity which therefore has a 
responsible part in accomplishing its own destiny. This 
destiny is therefore composed of both the external 
contingencies, and the autonomous or heteronomous 
decisions made and acted upon by this rational and 
spiritual entity we call man.
Therefore, the entity called man (and symbolized 
as [A]) is a predicate of the subject ground (ALL, or 
CC). However, (A) in its freedom, can be abolished from 
(CC) by its deliberate choice to remain separated, rather 
than be preserved in unity with its ground of being (CC).
If in such unity, the entity (A) is preserved and remains 
united with (CC), it does this by making (A's) maxim the 
same concept as that espoused by Kant's 'Categorical 
Imperative'.
It is my current contention that man, in his 
totality as a natural man and a spiritual man, is not 
capable (by himself) of accomplishing external actions 
that are in a one to one correspondence to his volitional 
intent. This failure includes any maxims found to be 
identical with those found in Kant's 'Categorical 
Imperative'.
I base my conviction on: (a) my identification with 
St. Paul's struggle with moral conduct; (b) my rational 
and intuitive acceptance of Kant's moral concepts as 
elucidated within the limits of man's conceptual knowledge
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(K2)— concepts subjected to the steps of the five D's 
within the appropriate mode of knowledge, (Kl), (K2),
(K3), or combinations thereof; and (c) my own post 
reflections (D5) after taking the leap of faith and 
operating as if such moral imperatives were really true 
premises.
Therefore, any opposing residue of independent 
action on the part of the human entity called the 
predicate (A) (as a singular from the human's creative 
source) is now self-cut-off from its potential source of 
power of 'being' and 'becoming.' Consequently, this cut 
off residue of independent non-cooperative and 
nonconforming actuality, will atrophy as its source of 
becoming is now abolished. It therefore eventually returns 
to the non-being (dust) from which it sprang. Evil is 
opposite in meaning as well as in spelling from the word 
live. Perhaps this is the basis for the warning or edict 
found in the Myth of the Garden of Eden. When man cuts 
himself off from the source of his being (by making his 
own self-determinations, apart from cooperation with and 
in unity with the universal source of power and being), 
then that person will eventually die, or atrophy back into 
the dust (indeterminate no-thingness) from which he/she 
came.
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CHAPTER 6
TILLICH
As stated earlier, the goal of this thesis is to 
develop a paradigm which synthesizes faith and reason, 
especially in reference to moral values.
The chapters preceding this one have established 
rational, emotional, and volitional aspects of the human 
personality that could be said to be mainly idealistic in 
nature. We know that the expansion of knowledge in the 
technical fields after the turn of the nineteenth century 
led to an optimism that knowledge was indeed virtue. Man, 
by himself alone, could now establish values and a mode 
of life that would be not only useful and self-satisfying, 
but would be one that fulfilled a sense of purpose and 
meaningfulness in life.
This optimism that technical science had all the 
necessary answers for a meaningful life was shattered by 
World War I. Mankind was left with a world where 
suffering, cruelty, meaninglessness, and despair are 
predominant. Essentialism has been primarily associated 
with idealism, and existentialism has been associated with 
the realism of our existent lives in this natural world.
Our goal is to help an individual achieve a unity 
of his subjective, objective, and volitional natures, 
especially in the area of ethical values and conduct. It 
is therefore necessary to show how such a unity of faith 
and reason can be at least partially accomplished over a
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period of time in spite of the distortions of each of 
these functions when they operate in our natural existent 
world. Paul Tillich, a prominent philosopher, theologian, 
and an existential thinker, is the most familiar and 
modern person I have found that combines idealism with 
realism in a systematic and scientific manner— a manner 
that utilizes the very concept of Being (Ontology) to 
underlie and support all the modes of knowledge (the 3 
K's, as previously proposed).
This chapter will review and analyze pertinent 
parts of his three volume work, Systematic Theology. (1)
My analysis of his works (published in the period
1951-1963) will utilize the five D's (scientific 
methodological steps) and the three K's (three modes of 
knowledge) to corroborate Tillich's method of 
'correlation' in relating essentialism to existentialism. 
His synthesis will lend considerable support to the final 
paradigm proposed by this thesis.
Step (D5), called the 'debug step', corroborates 
or corrects the conclusions reached by utilizing the five 
'D' step procedures in the analysis of the philosophical
concepts considered in this thesis. It does this by
substantiating a person's conclusions by checking them 
against standards set by the given communal group. This 
group consists of those persons trained in using 
group-established standard procedures to bring about the 
goals desired. We have previously seen that 
'corroboration' or 'substantiation' means a way by which 
we may decide whether our judgment is a true or false one.
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Tillich proposes to us an ontological use of the 
term 'truth' which is quite different from the usage 
sought by 'technical reason'. This difference is a vital 
one, and in order to understand Tillich's efforts to unite 
the two 'truths' by his 'method of correlation', the next 
section will briefly establish Tillich's concepts of what 
he calls controlling knowledge (K2 or objective) and 
receiving knowledge (K1 or subjective knowledge).
SECTION ONE 
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE TRUTH
Earlier, we discussed one source of conflict 
between faith and reason. It was found that 'technical 
reason' operates under the assumption that 'truth' can be 
verified only by the criteria established by empirical 
science. The safest test for this science is the 
controlled and experimental one— where successive testing 
gives the same results over a continuing time period.
Although Tillich agrees that every cognitive 
presupposition must be tested, he refutes a long held 
assumption by many that the experimental method of 
corroboration is the exclusive pattern for substantiation.
(Tillich I, 102) He reminds us that experiential 
cognition (which takes place in the total life process 
without holding all other factors constant except the one 
being tested) may give us results far less exact, but are 
far truer to life than are experimental (technical 
controlling) results. (Tillich I, 102)
Each reader can personally substantiate Tillich's 
conclusions that we have two cognitive attitudes, one
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subjective and the other objective. He acknowledges we 
need both types in our life processes and feels science 
is justified in extending the experimental methods as far 
as they can be. He reminds us that our receiving knowledge 
(K1 and K3) is corroborated by a creative union of the 
two natures (subjective and objective), which he calls the 
'union of the nature of knowing', and the 'nature of that 
which is known'. Such substantiation of an individual 
event in changing time and space is not a repeatable, 
exact, or final one. He tells us such a test is only 
indefinite, and there is always a risk associated with a 
judgment reached after such an encounter. (Tillich I, 103)
The reader is encouraged to relate Tillich's 
creative union of the knower (subject) and the known 
(object) with the Hegelian 'Notion' where the 'Notion's 
third moment takes the known (or the objective 'other') 
and preserves it by incorporating it into the first 
moment (or original subjective 'self'). Note also the 
similarity of the Notion's concept (that any remaining 
differences can be recycled in a later dialectic) to 
Tillich's idea of the indefiniteness of the judgment at a 
given moment— therefore providing a possibility for future 
openness to any change in the nature of the union.
At this point, we have established that there is 
a difference between experimental corroboration and 
experiential corroboration. However, it remains to be seen 
how an intuitive (K3) union comes about— a union in which 
one's life as a reasoning human being is both aware of 
itself as a knower, and of the 'other' as that which is
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known. Tillich gives us his convictions on how this can 
be done without having the term 'truth' be restricted 
solely to empirically corroborative (experimentally and 
repeatable confirmed) propositions.
He reminds us that modern philosophy usually 
considers that the terms 'false' and 'true' are 
qualities of judgment. The reality of an entity is that 
which it 'is'— in and of itself, the entity is neither 
false nor true. What we see before us as an object (or 
entity) can be an appearance, or the true being of that 
which is before our intentional gaze. Tillich maintains 
that the seemingly real (appearance) is not unreal (not 
true) unless it is taken for the really real— where the 
really real is the total essence or nature of that which 
is appearing before us. (Tillich I, 101)
Upon the basis of ideas expressed above, Tillich 
now asks us to consider his concept of what constitutes a 
true judgment (when our minds grasp and shape what we 
see as the 'reality' confronting us). He defines a true 
judgment as being "that level of an object's being, the 
knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and 
consequent disappointments." This concept of ontological 
'truth' is important enough for the purposes of this 
thesis that his expansion of the definition needs to be 
mentioned. He tells us that the term 'truth' is similar 
to the term 'reason'. Both are subjective-objective. Truth 
is therefore a combination of the true nature (essence) 
of a thing known in addition to the cognitive act by
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which the knower grasps and expresses the object's true 
essence. (Tillich I, 104)
This thesis will consider Tillich's ontological 
definition of 'truth' as a general standard against which 
to "zero beat" other ontological definitions of what 
constitutes a true judgment. If we accept his definition 
as being the most inclusive one we are currently aware 
of, we have a means of determining the degree to which a 
self-derived judgment of an event (within a given mode 
of knowledge) can be corroborated— corroborated within the 
context of the total picture concerning the complete 
nature (or essence) of what the given event 'is'. This 
'is' is that which is now confronting us as an external or 
internal object we recognize initially as an 'other' as it 
appears to our senses, or to our reason independent of 
sensory input.
One should apply Tillich's concept of 'ontological 
truth' as a basic reference when utilizing the other tools 
previously suggested for testing of the material utilized 
in this thesis to establish its proposed paradigm— a 
paradigm whose purpose is to provide an effective means to 
aid each person in the establishment of her/his own 
autonomous 'maxims' concerning her/his ethical values and 
resultant conduct in all aspects of her/his daily life.
SECTION TWO 
PHILOSOPHY (STRUCTURE) VERSUS 
THEOLOGY (CONTENT)
Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology by its very 
name implies the combination or synthesis of philosophy 
(rational structure or form) and theology (content or
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matter) when dealing with his basic subject matter, man's
'ultimate concern' (his/her very 'being'). His purpose
in this work is to correlate the existential questions
(arising from living in a world of constantly changing
situations and conditions) with answers appropriate to
such questions (concerning man's 'ultimate concern').
Tillich's answers are derived from the content of a
Christian theology and are in interdependence with
the questions. (Tillich I, 60)
In his development of the theological aspect of
man's nature, Tillich begins with man having two needs to
be satisfied— the statement of the truth of the Christian
message and the interpretation of this truth for each new
generation. Tillich's description of the general nature of
theology and his method of theology includes two formal
criteria which separate theology from other disciplines:
(1) "The object of theology is what concerns us
ultimately. Only those statements are theological which
deal with their object when it can become or is an object
of ultimate concern." (Tillich I, 12); (2) "Our ultimate
concern is that which determines our being or our
not-being. Only those statements are theological which
deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter
of being or not-being for us." (Tillich I, 14)
We are then told that the term 'ultimate concern'
is an abstract translation of the great commandment:
The Lord, our God, the Lord is One; and you shall love 
the Lord with all your heart, and with all your soul, 
and with all your mind, and with all your strength."
(2)
Understanding 'being' as being more than man's
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existence in time and space, Tillich finds this term to 
means the whole of human reality (its structure, purpose, 
and goals). Therefore, a threat of its loss is a matter of 
infinite importance. (Tillich I, 14)
By such formal criteria, Christianity may be seen 
to be the ultimate answer of theology to the existential 
questions asked by man. Christianity does not exclude but 
includes the trends in other religions which are moving 
towards the Christian answer. (Tillich I, 15)
Belief in Christianity may be justified as being 
the ultimate answer in that an ultimate answer must 
be one that is universal and absolute— however,it must 
also satisfy the concrete particular known as the 
existential human being. Only in Christianity did the 
'Word' become flesh and dwell among men. Only such an 
absolute universal and an absolute concrete object can 
be an adequate manifestation of our ultimate concern.
A relationship between the 'reason' of philosophy 
and the 'revelation' (or faith) of theology can be 
established only by finding a common ground between them.
To do this, Tillich defines philosophy as "that cognitive 
approach to reality in which reality as such is the 
object." Tillich tells us that the term 'reality' means " 
that structure of categories and concepts which are 
presupposed in every cognitive engagement with reality."
He sees philosophy as being the continuing search for 
those logical structures which make experience possible.
He also sees 'being' as the basic common denominator which 
is found in everything that 'is'. (Tillich I, 18)
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Returning to theology, Tillich now states that its 
object of ultimate concern must have reality in order to 
concern us. If it has reality, it has being, but must 
be a being that is not alongside other 'beings' or it 
would not be our ultimate concern. His conclusion is that 
the object of theology must be the very ground of all 
being, that Being which is the ultimate and unconditional 
power of all other beings. (Tillich I, 21)
Upon the establishment of a common ground (Being) 
upon which philosophy and theology both rest, Tillich then 
points out their differences. Philosophy deals with the 
structure of being, but must be objectively detached to 
maintain a unity within universal participation. It also 
must study everything in nature to find and comprehend 
the rational structure of all reality. The content of 
philosophy is knowledge in general about natural life as 
it is found subsumed under the (K2) categories of time, 
space, cause, and substance.
Theology deals with that aspect of being that is 
meaningful for us. Tillich proposes the ultimate concern 
of man is the continuation of his own being. Therefore the 
theological approach to being is found in an attitude of 
subjective, personal, and saving truth. The theologian's 
source is not a universal of pure reason that cannot be 
isolated to a particular place or time, but is the very 
Logos that became flesh. By means of this concrete 
universal, the believer is grasped by the power of the 
ground of being, and by the community established 
upon it. (Tillich I, 23-24)
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The third point of difference between philosophy 
and theology deals with the categories of time, space, 
cause, and substance in their relationships to the finite 
existent material which is structured by these categories. 
Tillich sees the content of theology as being the search 
for a 'new being' that is reunified in its relationship to 
very ground of being. (Tillich I, 24)
In spite of the divergences between philosophy and 
theology, Tillich believes that the developments taking 
place in each include a convergence towards each other. He 
claims the philosopher within one's self can temporarily 
become a theologian. This happens when his desire to be 
detached, objective, and universal, becomes influenced by 
his existential situation and his ultimate concern about 
it.
In return, a person's theology (as an ultimate 
concern) is infused with a philosophical bent when that 
individual seeks to demonstrate the universality of such 
a concern. Tillich sees such a situation as being a 
constant tension and burden to any theological work.
(Tillich I, 26)
The analysis to this point of the relation 
between philosophy and theology leads Tillich to the 
conclusion that there is neither conflict nor synthesis 
possible between them. He justifies his position of no 
conflict upon the supposition that there must be a common 
ground for conflict. He contends the ground of theology is 
its ultimate concern and philosophy's concern is the
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ontological analysis of the structure of being.
(Tillich I, 27)
If a discussion deals with this structure of being, 
the analysis must come from the philosophic side of one's 
self. He then argues that there can be no real synthesis 
of the two. He justifies this conviction by stating that 
any restriction on philosophy by religion diminishes the 
logos of being generally. In a similar fashion, Tillich 
sees Christianity as not being in need of a Christian 
philosophy in that Christianity believes the Logos who 
appeared as concrete in Jesus is at the same time the 
universal Logos. This claim includes within itself, the 
assertion that wherever the classical Logos is at work, it 
is in accordance with the Christian message. Therefore, 
Tillich understands that no philosophy which is obedient 
to the universal Logos can contradict the concrete Logos 
("the Logos which became flesh"). (Tillich I, 28)
My analysis of Tillich (at this point) is that he 
has denied the possibility of conflict and of synthesis 
between philosophy (structure) and theology (content) on 
the level of the pure reason of Logos itself. However, it 
is the conviction of this author that both subjective 
reason and objective reason, which constitute the basic 
ontological structure of the self and the world about the 
self, can be in a constant conflict, tempered by temporary 
moments of synthesis. Tillich sees that if a church, such 
as the Catholic Church, adopts a given philosopher 
(Thomas Aquinas), then that adoption limits the
philosopher to special conditions and given purposes to 
justify.
Therefore, I see Tillich as using his 'method of 
correlation' in order to make sense of a practical 
relationship between the questions asked by man in his 
human situations and the revelatory answers given by 
theology in a mutual and ongoing interdependence between 
them. (Tillich I, 18)
We can conclude that Tillich's 'correlation' means 
a relationship in which both philosophy and theology have 
an effect on each other, and yet remain independent of 
each other. If such a conclusion is accepted, then it 
remains difficult to see where the 'common ground' in 
Tillich's 'method of correlation' differs significantly 
from the 'common ground' premises underlying Hegel's 
'Identity of Opposites'.
We shall later see that the structure of 'being' is 
based upon the polarity of the subjective (sensibility or 
Kl) and the objective (reason or K2). The spirit 
(relationship or unity of Kl and K2 in K3) becomes the 
common ground of both (Kl) and (K2) in Hegel's 'Identity 
of the Opposites'.
In addition, Tillich's 'method of correlation' not 
only corroborates the basic premises of Kant and Hegel 
that we have emphasized, but will provide modifications of 
these basic premises where and when necessary. Such 
modifications are given in light of the reality of the 
existential distortions of both 'reason' and 'faith' in 
our modern and rapidly changing world. (Refer ahead to
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section four of this chapter', pages 156-162 for such 
substantiation and logically sound modifications) .
We have seen (in chapter three) Kant's assertion 
that autonomy of the modern human being is necessary if 
such an individual is to be held responsible for her/his 
moral decisions made and acted upon while living in this 
existent natural world. In addition to the questions asked 
about our very being, our sense of moral conduct, and what 
can we hope to accomplish as individuals, many other 
questions address the problem of what we can know and how 
we know that we know it. Hopefully, such acquired 
knowledge establishes the basic philosophical point of 
view from which we start when forced to make changes in 
our way of life today. Tillich suggests that we use the 
following definition of philosophy, which he understands 
to include most of the important philosophies appearing in 
history: "Philosophy is that cognitive approach to reality 
in which reality as such is the object." (Tillich I, 18)
Elements of the two philosophical viewpoints 
(essentialism and existentialism) can be found in each 
other. They need not be mutually exclusive and 
totally independent of each other. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clarify in the next section what Tillich 
means by his use of the terms "existential," 
"existentialist," and "existentialism." We need to be 
aware of how he uses each term in order for us to 
'existentially', yet with critical reasoning, examine 
the two viewpoints we have before us. Then we can use our 
tools to analyze, critically examine, and reasonably
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justify the conclusions we select to support the 
subsequent decisions that we risk making and carrying out 
in order truly to be ourselves both individually and 
within our collective groups.
SECTION THREE
CONCEPTS CONCERNING THE TERMS 'EXISTENTIAL'/ 
•EXISTENTIALIST', AND 'EXISTENTIALISM'
We have seen that Tillich is primarily concerned 
with the problem of making theology relevant to the 
cultural periods of history and the practical life 
situations found within these periods. His 'method of 
correlation' seeks to show the relevance of religion to 
the estranged state man finds himself in while attempting 
to find meaning and purpose in existent life, especially 
in periods of rapid and chaotic cultural change. He 
insists that, to avoid ambiguities of terms used in modern 
times, any system or method (such as his 'correlation' 
method) must not only define the terms used, but must show 
how and why they are used as such.
To justify Tillich's particular use of terms 
involving the word 'exist', he takes the reader back to 
the original 'root' meaning. Tillich takes this path 
because he thinks that words are a result of the human 
mind's encounter with reality. As a result, words are not 
only signs, but can also be symbols. Tillich distinguishes 
between signs and symbols, in that symbols are expressions 
that participate in that total experience of an object—  
participate as an expression of the experienced 
relationship between the knower and that which is known. 
Signs only point to reality as totally other. (3)
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Our word "exist" comes from the Latin word 
'existere' meaning "to stand out." The English equivalent 
meaning is "outstanding". In both cases, Tillich reminds 
us that to 'stand out1 must mean that there is something 
in which the 'outstanding' must also be 'standing in'. He 
goes on to state that 'being' (or that which exists) 
stands out of its non-being. It can do this if we regard 
being as participating in potentiality (not yet being in 
actuality or in existence in time and space). Tillich 
also points out to us that potentiality is that which is 
more than logically possible— it is that which has the 
power of becoming, but is not yet manifest as an existent 
entity. (Tillich II, 20)
We readers have been given the above background 
because Tillich deems it necessary to show the difference 
between actuality and potentiality. Potentialities have 
been considered even in pre-philosophy, as being 
'essential' and as such, are the structures of true being. 
Plato saw existences as shadows from their true, eternal, 
and essential ideas.
He also reminds us that Aristotle tried to bridge 
the gap between existence and essence by his conviction 
that there was no such thing as 'matterless form' or 
'formless matter'. (We have already seen in the chapter on 
Hegel how Hegel continued development of this Aristotelian 
concept by his 'Identity of the Opposites'.)
Another factor that Tillich makes known to the 
reader is his belief that the interpretation of Hegel's 
universal system of essences as classically 'essentialist'
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that caused the revolt against it— a revolt eventually 
called 'existentialism1. Hegel was seen as proclaiming 
existence to be the logically necessary actualization of 
essence. Hegel was believed to interpret the natural 
universe as being a reasonable progression of the 
self-development of the Divine Idea, so that existence is 
not a fall from essence, but an expression of it (Tillich 
II, 24)
We can reasonably sympathize with the reactions of 
those in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who were 
filled with anxieties, guilt, and loss of meaning about 
life that were brought about by detached (objective 
technical) reasoning. 'Existentialist' is now a term that 
applies to any individual whose world viewpoint is that 
the reality of man in this temporal life is one of 
distortion and a series of unresolved conflicts. Tillich 
found life's anxieties could be classified under three 
types: (1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation,
and; (3) emptiness and meaninglessness. (Tillich II, 25)
To avoid misunderstanding when talking about these 
terms pertaining to existence, Tillich asks us to further 
distinguish between the term 'Existentialist' just 
defined and the term 'Existential.' 'Existential', as 
the term is defined by Tillich, is first of all, "a 
human attitude of involvement in and towards life." We 
might think that this is a subjective attitude in 
opposition to an objective cognitive attitude, but 
Tillich tells us that, in the sense of an attitude, 
'existential' is a total self involvement
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participating in a given event— especially in a 
cognitive one. (Tillich II, 26)
His concept of this attitude includes man's finite 
freedom. This freedom allows man to participate to the 
point she/he can elicit changes in the situations she/he 
is involved in. Tillich anticipates that existential 
knowledge may appear to negate the objectivity needed in 
cognitive acts. He (and Hegel also) grant areas of reality 
that call for the detached abstraction (K2). He therefore 
points out that, in existential knowledge, both the 
subject and the object are transformed by the act of 
knowing— such knowledge does not exclude, but only limits 
objective detachment to those elements isolated and 
abstracted from what Tillich calls 'reality in its 
infinite concreteness.' (Tillich II, 28)
The other meaning Tillich finds in the term 
"existential" is a content. Tillich finds this content 
pointing to that form of philosophy which is called 
"Existentialism." (This term will be defined after 
Tillich shows us the connection or commonality between 
the existential attitude and the existential content.) 
Tillich sees this content in Kierkegaard's doctrine of 
man— a doctrine that finds man in a state of estrangement, 
despair, and anxiety. Kierkegaard also knew that only when 
man is ultimately concerned can he become knowledgeable of 
the object of his concern. Therefore, any existential 
situation keeps the cognitive function of man, as well as 
all aspects of his being, from a pure abstract 
participation in the essential knowledge of all that
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exists or 'is1. Only in an existential attitude can man 
possibly hope to glimpse the truth of Absolute Being or 
God above all gods. (Tillich II, 25-26)
In Platonic and Christian thought, we have an 
existential attitude that is found within the essentialism 
viewpoint that man is estranged from what he essentially 
is, but has the possibility of reaching his essential 
potentiality. Tillich points out that the finite freedom 
of man is, in the above viewpoint, encouraged to act and 
to be as a part of the universal. We will see in 
'Existentialism' the rejection of man's dependence upon 
anything other than himself. This latter viewpoint assumes 
that the freedom of man can be used to overcome or face 
the contingencies of temporal life. Man, in this sense, is 
alone and must by himself overcome the anxieties caused 
by a lack of any ultimate purpose or necessity in life 
for himself or the world in which he exists.
Tillich's whole system of theology is based upon 
the need for the basic truths of Christianity to be 
expressed in symbolic expressions that practically 
connect (correlate) spiritual truths and values to the 
everyday situations we find ourselves in. We have seen 
to this point the part essentialism plays in emphasizing 
the objective or universal part of one's being as one 
progresses on his/her path toward meaningful goals in 
life.
'Existentialism' is a protest against the idea 
that man here on earth is becoming essentially perfect in 
accordance with structures not of his own choosing. It
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emphasizes that individual man, as a subjective free self, 
must be his own exclusive creation. Tillich will maintain 
that when man becomes aware of his need for answers to 
his questions about his true ultimate concern, then his 
open search will find an eventual unity of his subjective 
and objective self— a unity that will transcend both 
aspects of self.
According to Tillich, all 'existentialists' find 
their answers within theistic or quasi-religious 
traditions that cannot be derived from the analysis 
itself. He justifies this conclusion by defining any 
object of ultimate concern for a person as that person's 
God. (Refer back to section two, page 141 for Tillich's 
criteria for the nature of theology.) (Tillich II, 25)
We can see where making the above distinctions 
allows Tillich to state that, in general, essential 
structures can be described in terms of objective 
detachment. The problems caused by distortions found in 
existence can be described or analyzed in terms of 
subjective involvement. Tillich again points out that 
'essentialist' and 'existentialist' philosophical views 
are not polarities isolated from each other. Each has a 
certain mixture of the other in it. Tillich therefore sees 
that we can have an objective cognitive attitude (K2) in 
which the element of subjective involvement (Kl) is 
dominant. Such an attitude is what he calls 'existential'. 
(Tillich II, 26)
His definition of the term 'Existentialism' could 
be briefly summarized by describing it as being an
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analysis of life situations in which man finds himself 
estranged to the point that 'rational' objective reasoning 
no longer gives him satisfactory answers, but only 
establishes questions as to where and how man can find 
meaning and purpose in life under such estranged 
conditions. (Tillich II, 25) We need to emphasize again, 
as Tillich does in his description, 'existentialism' does 
not attempt to find answers within its descriptions. He 
finds that all existentialists find their answers within 
the theistic or quasi-religious traditions that cannot be 
derived from the analysis itself. (Tillich II, 25-26)
The importance of the above paragraphs may become 
more apparent when we look deeper into what Tillich meant 
by his expression 'existential thinking'. 'Existential' 
is a term that Tillich uses to symbolize an attitude— an 
attitude on the part of an involved knower who 
participates with his/her whole being in the being of 
another person. Tillich calls the result of such 
an attitude and participation an 'existential' knowledge.
(Tillich II, 26) We can now see more explicitly that 
detached reasoning (K2) can play a part as an element of 
the total involvement, but more is needed. (Kl) and (K3) 
modes of knowledge are also needed to establish the 
interchange and relationship between two unique 
individuals— individuals whose 'existential' interchange 
can create new meaning for the respective knower and the 
known in their reciprocal interchanges.
It is hoped that the reader, at this point, is 
establishing connections between the data of the previous
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chapters and the material now being presented, or will 
establish connections with material forthcoming. For 
example, the concept of being has categories or structures 
which are more universal than any concept involving a 
given realm of existent beings, but are less universal 
than the concept of 'being' itself. Tillich sees the basic 
ontological question (the question of being itself) as 
presupposing a asking subject (self). This subject asks 
questions about the world (seen as 'objects') that exists 
externally to himself. Tillich finds this ontological 
structure (which is dialectical in nature) to logically 
and experientially precede all other ontological concepts.
(Tillich II, 26)
The next section will examine Tillich's concepts 
of 'reason' and 'faith' (revelation), and the existential 
distortions of both. Deep reflection upon the material 
presented there should help anyone to substantiate 
her/his own judgment as to the feasibility of Tillich's 
eventual goal-~that of showing that Christianity gives us 
the most useful, truthful, and 'soul satisfying' answers 
available to us in response to the mind-boggling questions 
arising out of daily life. If we find them appropriate, 
then we can overcome the inability of 'technical reason' 
to give us spiritual (yet pragmatic) answers— we can 
then engage ourselves in a risky, but meaningful response 
to life, and obtain results that can help offset the 
despair and meaninglessness that is so prevalent in our 
world today.
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SECTION FOUR 
STATIC AND DYNAMIC ELEMENTS OF ONTOLOGICAL 
REASON, AND THEIR EXISTENTIAL DISTORTIONS 
LEAD TO QUEST FOR REVELATION ('FAITH')
Tillich starts each major part of his Systematic 
Theology with a phenomenological description of the major 
concepts he will develop. Such a means of description 
clearly defines the meaning of the concepts he is 
establishing.This first step fulfills a two-fold purpose:
(1) It helps insure that the definitions are carefully 
made and can be utilized in a logically sound manner; and
(2) It compels any criticism to understand first what 
Tillich's concepts mean before evaluating them.
(Tillich I, 164)
In this section, Tillich shows us that any 
relationship between reason and faith (revelation) 
must be established upon the level of 'ontological 
reason' and not upon 'technical reason'. The term 
"Logos", in the classical philosophical tradition, is 
synonymous with the term "ontological reason". Tillich 
recalls for us that the definition of these synonymous 
terms is:
that structure of the mind that enables the 
mind to grasp and transform reality. Such reason 
is effective in the technical,practical, esthetic, 
cognitive, and emotional functions of our human mind.
(Tillich, I, 106)
We can now grasp, from this definition of reason, 
that its total meaning cannot be reduced to the meaning of 
one of its components. But somehow, this has happened in 
the minds of the public. Technical reason (K2) has 
succeeded so well in enabling mankind to obtain control
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over the natural environment that man himself has become a 
victim of such impersonal control. The previous section 
gave some details of the revolt called 'Existentialism' in 
response to man's dehumanization of his fellow men. We can 
now see that reason, only when used in its ontological 
meaning, can sufficiently determine the end goal of one's 
intentionality. On the other hand, 'technical reason' 
establishes the means by which the end is to be achieved.
If not before, we can now be aware of the functions 
of the Logos (which 'technical reason' has conveniently 
set aside). The final paradigm of this thesis will include 
the esthetic, practical, emotional, and the cognitive 
aspects of the (Kl), (K2) and (K3) modes of knowledge,
and the inter-relationships between all these functions 
that constitute the structure of ontological reason.
'Ontology', in the Dictionary of Philosophy
by Peter Angeles, has five definitions. The first is:
The study of the essential characteristics of 
Being itself apart from the study of particular 
existing things. In studying Being, in its most 
abstract form, it asks questions such as "What 
is Being-in-itself?" or "What is the nature of 
Being as Being?" (4)
Likewise, Tillich tells us that ontology is 
possible because there are concepts which are less 
abstract than Being, but are more universal than any 
concept specifying a a given realm of beings. These lesser 
abstractions than that of Being itself have been called 
'principles' or 'ultimate ideas' or 'categories'. Tillich 
sees a basic ontological structure which is the implied 
presupposed condition of the ontological questions. This 
structure consists of an asking subject and the objects
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towards which the questions are directed. Thus a 
subject-object dialectical structure exists which 
logically and experientially precedes all other
structures. (Tillich I, 164) In this light, we can return
to Tillich's breakdown of ontological reason into its two 
elements within the mind. Tillich defines 'subjective' 
reason as "the rational structure of the mind itself", and 
'objective reason' as "the rational structure of reality 
which the mind can grasp and according to which it can
shape reality." (Tillich I, 75)
Tillich makes sure that the readers do not forget 
that ontological reason in its above two forms is still 
vulnerable to distortions in existence. He declares that 
there are three distinct elements to be found in every 
rational act: a static element, a dynamic element, and 
existential distortions that can be found in both of them. 
Tillich again reminds us that structural possibilities are 
created by reality from within itself. He finds that 
living beings are successful results of reality 
actualizing itself within the bounds of objective 
reason. (Tillich I, 78) Tillich's comments seem 
to corroborate Hegel's view that successful creation 
must not contradict reason.
If we are willing to accept for the moment, the 
concepts given in the above two paragraphs, then we can 
understand Tillich's proposal that the depth (ground) of 
reason is not reason itself, though it appears in these 
finite structures of reason while transcending them in 
meaning and power. This depth permeates both the
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structures of the mind and of reality in a way that both 
actualizes and transforms them. He finds this depth 
of reason to be essentially implicit in all acts and 
processes of reason. (See end note (5) for corroboration 
of this by Bernard Lonergan's definition of metaphysics.)
It is also pointed out to the reader's attention 
that enlightenment and rationalism have misunderstood 
reason's essential nature with reason as it is experienced 
in finite existence. Man finds life as self-contradictory 
and ambiguous. His finite reason has no satisfactory 
answers to the questions about the ultimate which the 
human being finds himself seeking. Tillich uses his 
analysis of the situation of the reasoning being to 
conclude that finite reason fails to grasp its origin, yet 
this reason is instinctively aware that such an infinite 
source is present in himself and all that is finite. 
(Tillich I, 79)
Therefore Tillich finds, in reason's search, the 
structures of reason conflict with each other. However, 
in actual life, they are found to be separated, but united 
at the same time. We should again be able to note that 
while the terminology is different, Hegel's basic concepts 
involving separation and union are significantly similar 
to Tillich's, 'separated, but united at the same time.' 
(Tillich I, 83)
Conditions of the subjective and objective 
structures of our minds are located by Tillich in the 
self-destructive conflicts between them in our existent 
world. He claims the conflicts cannot be solved on the
160
basis of our existent actual reason. He asserts that, in 
our attempts to resolve the problem and obtain union of 
our finite reason with its ground of mystery, we are 
driven to seek aid from our depth of reason (the ground 
from which our reason comes forth).
Concepts of the terms "autonomy" and "heteronomy" 
are now given to us by Tillich (as he sees them in 
conflict with each other). He finds that reason, which 
disregards its depth and tries to establish and actualize 
its own structure, can be considered 'autonomous1. He 
finds autonomy, not as the freedom to be a law to oneself, 
but ones's obedience to the law of his own reason. Tillich 
considers such a law to be one of both the objective and 
the subjective reason. He finds it not to be willfulness, 
but an independent self-submission to its own essential 
structure. Tillich sees such a law of nature as divine law 
which is rooted in the ground of being itself.
(Tillich I, 84)
Now introduced to his concept of 'heteronomy', 
Tillich tells us its root meaning is 'heteros' (strange)
'nomos'(law). He sees this strange (therefore outside the 
self) law as both external to one's being and well as 
being able to be seen as that coming from the depth of 
one's own finite reason. Tillich finds the problem here as 
the problem of an authority which claims to represent the 
depth of reason against human reason's autonomous 
actualization. That is, heteronomy claims its authority 
from an external source that is not from the depth of 
one's being.
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We are shown that when the autonomous person has 
severed himself from his depth of reason, such autonomy 
is shallow and lacks power. It is therefore open to 
destructive tendencies from outside influences claiming 
absolute authority and becomes an illusory autonomy akin 
to heteronomy.
The root of both autonomy and genuine heteronomy 
has been established by Tillich in the law of the 
divine ground of being. He calls such a law 'theonomy'.
If such a concept is assumed to be a correct one, then it
follows that when either constituent element is separated
from the other, the unity of the two as found in theonomy 
is broken. Tillich assures us that 'theonomy' is not a 
divine law arbitrarily imposed on reason from a supreme 
authority. It means that, in a theonomous situation, 
reason actualizes itself in obedience to its own 
innate structural laws and in the power of its own
infinite depth of being. (Tillich I, 85)
To be pragmatic at this moment, we could also
recall Jesus's statement in the King James Version of the
New Testament, Gospel of John 7: 16-17:
My doctrine is not mine but His who sent me.
Whoever shall do the will of God shall know of 
that which I speak, whether it be of me, or 
of He who sent me.
Man does have the capability to transcend his 
ordinary range of reason, and realize the power entailed 
by such transcendence when he takes the risk and exercises 
his 'courage to be' beyond the limitations of existent 
reason. Mankind, by doing this, can truly appreciate 
St. Anselm's conclusions which he reached by
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reflecting upon his experience of the results of his 
actions taken in a theonomous manner. It is only through 
such reflection that one can truly understand her/his 
experience in a fashion (K3) not to be understood by those 
failing to take such a leap of faith.
We have been logically led to where we can now see 
that the conflicts of the structures of reason in the 
existent world do not lead to the resistance of reason 
to revelation, but to the search for 'revelation' as a 
solution to the disunity found in existence. The next 
section will briefly summarize Tillich's analysis of the 
cognitive function of reason in its search for revelation.
SECTION FIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO ELEMENTS 
OF COGNITIVE REASON
Tillich realizes that his systematic theology 
needs the cognitive element of ontological reason (Logos) 
for the conceptual development of revelation. Revelation 
is described by Tillich as the ground of Being's 
manifestation to the finite mind. Tillich states that it 
is the polar structure of cognitive reason that sets up 
the existential conflicts. He sees knowledge as a form 
of union that is achieved through separation. He finds
detachment as a condition of cognitive union.
Looking at earlier attempts of philosophy, Tillich 
found them to be designed to have finite reason understand
how (in light of differences between subject and object)
there still exists a cognitive union. He tells us that 
the failures of these previous attempts to solve the 
problem were due to their inability to explain the
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estrangement between object and subject. Tillich finds 
as a correlative that, as reason in general enters the 
conflict between relativism and absolutism, so cognitive 
reason becomes susceptible to the conflict between 
detachment and union found in all acts of knowledge.
(Tillich I, 97)
His analysis of the elements of cognitive (K2) 
reason shows that there are different mixes of detachment 
and participation in the different realms of knowledge. He 
maintains that no realm of knowledge exists without the 
inclusion of both cognitive elements. He identifies the 
mode of knowledge which is predominantly determined by 
detachment as 'controlling knowledge' (K2). He considers 
this type (K2) as being the outstanding example of what we 
have identified previously as 'technical reason'. Tillich 
maintains that a truly objective relation, to man himself, 
is one that is determined by the element of union.
A cognitive attitude which is based on union is 
given the term "receiving knowledge" by Tillich. Such 
knowledge takes the object into the Logos of the subject 
— a Logos which includes the element of emotion. This 
analysis of cognitive reason by Tillich concludes that 
the unity of union and detachment can be described by 
defining the term "understanding." Tillich sees that 
the root meaning literally is 'to stand under' the object 
and be in an interpenetrating participation with it.
(Tillich I, 98)
We have seen that reason, driven beyond its finite 
limitations, seeks in its own finite self-depth a saving
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knowledge to preserve itself as a self.
The next and final chapter of this thesis will 
include Tillich's conviction that a God beyond the God 
of theism will give 'faith'— faith as it is found in the 
depth of being, a courage to be. Such a courage is found 
in those able to become morally independent individuals in 
spite of obstacles trying to prevent them from doing so.
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1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 1. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 102. 
Subsequent references to this work will be cited in the 
text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich I, 103).
2. Mark 12: 29-30.
3. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol 2, 19. 
Subsequent references to this volume will be cited in the 
text parenthetically as, e.g., (Tillich II, 20).
4. Peter A. Angles, Dictionary of Philosophy, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1981)
5. Bernard F. Lonergan, Insight A Study of Human 
Understanding, (New York: Longmans, Green, and CO LTD, 
1965) 390. Lonergan's definition of metaphysics is, "the 
department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, 
transforms, and unifies all other departments."
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to present 
to the modern and moderately educated person a practical 
paradigm for testing the credibility of various world 
views. Such views are often proposed to be basic, clear, 
and distinct forms of knowledge that are self-evident (at 
least to those proposing them). They are proposed as 
the basic foundations upon which our rational structures 
of thought are subsequently built. As such, these views 
are offered as sufficient means to achieve life goals by 
way of three modes of knowledge:
(1) the empirical world of what 'is' (objective-self), and 
identified by the symbol (K2); (2) the world of the 
subjective-self) or (Kl); and (3) the reflective unifying 
factor within the centered self, and identified by (K3).
The (Kl) and (K3) modes of knowledge differ from 
the (K2) mode in that they operate in a world of what 
ought-to-be rather than a world of what 'is'. This 
reasonable moral world of what-ought-to-be is a world 
that, if achieved, would be not only of the true, 
but also of the good. A possible world of absolute good 
gives man the promise of eventual satisfaction, 
happiness, and a proposed goal to strive for— a goal that 
Kant told us is the good achieved as a result of an 
absolutely good 'holiness of will'. (See chapter three,
81)
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The paradigm designed to help meet these needs 
was formulated in response to my own personal desire to 
know, and to have such knowledge be in line with what 
'ought-to-be' as well as what 'is'.
A paradigm that tests various competing world views 
is expected to be effective not only in the short run, 
but by internal and self-corrective procedures to prove 
credible in the long term also. Its methodology requires 
that its users maintain an open attitude toward the need 
of any and all corrective reformulation(s) when necessary. 
Such a built-in self-corrective feedback procedure is 
essential for this model to maintain its credibility as a 
testing standard for corroborating newer concepts. These 
concepts are needed to amalgamate the latest changing 
conditions in our natural world as well as the changes in 
the rational world, the psychological world, and the 
spiritual world. Any resultant reformulation of our 
model should enable all users to play a more effective 
role in the continuing quest to reach their ultimate 
purposes and goals in life.
The preceding chapters included presentations 
concerning some basic polarities found in speculative and 
practical concepts of man's reason. Such polarities were 
also found to exist in man's concepts of his natural 
bodily sensations, needs, desires, and functions in order 
to survive successfully in this temporal natural world.
One's self-conscious actions are structured to 
achieve practical results in their relationships to 
entities in the natural world. Some of these entities are
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literally non-free in the self-determination of their 
final natures. Other organic entities are found to possess 
increasing degrees of self-determination. The ultimate 
level of autonomy in determining the means of achieving a 
self-determined goal is to be found in the rational and 
spiritual man.
Therefore, before the presentation of the thesis's 
final testing paradigm, a very brief summarization will 
be made of concepts found in each of the preceding 
chapters, concepts that are constituent parts of the final 
formulation of our paradigm.
To convince another person effectively to adopt a
world view that is in varying degrees opposed to his
present world view, a purely objective (emotionally 
detached [K2]) argument is usually insufficient. Therefore 
section two will present integrative (K3) factors not 
presented in section one, but are deemed necessary for 
one's subjective beliefs (Kl) to be successfully merged 
with the objective arguments (K2) already given.
Section three will present the author's current
world view and its coalescence into a paradigm that will
also aid persons to select the most appropriate goals for 
themselves. The paradigm will also enable them to 
participate in, modify, and utilize the most effective 
means of achieving their significant purposes in life.
Section four will present modern movements in 
counseling that substantiate the use of Hegelian concepts 
in the thesis paradigm for aiding persons in problem 
solving and problem management.
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Section five will present a schematic of the 
thesis's final paradigm. Upon the completed explanation 
of the schematic, the projected use of the paradigm in the 
author1s volunteer care-giver work in the Clark County 
Hospice Program will be presented in the final section, 
section six.
This final section will include a detailed example 
of how the paradigm could have been utilized in the 
author's care-giving to a terminal cancer patient and his 
bereaved survivors.
SECTION ONE 
BRIEF SUMMARIES OF CRITICAL CONCEPTS TAKEN 
FROM CHAPTERS ON KANT, HEGEL, AND TILLICH
KANT
In 1785, Immanuel Kant wrote an ethical treatise 
called Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. It 
established an understandable philosophical theory of 
morality and made it available to the general reader, 
one who had previously acquired a common knowledge of 
ethics and morality, but could not rationally defend his 
position against opposing viewpoints.
Kant wanted to establish some 'axioms' for any 
subsequent formulation of a system of moral laws; such 
laws could not be obtained by empirical observation 
(induction) of moral actions, but required reason for 
their establishment. (1) Kant believed that there is 
nothing in or out of the natural world that is absolutely 
good except a good will. Kant had to postulate both 
immortality and freedom in order for man to accept
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the responsibility to work toward and yet not reach such 
a goal (attainment of a personal absolute good will) in 
historical time.
Individuals can strive to realize a gradually 
higher grade of moral perfection. However, one's free 
moral choices need to be checked against Kant's concept of 
the content of an absolutely good will— a will to be used 
as an universal standard against which all individual 
moral intentions can be 'zero beat'. Corroboration 
of the need for such a standard is given by Thomas 
Aquinas. (2) Aquinas sees the essence of every 
individual at a given moment in time as a measure of the 
being and perfection of that individual. To make such a 
measure, a principle of universal value is needed which 
is held by all moral individuals and established by the 
ground of all being (God). This principle states that a 
greater or lesser degree of moral perfection can be 
appraised and put in proper order only in relationship to 
the maximum or absolute degree of perfection. However,
Kant's absolute good will was only identified as being 
a universal and necessary duty, without God being 
specified as the source of it.
Other major premises in chapter three dwelt with 
the various aspects of the human will (including its 
'disposition'). Kant saw good and evil intentions as 
opposing dispositions. He felt that, in spite of the real 
possibility of man's autonomy, actual autonomy could be 
surrendered. If so, a decline of the rational will and an 
increase of the inclinations would occur to the point that
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the will towards good would spontaneously cease and yield 
to a disposition of evil volitions. (3)
It is my contention that the presentation of Kant's 
duality of human nature and lack of any identity in 
common between the polarities of good and evil is what 
Hegel criticized as the limitation of the (K2) objective 
type of reasoning. To see and appreciate the advanced form 
of reason (called 'reflective reason1 by Hegel— a type of 
reason which overcame the limitations imposed by (K2) or 
understanding), we need to advance beyond Kant. We will do 
this next by briefly looking at the Hegelian development 
of the Absolute Idea— an eventual concept of a Divine 
Subjectivity.
HEGEL
The Hegelian 'Notion' (with the modifications made
for its practical applicability to the finite reason of
mankind today) is the keystone of the thesis's final
paradigm. Recollection of the details given to Hegel's
definition of his 'Notion' in chapter four helps us to
remember the bare bones of his definition as being:
The idea of a being which in passing 
outwards into its opposite, passes only 
into itself, and this opposite does not 
become anything different, but remains 
in the opposition, completely identical 
with itself. (4)
This final paradigm synthesizes the (Kl) and (K2) 
modes of human knowledge through the movements of reason 
(described more fully in the Hegelian chapter). My use of 
his dialectic is predicated upon my conviction that 
Hegel's 'Notion' can be rationally interpreted as a
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synthesis of idealistic, realistic, and existential 
concepts. As an unified concept, it is also a 
self-correcting mechanism (in response to later data 
input). As such, its inclusion within my final paradigm 
helped me and can help other individuals formulate (and/or 
correct) their own freely chosen moral ends and the most 
effective means to carry out those decisions.
Hegel's 'Notion', in this writer's opinion, is also 
a systematic method that can help an individual evaluate 
the usefulness of other basic premises of various current 
world views. Therefore, the 'Notion' concept is considered 
and utilized as the most efficient and self-correcting 
means of providing a conceptual structure for my 
paradigm. This paradigm enables one to synthesize 
his/her own particular and universal viewpoints in 
their own ever-evolving moral adjustments to an 
ever-changing physical and mental environment.
TILLICH
To really grasp Hegel's 'Notion' as a useful tool 
in establishing individual goals and the means of reaching 
them, certain sources are needed. They include Tillich's 
existential theology and philosophy (subjective (Kl) and 
objective (K2) reason) in unity, even though both are 
distorted by natural world ambiguities.
Tillich asserts his conviction that the resistance 
of recent philosophy to ontological truths has been due to 
the assumption that truth can only be corroborated within 
the methods utilized by empirical science. (5) The reader 
can recall that this thesis contends that all three modes
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of knowledge (K1,K2,K3) and combinations thereof) need to 
utilize the scientific '5D method' to: (1) dig; (2)
deliberate; (3) decide; (4) do; and (5) debug. The method 
is essential in deriving,justifying, or originating new 
conceptual structures of thought in the three respective 
modes. The argument throughout the thesis has been about 
the need to establish an individual and a collective group 
means of corroborating judgments (and actions taken on 
such judgments) for each mode of knowledge.
Comments by Tillich on ontological truths are 
corroborated by my personal experience. Tillich, in 
chapter six of this thesis, pointed out that methods of 
corroboration differ between the two cognitive functions 
that he calls controlling (K2) and receiving (Kl) 
modes of knowledge. The (K3) mode of knowledge is a 
synthetic relationship of the (Kl) and (K2) modes and 
therefore assumes the same risk entailed in the unique, 
spontaneous and total involvement found in (Kl).
His final conclusions about controlling and 
receiving knowledge review the radical risk of acting 
upon a receiving type of knowledge that cannot be made 
secure by further corroboration. He outlines three 
areas of risk that may befall those who act on receiving 
knowledge: (1) fate and death; (2) guilt and condemnation;
and (3) meaninglessness and despair. In his book Courage 
to Be, he defines 'courage-to-be' as "an ethical act 
in which a person affirms his own being in spite of the 
elements of his existence which conflict with his 
essential affirmation." (6) Tillich's question to all
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of us is, "what do we affirm, ourselves as a particular 
self, or ourselves as a part of a collective whole?"
In this book on courage, Tillich discusses 
the risk involved in affirming oneself to the point of 
losing one's being. He proposes to the reader that the 
threats of non-being, expressed in the three areas listed 
above, can be overcome only by a courage-to-be that is 
rooted in a power of being which overcomes the three areas 
of risk. Such a power would have to be greater than the 
power of one's world of consciousness, or of oneself in 
such a world.
Upon further examination of Tillich's analysis of 
man's predicament in an existent world, we find the option 
of accepting or rejecting the help of the power of 
Being-Itself (God). Tillich finds that such transcendent 
help is the only way to achieve a courage-to-be that 
allows a person to affirm his/her self in spite of the 
threat of nonbeing. Tillich asserts very emphatically that 
there are no exceptions to this way of overcoming the 
threat of nonbeing.
His analysis of the human predicament gives a 
person practical reasons for thinking that all courageous 
self-affirmations must have an open or hidden religious 
root. This background allows his readers to see the depth 
of meaning underlying Tillich's concept of faith. He 
defines faith as "the state of being grasped by the power 
of Being-Itself." He finds that such a power is never 
completely absent, but always present in every thing that 
'is'. Either personally or from a close friend, we can all
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relate to such awareness of the power of Being-Itself, 
especially in experiences which expose us to an immediate 
threat of extinction or non-being. (Tillich, 156)
It has been my own personal experience (as well as 
the testimony of others) that when our moral intentions 
are sincere and unselfish, we often find ourselves 
accomplishing moral objectives in a manner we know our 
ordinary individual selves are not capable of handling.
(At this point, we can recall my acronym of Lonergan's 
definition of metaphysics: 'UPTU' stands for knowledge
that underlies, penetrates, transforms and unifies all 
other departments of human knowledge".) (7)
To Tillich, that power of Being-Itself is the 
possibility a being has to actualize itself against the 
resistance of other beings. He points out that the 
polarity of being and its opposite, nonbeing, allows human 
reason to affirm the dynamic self-affirmation of 
Being-Itself. (Tillich, 179) He tells us that only 
because Being-Itself has the character of self-affirmation 
in spite of nonbeing, can courage be possible. His 
argument is that because courage participates in the 
self-affirmation of Being-Itself, it participates in a 
power which is capable of overcoming the power of 
nonbeing. Therefore, any act of courage on the part of a 
particular rational and autonomous being is an act which 
points that individual's awareness to the source of such 
power. (Tillich, 181)
The final high point of Tillich's analysis of 
man's courage-to-be is his conclusion that all forms of
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theology are transcended only in the experience he calls 
'absolute faith.' He finds its source to be the power of 
Being-Itself which accepts one's self-affirmation to be 
oneself in spite of all obstacles to do this. A 
description of this transfer of power (that enables one 
to affirm one's own being) is not possible, since it would 
transcend all rational, mystical, or person-to-person 
encounters. (Tillich, 178)
The final conclusion of Tillich to this remarkable 
analysis of courage is that an absolute faith is "a state 
of being grasped by the very power of Being-Itself." Such 
a state enables one to accept the anxieties which befall 
us when we are nearly submerged by the meaninglessness of 
events that occur almost daily in our individual lives.
Such a point calls for the courage-to-be which Tillich 
says will come only when one's subjective and objective 
God has seemingly been lost in a flurry of one's anxiety 
and doubt. (Tillich, 190)
SECTION TWO 
FACTORS INVOLVED IN 'SUBJECTIVE BELIEF'
To convince another person effectively to adopt a 
given world-view (a view which in essence conflicts with 
a view the recipient has previously held), a purely 
rational argument to that objective side of oneself is 
insufficient. It is insufficient because any views or 
concerns involved in matters of ultimate concern to a 
person should have all aspects of one's nature taken into 
account and united to the degree necessary to arrive at 
final specific goals and the methods to attain such goals.
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This author is convinced that his sensuous nature, 
the psychological, rational, and spiritual aspects of 
himself, need to be coordinated (with a certain degree 
of unity) and then made to stand behind his final moral 
choices dealing with specific problems found in everyday 
life. The following factors are based upon (Kl) and (K3) 
modes of knowledge which can then become basic data for 
their integration with one's rational (K2) mode:
a. William James gave us the following conditions 
necessary for convincing a person's practical reason 
that we should will to believe a world-view in matters 
of metaphysical belief: (1) that such a world-view must
be one which the individual would find to be meaningful to 
him/her; (2) that the belief offered may not be avoided 
but must be accepted or rejected as such; (3) that the 
option to be believed is one in which a person would be 
significantly affected by results achieved by acting upon 
such a belief ('live' option). (8)
b. In addition to a practical and objective type of 
appeal, a persuasive and subjective presentation 
concerning that new view may be also prove to be 
effective. Let us assume that a second person (B) 
sincerely believes that his/her given world-view is 
absolutely necessary in order to obtain the results 
striven for in given situations. Then (B)'s presentation 
and testimony (concerning the usefulness of his/her 
world-view) could persuade other persons emotionally, 
yet reasonably, to place their faith in the testimony 
from (B). The strength of such a subjective part of one's
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belief would depend upon the degree one would trust the 
testimony of the persuader.
Jesus of Nazareth is an example of such persuasion.
He asked those who saw and heard Him to trust that his 
religious world-view could achieve the results He desired 
when He attempted to adhere to the moral actions for which 
it called. He asked those who heard Him to accept His 
subjective (Kl) world-view, but also to look beyond the 
subjective, and to test this view objectively (K2) by 
trying it for themselves. In this way, He told us we can 
know the truth of the view he is testifying about— whether 
it is of Him (viewed as an individual man) or of a 
universal (objective) nature both in and beyond the ken of 
man. (9)
I believe that the above example taken from the 
New Testament espouses a religious world-view which 
takes into account the basic polarity of the human being 
(the subjective and objective sides to his/her nature).
It additionally asks that we experience and test the 
results obtained by the actions we take in following those 
unified moral concepts. Our reflections on the experience 
of taking such actions and the results achieved are then 
an individual way (as a part of a collective whole) 
of corroborating a universal (collective whole) standard 
for our individual moral conduct. As Jesus suggested, if 
honest reflection is taken after the experience, we will 
find that an individual's free choice of a given level of 
moral conduct reflects his level of being (as well as the 
mind's knowledge of it). The certitude of such a level is
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obtained by a 'zero beating' of it against the universal 
(collective whole) standard of moral conduct expected for 
the given situation. In this way, an individual can 
progressively build up an elevation of his/her moral 
intentions towards the perfection of the infinite 
mind, which is the ground of all existence.
The doctrine Jesus was referring to was not a 
scientific one in which a person could be impartially 
involved and always get the same results as others. It 
was one of a personal relationship with one's source of 
being. The Bible is full of illustrations of those who on 
'faith' tried living the newer ethical ways of life which 
far exceeded the previous legal requirements demanded by 
law. For one example, after doing and finding the proof 
Jesus said will follow, John (in I John) wrote, "That 
which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye 
also may have fellowship with us." (10)
Can the reader consider the parallels found 
between this New Testament example and Hegel's 'Notion'?
We can ponder the results obtained by the internal 
unity of our subjective and objective selves, and by 
our capability to make self-willed choices in the 
resolution of future differences between these sides 
of ourselves. In using the dialectical methodology in 
conjunction with the 5 D's involved in all modes of 
knowledge, we are using the best of human knowledge.
From this knowledge, we can derive those specific 
methods necessary to most likely achieve the sought 
end result.
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The Kantian Categorical Imperative for all 
persons (and the moral commandments of the various 
religions for their followers) would be the first 
consideration(s) for an individual who is tentatively 
selecting any moral goal pertaining to a given situation.
The second consideration would be to use the dialectical 
method and appropriate application of the 5 D's to 
ascertain the best method(s) to achieve the moral goal.
The reason this thesis supports the Categorical 
Imperative is that it is based on rational, practical, 
and supportive speculative reason concepts. If any 
religions base their moral commandments on authoritative 
dogma that is in conflict with sound reasoning principles, 
then active participants in such a group will have to find 
some way to resolve the internal conflict between their 
subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) modes of knowledge.
It is assumed that the majority of problems 
encountered in everyday life will be management ones 
concerning non-moral issues (or primarily K2). In these 
cases, the 5 'D ' method of getting the information, 
deliberating, and deciding on the best means (by 
subjecting each alternative possibility to a dialectical 
comparison) will be the most effective means of obtaining 
the desired results.
One can rationally sense, at this point in our 
concluding comments, that the means to an end could be 
a plurality of structures of logical thought. In such a 
case, the end result, or content of the final effect,
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would be a singular effect of the coalescing pluralistic 
actions.
Therefore, by practicing and experiencing such 
events, we can conceptually conclude that the forms (the 
rational structures which frame our actions) coalesce to 
produce an intended end result. This one end result is 
therefore ultimately equal to the sum of the many means 
used to achieve it. However, no moral equations dealing 
with inputs from finitely free and rational beings can be 
simply put like the above example. (APPENDIX II, page 228 
has been added to give the reader an idea of the 
complexity introduced to equations when the given factors 
are continually changing their inputs and their 
relationships to the unchanging [or constant] factors in 
the equation).
As parts of the creative whole of the universe, we 
can induce fairly close approximations to the whole in the 
area of finite quantities and their interrelationships. We 
cannot, as parts, know fully the whole of which we are 
only a part. Such knowledge, beyond that connected 
directly with our sense experiences, remains in the realm 
of speculative reason, intuition, a priori forms of 
knowledge, and revelations of a transcendental nature.
Complete knowledge of any unique entity which has 
a power of choice in its being and becoming will remain 
forever unknown to that attitude of mind that proclaims 
that all knowledge is conceptual (K2). Our conceptual 
way of thinking (K2) is primarily based upon observations 
taken from the empirical world and corroborated by results
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obtained by observations in the empirical world of sense 
observation. A higher level of being, a level we associate 
with the term 'transcendental thought' (K3), cannot be 
reached directly from the level of knowledge we call 
(Kl) or (K2).
From the end result of looking at Hegel's 'Notion' 
as a conceptual universal standard for human thought, we 
can have a reasonable comprehension of how to set up an 
analogous but modified model that will need continuous 
feedback from the results of using it. If we do this in a 
sincere drive for truths of a universal nature, we should 
not fear to accept and utilize the changes we become aware 
of— changes created from our and/or God's infinite 
potentialities of 'nothingness' yet to enter the finite 
world as existences.
My primary goal, emphasized throughout the thesis, 
is the establishment of a modern paradigm to test and 
evaluate alternative world-views. Its purpose is to 
provide a practical basic (yet evolving) standard for 
vulnerable existent human beings to test the empirical as 
well as the speculative and metaphysical world-views and 
universal premises (principles) to which they are exposed. 
Such views usually provide their own different standards 
in that they depend upon their basic premises as being so 
self-evidently clear and distinct that they are not in 
need of any further presuppositions or prior causes.
However, to my knowledge, we are currently left without 
a consensus among us as to a universal standard against
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which the respective world-views may be practically 
compared.
This section has given additional factors 
(including reason) that need to be considered when 
one's subjective part of his/her being is included in the 
testing and evaluating of one's beliefs and world-views.
It has attempted to persuade the readers that no given 
world-view should be totally accepted by an autonomous 
human being without subjecting it to her/his own 
self-corroboration. Such corroboration would include 
testing this world view's comparative value versus other 
conflicting world views. To do the latter, one must have a 
means (self-correcting) and a criterion by which such 
comparative evaluation can be accomplished. (See section 
five for a schematic of my final paradigm that can provide 
the means by which such an evaluation can be achieved).
Section three gives an example of how an 
an individual's current world-view(s) can be checked out 
by 'zero beating' its (their) respective concepts 
against the proposed testing paradigm. My current basic 
world view is based on my unified subjective beliefs (Kl) 
and objective scientific beliefs (K2) (derived from my 
background as a professional meteorologist). This unified 
world view has been modified as a result of the 
amalgamation of basic concepts contained in sections one 
and two. The resultant concepts survived my "zero beating" 
of them against the proposed thesis paradigm.
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SECTION THREE 
AUTHOR'S CURRENT WORLD VIEW AND ITS 
COALESCENCE INTO A PARADIGM FOR 
INDIVIDUALS TO PARTICIPATE IN,
AND TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE 
WAY TO ACHIEVE LIFE GOALS
Since the beginning of philosophical and 
metaphysical thought, we have had differing points of 
view concerning first causes. The ethical world awaits 
(and may await forever) a universal standard for 
self-conduct and self-control in all areas of human 
life. Different cultural conditions, different natural 
environments, etc., (plus the rapidly changing conditions 
to which all of these factors are subject) make it seem 
impossible to get a universal standard of conduct to which 
each of us could freely agree.
The problem is similar to that of knowing in full 
the truth of the entities that just 'are' in this existent 
world. However, this does not stop our desire for such 
knowledge in all of its modes in the areas of both what 
'is' and what 'ought to be'. This proposed paradigm is not 
a panacea that gives one an exact method for achieving an 
acceptable solution to all moral issues. But it is the 
result of much struggle and searching for a tentative 
standard against which to test (zero beat) our own 
beliefs as well as the alternative basic premises of 
various philosophic or scientific world views on the 
market today.
Many such alternative views are ones which 
declare themselves (implicitly or explicitly) to be the
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only and final truth upon which to 'zero beat' one's 
subjective and objective intentional relationships to 
external objects in the natural world. By placing all 
such views under our critical self-scrutiny through the 
application of the model's methodology to each particular 
view, we can find partial truths that are useful for 
the progression of our search for what is more wholly 
good and true. As such, these partial truths can be 
progressively accumulated, consolidated, and amalgamated 
into a composite whole that constitutes our basic world 
view. This evolving whole, as agreed upon by the members 
of the community holding these basic concepts, will 
constitute the basic standard which the group uses for 
corroboration by 'zero beating' their proposed individual 
choices of moral action against it.
We must include ourselves among those autonomous 
entities which are realistically found to be limited in 
their freedom to be the sole causes of their intended 
external effects. Our self-generated causes are open to 
further distortions incurred by the unknown number of 
self-free and self-determining entities existing in the 
external world of nature itself. Such a world is rather 
universally accepted as existing independently of us as 
individuals, whether we are conscious of it or not.
The above paragraphs are an attempt to portray what 
this author personally believes to be factors within the 
structure of a sound mind— a mind whose subjective side 
honestly seeks a unification with that objective side 
of itself in its particular form of being and becoming.
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Although my views and convictions may be seen as a 
consolidation of other previously expressed viewpoints and 
therefore not my own, I reply that they also contain my 
'subjective' self's wish for autonomy. If we are 
autonomous, we must be responsible for the acceptance or 
rejection of all ideas and concepts elicited by our 
everyday contact with ourselves, with other human beings, 
and with the natural world. We are as responsible for 
acting on views previously expressed by others as we would 
be if the views acted upon were of our own original 
creation. When all self-known moral views are 'zero beat' 
against one's own expanding set of moral standards before 
being accepted (as well as beat against one's objective 
knowledge of the group's basic standard for its members), 
then the final moral view taken can be said to be one's 
own.
The responsibility that accompanies actions based 
upon autonomous decisions by an individual also includes 
the responsibility for our acceptance or rejection of 
judgments based on critical inquiry of and the subsequent 
reasonable corroboration of the knowledge we consider as 
true and good. I therefore think the material presented in 
this final chapter is a result of my conceptions of what 
constitutes the means by which we obtain and corroborate 
our human truths concerning Being-Itself as the rational 
ground of all subsequent being. I have tested these 
conceptions and suppositions by much self-critical 
inquiry and 'zero beating' the results against those 
obtained by peers seeking answers to the same questions
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for which I have sought answers. A reasonable 
corroboration was obtained from all the sources used. 
Therefore, the final concepts I have included in the 
thesis should be considered as truths of my judgments 
also.
Advances in philosophy have led to a fuller 
explication of the nature of a rational and spiritual 
human being. They have expressed this nature in more 
comprehensive structures of thought. The search for the 
nature of one's being and its progressive apprehension 
in human thought goes back in historical time to 
Heraclitus (who spoke of change and progression in 
such a manner that he could say, "I am and I am not"). It 
has continued its evolving progression through the 
various combinations of partial truths expressed in 
the terminology and premises of the idealists, realists, 
pragmatists, etc., of yesterday and today.
The amalgamated factors with which I have chosen 
to formulate my final paradigm are not closed, but 
open to subsequent progressive enrichment, correction, 
and utilization in determining and in achieving my end 
goals in life. I have accepted these basic factors as 
contingent truths for my rational will (volition) to test 
itself against by 'zero beating' its practical reason 
against what I consider to be universal revelatory 
(through insight and experience) standards for all 
rational and spiritual human beings. The reader can 
recall, in my presentation of certain Hegelian concepts, 
that 'spirit' is defined as that reflective faculty of the
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mind that works to find a common unity between the (Kl) 
(subjective) and (K2) (objective) modes of knowledge 
accessible to human reason in its totality. By freely 
allowing my (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge to present 
their preferences to my central 'Self1, I have the choice 
of selecting from alternate ways of 'ought to', one (or 
ones) which I believe has (have) the greatest probability 
of helping me achieve my currently intended goals in life.
The search still goes on for the universal 
acceptance (by all moral beings) of a universal standard 
for morality and ethics. Such a standard would allow 
reasonable affirmation of the right of each rational 
human being to be creatively and freely different from all 
others. It would also, at the same time, be a universal 
(K3) standard freely accepted by each of those individuals 
adhering to such standards as constituting the basic 
premises for determining the proper mixes of individual 
self-concerns in conduct to the concerns of the group as a 
whole.
If such a conception of what constitutes one's 
responsibility to self and to one's community were 
progressively adopted by all rational and spiritual 
beings, then the world in which we live could become 
progressively liberated from the distortions we now find 
in it.
I have also rationally and intuitively accepted 
the fact that only the pure desire to know what 'is'
(and an unbiased desire to do what 'ought to be done') 
can successfully counter the distortions we find in our
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way while working to achieve our goals. Choices of conduct 
by other individuals vary considerably. Such free or 
non-free choices of moral intentions become distorted 
when applied in the existent natural and temporal world.
Let us now assume that we have a tentative 
acceptance of the basic principles that: (1) we are
autonomous and spiritual human beings; (2) that our 
reasoning powers are transcendental in nature; and (3) 
we have the ability to resolve (in thought) the conflict 
between our (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge by way of the 
reflective (K3) mode of knowledge. I believe that we can, 
with the use of the 5 D's and the successive cycling of 
the Hegelian moments of thought (as described in the 
schematic model in the next section of this chapter), 
become communal members alongside those who in their free 
choices become unified under and in a universal concept of 
morality.
In my attempts to subjectively persuade readers to 
test out for themselves the paradigm proposed in this 
thesis, I have not expanded on the importance of Kant's 
description of the nature of the human will. A deeper 
look into it certainly keeps one's will from rationally 
absolving itself of the responsibility in making or 
refraining from making ethical self-choices in the area of 
ethical conduct. The remaining paragraphs of this section 
will indicate the influence of Kant's concepts (concerning 
the human will) in the establishment of my moral 
independence and responsibility for my moral actions in 
daily life.
190
Emphasis is upon the (Kl) and (K3) factors (without 
neglecting the (K2) input into them). The presentation is 
intended to be a subjectively persuasive one. It will 
illustrate my personal responses and conclusions based 
upon my experiential and experimental application of 
premises such as Kant's 'Categorical Imperative,' Hegel's 
'Notion,' and usage of the 5 D's in the three modes of 
knowledge, (Kl), (K2), and (K3) .
Any action in the moral realm of the subjective 
side of me (emotion, feeling, and impulses) is a part of 
my human nature. If this side of me negates or dilutes the 
objective and rational faculty of my will) before this 
latter side of me makes its final choice of intentional 
moral conduct, then my natural inclinations and 
unconscious desires dominate my final decision (or 
final 'maxim of choice') about how to act morally in a 
particular situation. A choice of this sort is literally a 
heteronomus choice. A truly autonomous choice would be a 
spontaneous one undetermined by any previous experiences 
within or without oneself. After such a choice, one's 
practical reason can be 'zero beat' against a universal 
standard which one would be willing (as a part of that 
group which is in common agreement concerning the 
resultant 'universal standard') to accept. This gives one 
the means to check his/her autonomous volition to do what 
he/she ought to do. A tentative autonomous moral decision 
can be corroborated by seeing if it is sufficiently in 
accord with the group's standard. In this way, one can 
freely give up part of oneself to a communal standard and
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yet feel he/she has maintained his/her own power of 
self-determination in one's moral conduct in the temporal 
world.
To avoid any implication of a 'sell out' by the 
individual's freely accepted adaptation to a group 
standard whose limits of variation do not go far enough to 
include an individual's moral maxim for action, the reader 
is reminded our paradigm (and our explanations previously 
made) have recognized such a possibility. Such communal 
standards have been recognized as being subject to change 
in accordance with changing internal and external 
conditions affecting the individuals composing the group.
If so, it is up to the individual freely to attempt to 
persuade the group to modify its previous standards to 
accommodate new truths or changes necessary to make their 
basic standard the most effective means by which the 
individual objectives of the group are obtained. In all 
cases, the individual is still free to reconsider freely 
his autonomous moral choice of action that falls beyond 
'acceptable group variation limitations'. He/she can then 
modify his/her moral choice accordingly, or can freely 
continue to maintain his/her convictions that do not 
conform to the 'group' standard.
I shall be the first one to admit that until I 
struggled with Kant, Hegel, and Tillich (and other 
philosophers, logicians, and theologians), my objective 
and rational self accepted on religious faith (K1 and K3) 
that the creator of all that exists (and will yet come to 
be) revealed to mankind some of its basic truths.
Being-Itself did this via many routes— routes such as 
revelation, experience, reason, intuition, a priori 
knowledge, and even that form of connatural knowledge 
subsumed under (K3) in this thesis.
I now can reasonably affirm Kant's explanation of 
the nature of our own volitions or wills in their 
production of spontaneous self-chosen moral intentions. 
Such acceptance makes myself and others basically 
responsible for all our intentional choices.
I strongly believe that if all of us, as 
individuals, give our maximum efforts to accept and carry 
out the objective (universal) truths recognized by that 
faculty of our minds that we mean by the term 'practical 
reason' (K2), then our volitional power to choose between 
alternatives will subsume or negate our competing desires 
My will (as an exemplar of other wills operating under 
similar conditions) can then issue a rational moral 
'maxim of choice'. Such a choice would be a result of my 
autonomous willingness to accept the responsibility of my 
subsequent actions being in line with what my practical 
reason identifies as a collective choice of moral beings 
(or a universal standard of moral conduct).
It is my firm conviction (based on past moral 
experience) that the (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge 
and their unification under (K3) still lack the power 
needed to obtain perfectly in action that which the mind 
intentionally desires to do in the realm of moral 
conduct. The power to have the structure of intentional 
moral thought become actualized as a content equivalent
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to one's structural intentionality lies in a higher 
concept of unification under (K3). Such unification 
occurs when one's moral choices of intentional action 
coincide with the universal standards of conduct. The 
only source of such universal standards for mankind 
(that is free of external influences on it) is the 
ground of all existent beings, the original self-caused, 
self-determined, and self-developed Being-Itself.
Such a concept lay hidden in my understanding of 
the religious concepts found in the Bible New Testament. 
Tillich expressed this underlying factor in terms that 
implicitly describe, to a degree, that unexpressible but 
tacit knowledge of a true oughtness— an oughtness that can 
only be obtained when the intentions desired are in unity 
with the ground source of all 'good wills' or with what 
Kant identified as an 'Absolutely Good Will'. This power 
of acting in line with the source of all being will be 
found to achieve in actions, a greater degree of adherence 
to the original 'maxim of choice' upon which subsequent 
moral actions are based.
An individual 'maxim of choice' by one's own will 
that is acceptable to one's affirmation that one would 
want this choice to also be a universal intentional mode 
of conduct that one could freely submit to is, in my 
judgment, the only 'maxim of choice'— one that could 
therefore be reasonably affirmed as a morally 
spontaneous and autonomous choice of my integrated 
thought's intention. It can, in my judgment, be carried 
out to a fair degree by dependence upon human reason
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seeking ultimate truths of a moral nature. However, my 
experience indicates that when one accepts a dependence 
upon, and a trust in the ground of all being as a 
foundation which underlies and supports us morally, then 
we are assisted in overcoming those parts of our 
existential nature that resist our physical actions 
to achieve our moral intentions.
In the areas of the non-moral aspects of my 
knowledge (as they pertain to the areas of finite 
necessity in the objective and external world), the 
realm of (K2) knowledge must be predominant and in some 
cases, as exclusive as possible. My convictions are that 
Hegel gave the world a dialectical method for thought 
correction that is equally applicable to the inductive 
methods of empirical science. This dialectical method 
enables us to approach the ideal structured concept as 
being the content of the achieved goal. Pragmatic results, 
achieved by different ways of testing in the different 
modes of knowledge (Kl), (K2), and (K3), will ascertain
this equivalency. To do so, the means and testing of 
the means must include all aspects of those factors 
significant to achieving the desired attainment of a 
given mode of knowledge.
While not found explicitly in much of the 
literature I studied (except in Lonergan), I believe that 
the common ground that must be found in order to unify 
polarities (such as the subjective and objective aspects 
of one's being) can only be reached by means of a 
dialectical method that is always open to further
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refinement of its basic rational premises. The dualistic 
concept of man failed to find rational grounds for such a 
commonality. However, I found in Hegel, Lonergan, St.
Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Tillich, and portions 
of the Bible (at least implicitly), concepts that pertain 
to the mode of knowledge we call (K3) in this thesis. For 
them, (K3) does provide the common ground on which unity 
between (Kl) and (K2) modes of knowledge can be built.
These concepts, if accepted, provide a common ground 
between polarities so that their similarities as well as 
differences can be integrated to show a mutual 
independence and an interdependence upon each other.
It is my opinion (after much reflection and 
comparing of these similar concepts) that the best 
definition of metaphysics I have found is one that 
includes the understanding of (K3) by the above authors.
It is found in Bernard Lonergan's book INSIGHT - A Study 
of Human Understanding. (11) He states that "metaphysics 
is that department of human knowledge that underlies, 
penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other 
departments." [emphasis added] I have referred to this 
definition in one of my chapters by the acronym 'UPTU'.
This 'Up to you' (based on the first letters of the four 
predicates contained in the definition of metaphysics) is 
a way to remind all of us that it is up to each of us as 
to the degree we accept and apply our knowledge of 
metaphysics to the other departments of our human 
knowledge.
Many (including myself) see such a definition as
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one that is representative of the nature of that which 
metaphysics (as predominately a [K3] mode of knowledge) 
intuits as an integral (even if unknown as such) part of 
those modes of knowledge (Kl) and (K2). The accepted 
nature of such a metaphysics opens the door to utilization 
of its possibilities. If such possibilities are 
reflectively considered, they can be explicitly 
incorporated into means of action to more fully achieve 
the moral results man desires (but finds he does not 
completely reach in actuality).
It is cautioned that (K3) is still a wide and open 
mode of knowledge that Hegel was surely aware of when he 
defined religion as "the elevation of human thought 
towards the infinite". (Schlitt, xv, chapter four, 92)
My chief objective in this thesis is to submit 
concepts that are sound because they essentially utilize 
the application of the scientific method of (K2), the 
5 D's, and use them appropriately in their methodology 
and resultant conclusions. The 5 D's apply to the other 
two modes of knowledge (Kl and K3) as well as to the 
interrelationships that are potentially capable of 
existing between and among all three modes. The testing 
of all modes (in the pragmatic sense of content being 
found as equivalent to the created thought structure being 
existentially actualized) is necessary. Corroborative 
evidence (showing the reliability of the judged mode of 
actions to achieve the predicted future results) allows 
rational justification of the true structural forms of 
thought to be considered as equivalent to the content
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found within the end effect desired to be achieved.
My proposals of different means of corroborating 
the correctness of one's actions to achieve a desired 
result (moral or otherwise) are not new. Each mode of 
knowledge will essentially use the same 5D methodology 
but differ in the particular means of justifying the 
conclusions and content as they are used to solve problems 
falling within the applicable mode and/or combinations of 
modes appropriate for their solutions. (11)
The paradigm has been established to be a means by 
which the teleological or final purposes and goals of 
individuals can be most practically and effectively 
accomplished. Such a claim can only be made with the 
provision that the concepts constituting the current 
model are ones that remain open and flexible to future 
changes. Such changes will be needed to meet the changing 
internal and external conditions which are yet to come in 
this evolving world of nature and spirit in which mankind 
dwells.
All proponents of change should encourage those who 
are reluctant to accept change at least to give all open 
systems (capable of being updated without losing their 
basic truths) a chance. They ask that others try them 
experientially and experimentally. If pragmatic testing 
shows their failure to achieve the desired results, they 
can be abandoned, or revised sufficiently to maintain 
their old viability.
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SECTION FOUR 
MODERN MOVEMENTS IN COUNSELING THAT 
SUBSTANTIATE THE UTILIZATION OF 
HEGELIAN CONCEPTS IN MODELS 
DESIGNED TO HELP PERSONS 
IN PROBLEM SOLVING AND 
PROBLEM MANAGEMENT.
Gerald Egan, author of The Skilled Helper - A 
Systematic Approach to Effective Helping, has written over 
a dozen books. (12) A professor of Psychology and 
Organizational Studies at Loyola University of Chicago, 
Egan currently teaches and writes in many areas including 
communications, counseling, organization effectiveness, 
and the management of change and innovation.
A comprehensive study of his 1990 book, The 
Skilled Helper, will provide readers with an extensive 
corroboration of the Hegelian dialectic as being a 
meaningful, flexible, and reliable conceptual structure— a 
basic ground structure that provides a common ground (K3) 
for the union of subjective (Kl) and objective (K2) forms 
of knowledge.
Egan sees a general movement, in the many forms of 
counseling and psychotherapy today, to consolidate the 
good ideas and establish an integrative set of what he 
calls 'converging themes'. A set of such principles, and 
methodologies would constitute the basis for what Egan 
tells us others would like to see as the future 
establishment of a 'common paradigm'. Egan and others see 
such a paradigm as a synthesis of several methods that can 
meaningfully guide its users in what they do. {Egan,14)
For Egan, helping others is a process of education where
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the goal of such help is measured by the learning achieved 
by the client. He defines learning as "What takes place 
when options are increased". (Egan, 6) Certainly, the 
movements of the Hegelian dialectic are designed to 
flexibly adjust to changing situations and to maximize the 
options potentially available to achieve a given goal.
The following schematic and explanation of my 
paradigm does not include any guidance for the training 
and accomplishment of communication skills. Such skills 
are necessary for any helper to effectively pass on to 
others the ability to: (1) efficiently utilize this
paradigm in the development of the client's ability to set 
goals; (2) solve problems and; (3) maintain a high level 
of effectiveness in the face of changing conditions. 
Therefore, Egan's book is recommended to supplement my 
paradigm by its teaching of those communication skills 
necessary to accomplish the purpose of this thesis.
SECTION FIVE 
PARADIGM SCHEMATIC INCORPORATING THE 
5D'S AND THE HEGELIAN 'NOTION' IN 
THE MODES OF KNOWLEDGE (Kl) ,
(K2), (K3), AND THEIR
COMBINATIONS.
entities unable 
to be unified 
in (D)
(C)-- (C)
(C)—
V /
(Al)
(A2)
Al
(A)
Kl
(B)
K2
(D) (E,F. G, . . . ) (T)
K3 = Unity of Kl and K2
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The letters (A, B, C, D, E,F,G.. and H) in the
above schematic designate the stages of the reasoning
process in the establishment of human goals and the most 
effective means of achieving them. Their explanations and 
relationships will be expressed in terms or concepts that 
this thesis has put in modal terminology and subsumed 
under the three modes of knowledge known as (Kl), (K2),
and (K3).
Before the fuller explanation of the schematic from
an epistomological view (or that of the knower seeking to
know entities within him/her-self and/or the external 
world of existent entities), we need to be constantly 
aware of the vital point of Hegel's 'Notion'. The vital 
point is his ontological development of the being of 
existent entities in the externalized world of nature.
Such entities are seen originally as 'others' in 
their opposition as objective (K2s) to the being of 
any subjective self (Kl). So, considered as the content 
of our selves and of other beings in the world, Hegel's 
'Notion' goes through the stages of the schematic in the 
following manner: (1) The (A) stage of the schematic is
the immediacy stage of the being of reason itself; (2) The 
stage labeled (B) is the process of thought in developing 
its own content and structural nature simultaneously. The 
process at this stage is the mediation stage of thought 
itself as it develops towards its completion as the 
Absolute Idea or Divine Subjectivity (God as the ground of 
all subsequent being in and out of this natural world);
(3) The stage labeled (D) is the unity of being in its
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immediacy as stage (A) with its mediation with its 
'otherness' in stage (B). This unity of the previous two 
stages is accomplished by self-mediation of thought 
itself; (4) Stage (C) in the schematic represents the 
abolishment of that aspect of being in the natural world 
which cannot be reconciled and brought into the unity 
found in the self-mediation of the stage called (D);
(5) Stages E, F, G, .... represent the content (being) of 
those singular entities called human beings as they 
progress in thought (spirit) by various methods to 
achieve the content (nature of their being) in the 
ultimate goal or purpose of their singular being. That 
goal is stage (T).
To help relate the connectivity of the knower to 
the known, we recall that Hegel concluded that reason as 
object (essence) (K2) is from the side of being. Reason 
as subject (Kl) is reason seen from the side of the 
knower. The stages of the above schematic are united by 
the concept into the unity known as (K3). In the complete 
structure of the 'Notion', we find that in any being of 
completed thought about itself, the form is the content, 
and the content is the form.
Because persons are concerned with the practical 
application of the Hegelian 'Notion' to improve their 
adaptions to the modern world and its rapidly changing 
condition, details of the stages will be now expressed in 
terms applicable for the usage of modern man in his daily 
life.
Explanations of the letters used (and the flow of
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thought in the establishment of a final goal and the means 
of achieving it) in the above schematic of the thesis 
paradigm are as follows:
(A) is the subjective self associated with the mode 
of knowledge defined in this thesis as (Kl). D1 or digging 
out basic data would take place initially in (A). (Al) 
represents the subject's internal potentialities logically 
possible, but not actualized. It also contains 
potentialities previously considered but rejected from 
the united synthesis of (Kl) and (K2) known as (K3). (A2) 
represents the basic ground of subjective knowledge that 
includes the (Kl's) acceptance of (K2's) input through
(K3) reflection and the return to (Kl) of the resultant 
unity of (Kl) and (K2). This subjective self is an ever 
growing base in which the subject's potentialities change 
into actualities in the continual movement of reason from 
(Kl) through (K2) by means of (K3). In this manner, the 
dialectic method gives itself an ever increasing and 
flexible base of alternatives from which to select the 
best way (pragmatically and ethically) to achieve the 
subject's teleological goals.
(B) signifies that mode of knowledge (K2) which 
is two-fold: (1) the objective knowledge of the external 
world; and (2) those creative aspects of the 
subjective-self which are initially recognized by (A) as 
being different and contrary to it. Continuation of D1 
plus D2 (deliberation) would take place during the 
attempts of (A) to reconcile the apparent conflict between 
the (A) and (B) aspects of a self.
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(C) represents any data rejected by (A) of the 
information presented through (B) and mediated by the (K3) 
mode of knowledge. It represents material I gave the name 
of 'Transcendental Entropic Residue' (or 'TER')— (refer 
back to chapter five, pages 124-127 for further details.)
(D) represents the internal dialogue in which 
attempts are made to reconcile the differences between (A) 
and (B) in (A's) attempt to establish a unified basic 
decision upon which a realistic final goal can be 
formulated. This final goal is designated in the diagram 
as (T).
(D) also represents the positive results of Dl, D2, 
and D3, under unifying role of (K3), to find a common 
ground between (A) and (B). The role of the will of the 
subjective self determines what degree of unity between 
(A) and (B) is needed before a specified goal (final 
end result designated as [T]) is accepted (without further 
reconsideration). All five D's should take place in the 
dialogue of stage (D). If the goal (T) is found to be 
both practical and possible, then reason proceeds towards 
its final goal by way of the stage indicated by (E,F,G, 
etc.)
(E,F,G, etc.) represent the various alternative 
means which reason finds capable of individually or 
collectively achieving the goal. In the consideration of 
each of these potential alternatives, moral aspects 
(as well as material means) need to be subjected to the 
'five D' steps of the scientific method as they apply to 
the respective mode of knowledge under consideration. The
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single or collective means by which the end goal is to be 
reached then constitute the path(s) of actualization the 
originating thoughts created in their formulation of the 
end goal (T), and of the means to achieve (T). The 
subsequent actualized actions, based on these originating 
concepts, will eventually coalesce and produce the end 
product, or content of the final goal (T).
Stage (T) may be called the teleological aim 
inasmuch as it logically precedes the beginning of 
determining the most effective and practical means of 
achieving this goal of the subject. Many goals of the 
subjective-self require a lifetime to achieve, and they 
are therefore subject to continuous revision to meet 
changing conditions. It may be that the means by which 
they are to be achieved must undergo revision to meet 
future changes in the person and/or his/her external 
environment. In either, or both cases, the whole process 
of reason (as indicated by the above paradigm) needs to be 
undertaken again (and tested by the corroborative means 
appropriate to each mode of knowledge).
It is felt by this author that in his individual 
testing of the principles involved and utilized in the 
order given by the schematic of the thesis's final 
paradigm, the model has justified itself as going on 
beyond that 'common paradigm' being sought by 
psychotherapists. Those who oppose Egan's (to me,
Hegelian) synthesis of methods fear that one helping 
system would be imposed on everyone and diversity would be 
lost. (Egan,14) However, if honestly utilized, the thesis
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paradigm is capable of the flexibility needed for all 
three modes of knowledge and their combinations. It will 
give us the basic foundation for the testing and updating 
of the model itself.
The author intends to utilize this paradigm in the 
teaching of its principles to those volunteer helpers in 
the hospice program. Communication skills and other 
factors found to be pertinent in this field will be sought 
out and the appropriate personnel to train the volunteer 
helpers in all of these areas must be found and utilized 
to make such a program successful.
Then, the appropriately trained field helpers can 
help the survivors of terminally ill cancer patients to 
become more proficient in the management of daily life 
problems and concerns. It is expected that the feedback 
from the field will allow this model to be adjusted in 
order to increase its usefulness in the future.
SECTION SIX 
UTILIZATION OF PARADIGM IN AUTHOR'S 
VOLUNTEER CARE-GIVER WORK IN THE 
CLARK COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT 
HOSPICE PROGRAM
The author intends to utilize this paradigm in his 
own volunteer care-giver work and eventually in the 
teaching of its principles to other volunteer care-givers 
in the Clark County Health District Hospice Program. 
Volunteer care-givers are a part of an interdisciplinary 
team. This team basically consists of a physician-directed 
and nurse-coordinated program to provide supportive care 
to the terminally ill patient and family in a home care 
setting. The Hospice program is designed to give the
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necessary supportive care needed as a result of emotional, 
spiritual, social, physical, and economic stresses 
engendered during the final stages of illness. (See 
APPENDIX III, pages 231-233 for a historical background of 
Clark County Health District Hospice Program.)
Hospice recognizes the need to assess spirituality
issues found in patients and their families. The program
tries to insure that all care-givers get to understand the
relationships between spiritual issues and religious or
non-religious belief. To help do this, Hospice defines
spirituality as:
that which is experienced as a capacity for 
transcending one's working realities (physical, 
sensory, rational, and psychological) in order 
to live and be loved within one's communities,and 
to search for and give meaning to existence while 
coping with the urgent needs of everyday life. (13)
By operating under this broad-based definition of 
spirituality, experienced Hospice workers feel they can 
address the spirituality issue in both non-religious and 
religious areas without imposing any of their beliefs upon 
the patient and family. They feel free to deal with the 
issues presented to them so they may assist others to 
strengthen their inner resources in order to give them 
more meaning to their existence. Therefore, when care is 
given to patients and families who have not had a 
religious affiliation as a part of their daily lives, 
Hospice team members feel they have a goal. This goal is 
to assess and deal with any issues that come up and lie 
within the Hospice definition of spirituality. Hospice 
workers should never try to impose their personal beliefs, 
but are allowed to state them if requested to do so. The
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ideas of those given care and comfort should be listened 
to, but Hospice workers are discouraged from getting into 
any religious debates, for such may often be 
counter-productive to the services offered by Hospice. 
(Self,5)
I believe that by utilizing the paradigm, I can be 
of greater help in assisting care-receivers work through 
any anxieties they express about fate and death, guilt 
and condemnation, and doubt and meaninglessness. I hope 
to let them see that as another self, I have struggled 
and am still struggling to become a more unified self—  
a self in which my expanding (Kl), (K2), and (K3)
modes of knowledge are aiding me to become a more 
self-responsible part of both the physical and the 
spiritual dimensions of the world. These modes, in 
addition to the 5 D methodology of checking out various 
methods of achieving a given goal(s) to be realized by the 
care-receiver, would be used by myself while aiding them. 
The paradigm itself would only be brought to the care 
receiver's specific attention if he/she expressed a desire 
to discuss it— otherwise, it would be held 'behind the 
scenes'.
For example, about seven years ago, I was a 
care-giver for a 72 year old engineer who was diagnosed 
as terminally ill with a brain tumor. John was a strong 
individual who did not want to appear weak to his family. 
His religious background was one in which authoritative 
church authorities dictated legal requirements necessary 
to be met or one was eternally damned. He rebuked such
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legalism and separated himself from active church 
participation. I was able to strike a close relationship 
with John very shortly, as we were both professional 
scientists in our respective fields. After hearing about 
his religious background from his concerned family, I 
gradually shared with John a world view based upon my 
conviction of being accepted by the ground of all Being or 
God. John and I communicated well. By my willingness to 
share weaknesses I was working to overcome, I was accepted 
by him as a caring individual who was accepting him as he 
was, without any judgment. John eventually realized that 
by withholding and not sharing some of his doubts, fears 
and weaknesses with his family, he was preventing them 
from giving him the deeper sense of peace, trust, and 
acceptance which he needed to help him courageously face 
his eventual mortal death. Upon taking the risk of a much 
deeper sharing, John found the family acceptance he 
previously felt would not be there for him if he were to 
let them know him as he really was.
Needless to say, both John and the family were 
strengthened by new ties. John passed away shortly 
thereafter, but some spiritual needs were brought out into 
the open and met in a very comforting way for all the 
family.
This event took place before my research work in 
the Institute for Ethics & Policy Studies (and the 
establishment of my paradigm as a result). I did not have 
an opportunity to get into a serious dialogue with John on 
the effectiveness of the paradigm to rationally reconcile 
the opposition between the 'faith' (subjective) and
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'reason' (objective) aspects of the human mind.
If that opportunity had been available, I am sure 
both of us would have elevated our finite reasoning powers 
towards the infinite even more than we did in our open 
exchanges about ultimate matters of concern that we shared 
together. I would have told him that I had a vital key to 
aid me in making and carrying out decisions I had to make 
about life (especially in areas of morality and my 
personal existence as a self looking for purpose and 
meaning in life). This key could be understood as an 
open-ended paradigm. Its basic structure would use the 
5 D's of scientific methodology (D1 = dig; D2 = 
deliberate; D3 = decide; D4 =do; and D5 = debug), and 
apply them to each of the three modes of knowledge which I 
would identify to him as being: (1) a (Kl) mode of self,
which is a subjective self whose uniqueness and potential 
autonomy is (by the very act of its existence) in a 
constant state of becoming what its desired essentiality 
seeks to be; (2) a (K2) aspect of self (objective side of 
self) which would be not only a way of recognizing unique 
differences within the oneness of each living entity, but 
also include that aspect of oneself that is in unity and 
participation with other entities by sharing common 
values. This (K2) aspect of oneself would also include 
other things that seem to be different, impersonal, 
objects to be viewed without having personal 
interrelationships; and (3) All aspects of the (Kl) and 
the (K2) modes of knowledge implicitly contain parts of 
(K3). (K3) is that mode of knowledge which is the basic
210
ground of unity between the (Kl) and (K2) inodes.
Later, as we discussed issues such as death and 
loss of self-being, I would have brought up the acronym 
'UPTU'. I would have explained to him that it stood for 
the power of being that underlies, penetrates, transforms, 
and unifies all departments of human knowledge. As such, 
it stands for the power of Being-Itself— the power that is 
expressed in the very act-of-being of everything which 
'is1. This power (or ground of being) is found as 
grounding all aspects of the (K3) mode of knowledge, and 
can be recognized within oneself as being a different 
manner of grounding for man's inclinations and virtues 
(such as courage to be and to become).
Thomas Aquinas integrates the three modes of 
knowledge in a helpful way. He sees such virtues as being 
found in a subjective self's (Kl) own powers of will and 
desire. These virtues are embodied in oneself in a manner 
so as to be in a non-conceptual accord with it. (15)
Saint Thomas sees the (Kl) mode as that which is in union 
with or co-natured with the (K3) mode of knowledge so that 
(Kl) and (K2) aspects of the human self are not in 
conflict, but the intellect (K2) works in conjunction with 
the affective inclinations (Kl) and the dispositions of 
the autonomous human will. When we are asked to explain 
the integrative or, to him, "connatural" knowledge (K3), 
the very nature of it makes it incapable of being reduced 
to the abstract concepts which constitute the (K2) mode of 
knowledge.
With St. Thomas, I see mankind as continually
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trying to grasp K31s elusive totality in its infinitude.
Man does this by calling such a ground of being by a name, 
such as God or Intelligent Creator of all there is, or the 
Divine Subjectivity. In spite of the difficulties involved 
with noun-concepts, which are abstractions from entities 
that 'are' by their very existence, we can have a general 
structure within which we can progress in our search for 
knowledge of the ultimate. We can define it in a very 
limited sense by calling this (K3) mode of knowledge as 
that power of Being-Itself which underlies, penetrates, 
unifies, and transforms the finite self as subsumed under 
the modes of knowledge which fall under the categories of 
(Kl) or subjective-self, and (K2) as the objective 
'other'. 'Other' (in the case of the ultimate concerns of 
one's own being now threatened by physical death) would 
stand for the other aspect of self which is becoming or 
being considered via the process of the 5 D's to carry 
forward the process of becoming.
The paradigm schematic illustrates the progression 
of thought movements starting from the (Kl) mode of 
knowledge through the (K2) mode. Critical reflection upon 
any apparent contradiction between these two modes is 
where the underlying aspects of (K3) (in response to one's 
intentional reflection) bring about the internal unity of 
the various aspects of oneself. In the process of change 
within oneself (as well as change due to the external 
changing environment), an updated feedback of new 
information will be necessary to start back at home base 
(Kl of subjective-self) and repeat the '5D' steps in each
of the three inodes of knowledge.
This recycling can start from either end; (1) a 
creative postulate of potential becoming from which 
deductive processes via the 5D's can occur; or (2) from 
observation of external facts of one's conscious World and 
an inductive process to reach potential universals or 
knowledge posited under the mode called (K2). Following 
Hegel, this schematic is used in a dialectical manner.
The dialectic process is one which not only includes both
methods of reasoning (inductive and deductive), but also 
leaves the door open for further cycles of dialectic
employing the 5 'D's and the (Kl), (K2), and (K3) modes of
knowledge available to the finite human mind.
John would have understood this quickly. Others 
(who had unexpressed or unknown religious convictions and 
a non-scientific background) could be given the same 
information, but in language they could understand and 
learn to apply so they could achieve a purposeful way of 
living while still physically alive. For example, John 
raised beautiful roses which he cultivated, cared for, and 
participated with them as if parts of himself. John and 
others could be shown this as an example of the beauty and 
goodness that results in the unification of all the 
various parts (many) of the whole unique rose plant. Its 
roots could be seen as in unity with a larger unity 
(water, soil, sunlight, etc.), so as to constitute 
the basic essence which in its becoming would be actuated 
into branches, leaves, and finally the roses themselves. 
Beauty has been defined as the unification of the variates
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(the many). The whole plant itself needs each of its 
various (many) parts which are unified to reach its 
teleological (end) goal, or the production of the 
beautiful flower. It, the flower, is recognized by human 
thought as completed essence and therefore good in its 
perfection. So man can understand that in nature, beauty, 
truth, and goodness are universal attributes that man 
himself can comprehend. For such comprehension, the 
objects need to have actualized their full essential 
potentialities (as essential structures within which 
changes ultimately complete the process from uncompleted 
actuality to full actuality).
Man, in his finite reason and spirit, has the 
potentiality to utilize his autonomous will. In spite of a 
contingent external world, a person can be conceptualized 
as a spiritual creature who has infinite possibilities to 
play a significant part in his/her essential growth— a 
growth in which they can participate as both an individual 
part and as a participating part of a dimension (spirit or 
reason) of life that transcends the physical world in 
which we currently find ourselves.
Such a view helps to establish hope for a 
continuation of being in a dimension beyond our time-space 
world, and gives a person the courage to be what they 
desire to be, or to become in spite of impending physical 
death. Such a step requires risk and hopefully, an 
internal corroboration of being supported by the very 
power of Being-Itself when one takes such a risk and dares 
to become beyond that which one now 'is'.
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A care-receiver may desire such a dialectical 
examination of current beliefs they hold (and their 
corroboration by a group holding similar conclusions).
It is recognized by care-givers that many persons 
having a terminal illness have not been open with 
anybody concerning issues such as a belief in a 
Being-Itself who is in, under, and beyond the finite 
temporal world in which we exist. As indicated previously, 
all of us need to feel we are accepted by others. To 
insure this, we often hide from others (and ourselves) 
those weaker parts of ourselves that we are ashamed of or 
feel guilty about. Any relationship between a care-giver 
and a care-receiver is a unique and variable one.
Listening and accepting the care-receiver as he/she is 
(with out judgment) will establish a deeper relationship. 
Hopefully, it will be a relationship that enables the 
care-receiver to holistically ([Kl] and [K2] united by way 
of [K3]) believe that God (ground of Being-Itself) will 
receive him/her in the same fashion she/he have been 
received by another concerned and loving human being.
If any of the above is brought out and mutually 
shared, then that care-receiver can be reassured by the 
testimony of other beings in similar situations ("We tell 
you these things we have seen and heard in order that you 
might know what you believe.") (N.T. I John 1:3) We all 
seek assurances that any decisive course we have chosen to 
pursue for the remainder of our mortal lives is one in 
which we are acting, not only as (Kl) selves, but are also 
acting in unity with our (K2)s. Such (K2)s work not only
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in cooperation with our (Kl)s, but also in participation 
and unity with others.
This author has applied the paradigm to the faith 
aspect of self (Kl) as well as the (K2) or objective part 
of my being. I have accepted the Tillichean definition of 
both 'faith' and 'religion' as being "the state of being 
grasped by the power of Being-Itself." (Tillich, C. to Be. 
173) We need to see that this concept of Being-Itself is 
not another being, but is the intelligent and spiritual 
source, power, and ground of all being. Even the courage 
of despair (which comes from not being able to see any 
hope or meaning in the existent world in which we live) is 
grounded in the power of Being-Itself. One must be 
existing in order to courageously declare that life as 
existence is only what one, alone in one's absolute 
freedom, makes oneself into essentially what he/she is in 
this temporal and existent world.
For an example of an application of the paradigm to 
the religious realm, we can look at the New Testament 
scripture II Timothy Chapter One. There we are told that 
"God does not give us a Spirit of fear, but gives us a 
Spirit of love, a Spirit of power, and a Spirit of a sound 
mind." John and I could have scrutinized the elements of 
this idea of Spirit. With John, I would have started on 
the sound mind (objective reason or [K2]) of man, and 
identified the Spirit of Love as the (K3) found 
underlying, penetrating, transforming, and unifying both 
(K2) and (K2)— doing all this within and between (K2) and 
(Kl) as they progress in the process of becoming greater
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integral parts of the sound mind promised to those who 
seek unity with the ground of their being. The Spirit of 
power would be also be primarily associated with the mode 
of knowledge called (K3) in the paradigm.
We could have mutually and methodically inquired 
into the basic questions of being asked by a self which 
finds itself in a world of which it is a part. The basic 
structure of a being which inquires into its own being is 
found in a self that has a world that is grasped and 
linked together by the human mind. We could have really 
looked at the polarities that start from the polarity of 
subjective self (Kl) and its other (K2) as the objective 
and external world in which the self finds itself. From 
there, other polar elements can be considered, such as 
freedom and destiny, finitude and infinity, universal 
(many) and the singular (one as complete self). In the 
progressive examination of these polarities, we could 
come to see what Hegel gave to the world when he proposed 
the 'Identity of the Opposites'. No pole of any polarity 
can exist without its opposite pole. Therefore we can 
rationally seek for that unity or common ground that 
exists in spite of the differences of the opposite poles 
of any given polarity. We could have shared basic tenets 
of any of our convictions and accepted or debugged our 
eventual conclusions for this given time (and contingent 
factors found therein). We would have applied the 
schematic paradigm proposed in this chapter. The 5 D 
steps (applied diligently in each movement of reason) 
would have allowed us to spot errors, search for other
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possibilities, debug, and cyclically run the dialectic 
again and again eliminating the contradictory factors. 
Eventually, we could have arrived at a mutual acceptance 
of that which would be the best possible goal of our 
problem and the best means of reaching it in a useful as 
well as ethical manner.
Such a basic view would be primarily sought as a 
base upon which to build our concepts involved in matters 
of ultimate concern to us. When accepted, we then have to 
live with them, die with them, and find the best ways we 
can to achieve any sort of progress towards reaching our
ultimate moral goals in and beyond mortal life.
I do not have any reservations about the usefulness 
of the paradigm to provide a means by which the user can 
become more self-responsible and self-determined in 
achieving a personal and meaningful philosophy of life 
(world view), though of course, I am fallible and need to
update the art of using it just as others should.
If called upon to justify my own meaningful 
philosophy of life, I most certainly would relate a 
corroboration of it by use of the paradigm proposed in 
this thesis. The paradigm would be explained by way of 
analogy and language found to be understandable by the 
inquirer. It would then be hoped that he/she could 
comprehend that by use of the reflection needed in the 
(K3) process, a basic unity between a person's opposing 
views (subjective and objective) can be found and grasped. 
Doubts and/or conflicts by the questioner can be openly 
and honestly reflected upon (via K3 in the paradigm
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schematic) when the care-receiver is secure in the 
non-judgmental acceptance given by the care-giver. If so, 
it may be possible that the struggler can come to see 
(as previously stated) that he/she can maintain their 
perceived individuality and still be in a purposeful 
unity— a unity with Being-Itself (that which is the 
source of all entities) which is in and yet transcends 
finite existence.
I expect to document carefully the results of 
utilizing the paradigm in the assessment of and the aid 
given to the care-receivers in respect to their universal 
and also unique spiritual needs. Results will be 
summarized and documented on an extensive evaluation form 
that each volunteer now fills out. This form includes 
space for and encourages suggested changes (or 
documentation of new material to be incorporated) to both 
the training given and suggested manual procedures 
provided to aid the volunteers.
Examples of specific cases can corroborate how my 
paradigm was used as a systematic methodological inquiry 
into different alternative ways to present basic materials 
and information given to help care-receivers reach their 
goals— goals that were determined to be realistic ones 
by subjecting each to the 5 'D' methodology and the 
methodology based upon a modified form of the Hegelian 
dialectic. In this manner, the care-giver can corroborate 
if the basic procedures given in the training and guidance 
manual are maximally sufficient in each specific case. If 
not, by using the paradigm, one can seek out and test
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alternatives. Then the best 'fit' alternative can be shown 
to and utilized by the user to afford maximum 
effectiveness in support of his/her needs. I am confident 
that the paradigm's usefulness, when adequately 
documented, will result in its incorporation into the 
overall program as an effective tool— a tool that Hospice 
can utilize in its efforts to provide maximum care and 
comfort to those it serves.
In conclusion, my paradigm was designed to be a 
foundational tool to help correct old views, or to 
reformulate another world view in lieu of world views 
which have not given morally satisfactory answers to the 
user's sincere search to find a moral meaning and purpose 
in life. The paradigm should be seen as a tool that allows 
objective reason (K2) to be combined with a reasoning 
found in the subjective mode of knowledge (Kl) under the 
unifying principles identified in this thesis as belonging 
to a third mode of knowledge called (K3).
Rudolph Otto wrote a book called The Idea of the 
Holy. (14) He stated that he did not oppose reverent
minds interpreting divine nature via ethical and rational 
categories. Otto felt these categories, although an 
essential part of the content of what we call sacred, are 
not the whole of it. If either the (Kl) or the (K2) mode 
of human knowledge is addressed exclusively, it promotes 
the extreme opposition of the other mode. Otto made room 
for a common ground between the two modes without having 
either losing its respective differences. The translator 
(Harvey) noted that Blaise Pascal (a famous mathematician)
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in the seventeenth century pointed out the same danger.
John Harvey quoted Pascal as saying:
If one subjects everything to reason [K2], 
our religion will lose its mystery and its 
supernatural character. If one offends the 
principles of reason, our religion will be 
absurd and ridiculous ... There are two 
equally dangerous extremes, to shut reason 
out [K2] and to let nothing else [Kl and K3] 
in. (14)
An inherent drive for knowledge that lets mankind 
make sense out of life and death still goes on. A risk is 
always involved when one determines what he/she is and 
will eventually become, and then acts on this conviction 
to achieve life-goals. Adaptations to meet the 
contingencies of life yet to come will be necessary to 
find and utilize the most effective way(s) possible to 
achieve a meaningful existence in our striving to live 
daily in a moral and responsible manner. All 
methodologies to aid a person require that they be 
flexible and open ended to significant and relevant 
changes. This thesis paradigm includes flexible 
methodologies to insure its practical usefulness to any 
user. By fully utilizing the paradigm, a person can 
play a significant and responsible part in becoming 
that which one feels he/she is ultimately destined to be.
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APPENDIX I
EXAMPLES CORROBORATING FREE WILL OF 
MAN IN CHAPTER 3, SECTION FIVE
When Laplacian determinism was accepted, which was 
prior to 1900, this analogy was used to illustrate the 
deterministic point of view. A stone which is thrown into 
the air might think it is free, but rational man knows it 
is bound by cause and effect, the cause being gravity. The 
stone is therefore not free to act as it chooses. Rational 
man may feel free, in the same way, but those who believe 
the natural world (including man) is determined by natural 
laws also think that man only believes he is free. The 
deterministic observer feels he possesses a deeper 
knowledge of the natural world, and does not find freedom 
as being real. It is seen as being illusory and a 
subjective reaction to one's refusal or inability to reach 
objective reality. (A reasonable explanation of how a 
deterministic view is right in some situations and wrong 
in others will be given in the Hegelian chapter.)
However a statistical determinism replaced 
the Laplacian determinism about 1900. Chance alone is 
the prime mover in this form of determinism, but the 
statistical laws of randomness allows a theoretical 
possibility of fluctuations capable of eventually 
contradicting the known laws of probability.
Lecomte du Nouy, a French biologist, in his book 
Human Destiny, gives us this statistical argument and
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conclusion on the stone versus man analogy. (End Note 5 
of chapter three) A stone might not fall, but in 
experience, it always does. On logical grounds, the 
analogy is fallacious and unsound because the two events , 
man and stone, cannot be compared as if being in the same 
category.
The stone's notion of freedom is univocal (only one 
possibility) and man in his dual nature has two 
possibilities— (1) to obey his natural world sense 
impulses and inclinations and; (2) to freely reject such 
impulses and choose to follow a maxim in accordance with 
reason's input to his will.
Kant accepts this duality in man, but states the 
idea of freedom must be presupposed to be able to 
autonomously act in favor of pure practical reason's 
choice to follow the laws of the intelligible world. Kant 
also told us that we can experience and know the end 
results (effects), but we can not know the suppositions of 
the intelligible world which gives us universally valid 
laws.
The deterministic observer, under the Laplacian 
deterministic viewpoint, said a deeper knowledge of the 
world shows freedom is not real and is only a subjective 
reaction to one's inability to reach objective reality.
Let those still subscribing to such a view consider du 
Nouy's explanation of an experimentally and corroborative 
means of establishing evidence for man's freedom— freedom 
from those man made laws established from the current 
scale of observation in our natural world.
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If we agree with the above reasoning and premises, 
a statistical law, if no bias is introduced, allows each 
of two choices (calling the results of a flip of a coin) 
to determine heads or tails), to be equally possible.
Therefore, man has no freedom of choice between two
determinations of equal possibility. But man is not a rock 
nor a coin. Experiments and our practical life experiences 
show us that there is a large difference in the number of
people choosing to act— act according to values arrived at
by reason in the intelligible world and the number of 
people choosing to act according to their natural desires 
and inclinations as a members of the natural world. If a 
difference exists in the numbers of people in each 
category, the choices are not equally probable.
One could call this smaller number in the above 
example a fluctuation of those choosing the path of 
intelligible moral evolution. However, a fluctuation is 
not determined, but on the basis of the fluctuation's 
statistical definition, it is a fluctuation entirely due 
to chance. Therefore, logic can only proceed in one 
direction, and to the following conclusion. The attitude 
of man or his intent to go against his animalistic 
nature is not a pre-determined intent or attitude. The 
only other alternative is that man is free— he has an 
autonomy of will to make or deny the choice of going along 
with a rational being's concept— a concept of a natural 
deterministic law that tells him he has no such choice 
available to him.
It is my conviction that if Kant had a modern
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scientific background, he would not have had to resort to 
speculative reason to show the possibility of presupposing 
the freedom of the will. His speculative approach was 
possible because such a possibility did not involve itself 
in a contradiction with the principle of natural necessity 
in the inner connection of appearances in the world of 
sense.
In the sense of the world, one can speak 
realistically only about the objects perceived on the 
human being's scale of observation. Such a scale limited 
by man's unaided senses and the extension of those senses 
by scientific instruments has been very prolific in recent 
years. Each time it has, the pseudo-natural laws (made by 
man) have had to become modified or even reversed. Newer 
models (that are now called paradigms) to utilize the new 
information are then made. Therefore, we have no 
logical reason for not anticipating other possible 
reversals of cause and effect laws in the intelligible 
world under given circumstances not yet established.
An example of the reversal of a deterministic law 
stating that equal pressure is exerted by a gas upon on 
all inner surfaces of any leakproof container is this—
On a scale of observation in the molecular realm, random 
movement of gas molecules will exert unequal pressures 
exerted by them in a vessel comparable in size to the 
molecules of gas. (De Nouy DM, 40)
At a microscopic level, let twenty molecules be 
contained in a micro size barbell container such as an 
hour glass with the containers at each end capable of
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holding twenty molecules. These containers are connected 
to each other by a narrow tube whose diameter was such the 
molecules would have to go through single file. According 
to our natural world law of equal pressure, the random 
action of the molecules would find ten in each bulb on 
the ends and none in the process of passing from one side 
to the other. Randomness at this microscopic level would 
find equal numbers of molecules (pressure) in each bulb 
the exception rather than the rule.
APPENDIX II
MATHEMATICAL FACTORS INVOLVED 
IN EQUATING HEGEL'S 'ALL'
WITH HIS 'MANY'
In simplified terms, as in objective mathematics, 
the whole (one) is equal to the sum of its parts (many). 
It is my belief that our 'hang-up1 in accepting this form 
of abstract thinking comes from assuming the term 
'identical' (or equal) means there is no difference 
between those entities deemed identical. Hegel's 
'Identity of the Opposites' can now make more sense to 
us by our own experience of its practicality. We can now 
perceive that the terms being called equivalent contain 
the same number of the basic units of measurement. For 
example, 50 cents plus 2 quarters is equivalent and 
identical in value to a one dollar bill. We can 
perceive that the one bill is yet different by its 
oneness while identical in its equivalent value. The 
external appearances (show) are different, yet the common 
ground (internally speaking) is that both sides of this 
'Identity of the Opposites' contain the same basic number 
of units we call cents or pennies.
Mankind tends to think in terms of that which can 
be shown to be equal (identities such as 8 = 5 + 3). 
Reason (in the (K2) sense) seeks control by being able to 
get the same results or effects each time by working with 
relationships where causes are known and unchangeable.
In such situations, the effects can be reliably predicted.
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However, coming up with an equation that reflects 
the inexhaustible alternatives that a rational and 
moralistic human being could consider (when deciding upon 
a 'maxim of choice' in arriving at a moral goal to work 
toward achieving) is much more complex. Such an equation 
should never be considered as analogous to those equations 
used in the world of finite necessity and the 
relationships between such finitely necessitated objects.
A 'First Intelligence' of pure thought, pure 
self-determination, and pure self-development can never be 
limited to an abstract 'finitely necessitated' concept.
The postulate of the 'Notion', in its pure form, 
pertains only to the self-generating movements found 
within the first cause itself. As a part of this first
cause, each individual constitutes a part of the original
whole; but the sum of all current parts does not equal the
'All'. Instead, in mathematical terminology, the
equivalent equation of the original 'All' is equal to the 
sum of its many (infinite?) parts at a given time 'now', 
plus the infinite and mysterious potentialities of the 
'nothingness' found within the ground of Being-Itself. 
These unpredictable potentialities are not irrational 
ones, but are logically possible for the selective choices 
made by the First Cause. The following paragraph is a 
brief mathematical derivation of this equation.
A mathematical equation that contains an infinite 
number of potential (but not yet expressed alternative 
ways an infinitely free entity possesses) put in a form of 
the 'All' (as one) equal to the sum of the particular
parts of the 'All' plus the infinite not yet actualized 
particulars is as follows: In as brief a symbolic form as 
we can make;
Let A (as 'All') - [minus] (nothings yet to become ....as
XI,X2.X3, Xnth) = the sum of (actualized
particulars [and currently becoming actualized 
particulars] as Xla,X2a X3a.... X[nth]a). We may 
algebraically add the expression (nothings yet to become 
XI,X2,X3.... Xnth) to both sides of the equation. This 
merely shifts the mystery of the yet to become (as 
particulars) from the left side of above equation (called 
the 'All' side) to the side of the sum of the particulars. 
Thus we have the equation A= (Sum of Xla,X2a ...X[nth]a] + 
[plus] [XI,X2...Xnth]). Either form of the above 
mathematical equation represents what the words of the 
previous paragraph attempted to portray. The purpose of 
this illustration is to point out that simplification can 
lead to loss of comprehension unless complex wholes are 
known and understood before the reduction of them to 
abstract conceptual expressions is made.
APPENDIX III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLARK 
COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT 
HOSPICE PROGRAM
During my active involvement as a volunteer 
care-giver during 1987-88, I was not utilized in the 
post-bereavement period of the survivors of the deceased.
A need in this area of care (that I felt could be 
fulfilled by trained volunteer care-givers) was the basis 
of my original intent to submit my paradigm as a means of 
helping volunteer care-givers aid survivors in their 
readjustment period. This would include helping immediate 
family members become aware of goals they want to reach, 
and to help them find and correct deficiencies needed to 
be overcome to reach goals that are realistically 
achievable.
After completion of my paradigm in February 1994, I 
went to the Coordinator of Volunteer Services, and found 
that volunteer care-givers have a much larger role to play 
(which includes helping survivors in the post-bereavement 
period). Guidance for help in all areas is now included in 
an extensive 39-hour training course for volunteers prior 
to their initial assignment to a Hospice team. Also, a 
loose leaf notebook of detailed standard guidance (472 
pages) and references to additional resources is issued 
to each volunteer. The current training and availability 
of methods to be used includes guidance in areas such as 
stress, pain, communication, dying, self-esteem, mental
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and spiritual preparation for death, and post-death 
planning and support. However, I did not find any guidance 
manual material that proposed a solution to problems 
caused by a person's subjective knowledge (Kl) being in 
opposition to his/her (K2) or objective knowledge. I 
therefore intend to use my paradigm (upon return to being 
a volunteer care-giver) to help those willing to work upon 
a resolution of any such self-conflicts.
To illustrate how my application of the five D's 
and the Hegelian dialectic can be used in conjunction with 
the guidance and data available in the Hospice Notebook 
Manual, I have selected material concerning the religious 
needs of the terminally ill. One article in the guidance 
manual again emphasizes the need for an assessment to be 
made as to where spirituality and/or religion fit in their 
lives and if it will be available to help them meet their 
needs. (Self,8) Religious needs are expressed in this 
article which the author feels are seldom or never openly 
expressed. Mudd (the author) feels these often-hidden 
needs should be addressed.
The first need stated is that of having a 
meaningful philosophy of life. Here, Mudd sees the 
terminally ill asking questions of themselves such as,
"has my life had meaning?" "Am I meaningful to anyone?" 
"Will I be remembered?" He continues by telling us that 
as supportive care-givers we can listen, be a sounding 
board, and show the cared-for that they are meaningful to 
us by our entering into their struggle. Both Mudd and I 
see the care-givers as needing to accept non-judgmatically
whatever way care-receivers find meaning (even if we 
do not agree). Our task as care-givers is to assist 
them in discovering or affirming their own meaningful 
system. (Self, 8)
